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Selecting Scrutiny in Compelled-Speech
Cases Involving Non-Commercial
Expression: The Formulaic Landscape of
a Strict Scrutiny World After Becerra and
Janus, and a First Amendment Interestsand-Values Alternative
Clay Calvert*
This Article examines how courts select the standard of
scrutiny—strict, intermediate, or something akin to rational basis—
in compelled-speech disputes following the United States Supreme
Court’s 2018 rulings in National Institute of Family and Life
Advocates v. Becerra and Janus v. American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees. The compelled-speech doctrine
provides individuals and entities with a qualified First Amendment right not to be forced by the government to convey messages
under certain circumstances. This principle sometimes is referred
to as an unenumerated First Amendment right not to speak.
The Article concentrates on compelled-speech mandates involving non-commercial expression in a factually eclectic collection
of 2019 cases. Specifically, it focuses on the methodologies for
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determining scrutiny and how, in turn, Becerra and Janus influence those tacks. The right-not-to-speak cases addressed here
concern the government requiring: (1) building owners to post small
warning notices about a structure’s construction; (2) real-estate developers to either display or fund public-facing art; (3) newspapers
to disclose facts online about buyers of political advertisements; (4)
groups registering voters to give disclaimers to those with whom
they interact; (5) registered sex offenders to display warning signs
in front of their residences proximate to Halloween; and (6) business operators to create expressive products (wedding invitations
and videos) celebrating same-sex marital unions. Courts selected
strict scrutiny in all but one of these diverse circumstances and
often were influenced by Becerra and/or Janus in doing so, but was
that rigorous standard appropriate? Does its application, in other
words, amount to judicial overkill against the handiwork of lawmakers? The Article argues that if courts in some of these settings
used a First Amendment interests-and-values approach for determining scrutiny—a path favored by Justice Stephen Breyer—instead
of a simplistic, long-standing formula pivoting on whether a law
is content-based or content-neutral, then they might have deployed a less stringent test that better balanced competing interests.
The Article identifies five First Amendment interests and values for
resolving scrutiny in a more nuanced fashion in future compelledspeech disputes.
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INTRODUCTION

Striving to foster awareness of earthquake risks, the City of
Portland, Oregon, adopted laws in 2018 and 2019 affecting owners
of unreinforced masonry buildings.1 The city has approximately
1,600 of such structures.2 Unfortunately, Portland also “has about a
1

Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1292 (D. Or. 2019);
see also id. at 1306 (noting “Defendants’ stated interests in ‘building awareness of seismic
risk’ and promoting public safety”). The 2019 ordinance replaced a prior one adopted in
2018 that affected the owners of such structures. Id. at 1287–88.
2
Elliot Njus, Portland Delays Earthquake Warning Sign Ordinance, OREGONIAN
(Portland), Mar. 1, 2019, at A4.
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one-in-four chance of suffering a major 8.0-or-greater earthquake
in the next fifty years.”3 These edifices are unlikely to withstand
such powerful seismic activity.4 Portland’s Bureau of Emergency
Management warns that unreinforced masonry buildings create “a
great risk for human injury, property damage, and loss of economic
use after an earthquake.”5
The 2019 ordinance, like its 2018 predecessor, required owners
of these buildings to conspicuously post placards measuring eightby-ten inches on their exteriors near main entrances.6 The signs had
to convey the following government-mandated message in at least
fifty-point bold type:
THIS IS AN UNREINFORCED MASONRY
BUILDING.
UNREINFORCED
MASONRY
BUILDINGS MAY BE UNSAFE IN THE EVENT
OF A MAJOR EARTHQUAKE. P.C.C. [Portland
City Code] 24.85.065.7
Portland established definitions of both reinforced and
unreinforced masonry.8 Buildings satisfying specific retrofitting
3

Elliot Njus, Building Owners Seek to Block Warning Sign Ordinance Permanently,
OREGONIAN (Portland), May 15, 2019, at A9 [hereinafter Building Owners]. For purposes
of comparison, the Loma Prieta earthquake, which struck the San Francisco Bay Area in
October 1989, killed sixty-seven people and caused more than $5 billion in damages,
measured 6.9 on the Richter scale. See San Francisco Earthquake of 1989, HISTORY (Dec.
18, 2009), https://www.history.com/topics/natural-disasters-and-environment/1989-sanfrancisco-earthquake [https://perma.cc/RH9P-4PX2].
4
Elliot Njus, Earthquake Warning Ordinance Spurs Lawsuit, OREGONIAN (Portland),
Dec. 21, 2018, at A10.
5
Why Are We Focusing on URMs?, PORTLAND BUREAU OF EMERGENCY MGMT.,
https://www.portlandoregon.gov/pbem/77827 [https://perma.cc/RH9P-4PX2].
6
Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d at 1288.
7
Id.
8
Specifically, Portland defined unreinforced masonry as:
[A]dobe, burned clay, concrete or sand-lime brick, hollow clay or
concrete block, hollow clay tile, rubble and cut stone and unburned
clay masonry that does not satisfy the definition of reinforced
masonry as defined herein. Plain unreinforced concrete shall not be
considered unreinforced masonry for the purpose of this Chapter.
PORTLAND CITY CODE § 24.85.020(Z) (2019),https://www.portlandoregon.gov/citycode/
article/745486 [https://perma.cc/E2PZ-YKR3]. It also defined reinforced masonry.
PORTLAND CITY CODE § 24.85.020(W) (2019), https://www.portlandoregon.gov/
citycode/article/745486 [https://perma.cc/E2PZ-YKR3].
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safety and collapse-prevention standards were exempt from the
placard ordinance.9
The Masonry Building Owners of Oregon (“MBOO”), along
with several other plaintiffs, sued Portland and its mayor, Ted
Wheeler.10 They claimed the mandate violated their First Amendment right of free speech.11 Specifically, the plaintiffs argued the
ordinance compelled them to transmit a message they wished not to
utter, thereby transgressing their unenumerated First Amendment
right not to speak.12 The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that:
[t]he forced speech mandates violate core First
Amendment principles, by compelling targeted
building owners to broadcast the City’s views and
negative opinions about their buildings. The forced
speech mandates violate the constitutional rights of

9

Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d at 1289.
Id. at 1293–94.
11
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, that
“Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated ninety-five
years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties
to apply to state and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (finding “that freedom of speech and of the press—which are
protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among the
fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States”).
12
See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of St., Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2464 (2018) (holding that “measures compelling speech are at least as threatening” as those
restricting “what can be said”); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S.
47, 61 (2006) (“Some of this Court’s leading First Amendment precedents have established
the principle that freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what
they must say.”); Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985) (“We
have…held that in some instances compulsion to speak may be as violative of the First
Amendment as prohibitions on speech.”); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)
(“We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First
Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to
refrain from speaking at all.”). See generally Genevieve Lakier, Not Such a Fixed Star
After All: West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, and the Changing Meaning
of the First Amendment Right Not to Speak, 13 FIU L. REV. 741 (2019) (tracing the
evolution and changing conceptions of the right not to speak from its origins in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), through the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in National Institutes of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra,
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018)).
10
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Plaintiffs and other targeted building owners to decide for themselves what to say and what not to say.13
In terms of the ordinance’s practical impact, the placards might
harm the financial interests of some of the buildings’ owners. That
is because prospective tenants of these structures might be chary of
renting space upon discovering their vulnerability to earthquakes. 14
Additionally, the monetary costs to retrofit a building to avoid the
placard requirement are steep.15 In brief, the placard ordinance
partly pitted Portland’s public safety and welfare concerns against
the private fiscal interests of some of the city’s owners of unreinforced masonry buildings.
The nuances, however, of the First Amendment right not to
speak asserted by the MBOO against Portland are unclear. 16 Given
such murkiness, a key issue facing an Oregon federal district court
in May 2019 in Masonry Building Owners of Oregon v. Wheeler17
was the standard of scrutiny that should apply to determine if

13

Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief for Violation of the United States
Constitution and the Federal Civil Rights Act at 10, Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v.
Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279 (D. Or. 2019) (No. 3:18-cv-02194-AC).
14
See Building Owners, supra note 3 (reporting that “[b]uilding owners stand to lose
tenants who are uncomfortable living or working in a vulnerable building, or who feel their
customers might be wary of entering the building,” and adding that building owners “also
face astronomical costs to retrofit the buildings and say they would as likely be forced to
sell to a developer who would tear it down”).
15
See id.
16
See Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 A LA. L. REV. 1277, 1283
(2014) (“For the most part, government attempts to force individuals to affirm beliefs
contrary to their own…are subject to strict scrutiny and struck down. But the Supreme
Court has been less clear and less consistent when dealing with compelled speech that
deviates from that paradigm.”) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added); Nat Stern, The
Subordinate Status of Negative Speech Rights, 59 B UFF. L. REV. 847, 849 (2011)
(observing that “the right to resist governmentally imposed expressive activities has
evolved into a sprawling and ungainly doctrine” that “has lost much of its coherence and
explanatory power”); Mark A. Strasser, What’s Fair for Conscientious Objectors Subject
to Public Accommodations Laws, 48 N.M. L. REV. 124, 124 (2018) (asserting that while
the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a First Amendment right not to speak, “its contours
are much less clear than many appreciate”); Eugene Volokh, The Law of Compelled
Speech, 97 TEX. L. REV. 355, 356 (2018) (contending that the details of the right not to be
compelled to speak “are often hard to pin down”).
17
394 F. Supp. 3d 1279 (D. Or. 2019).
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the warning on the small signs violated the First Amendment.18
That issue tracks the twin macro-level questions at the heart of
this Article:
(1) How have courts selected scrutiny in compelled-speech
cases involving non-commercial expression following the United
States Supreme Court’s dual right-not-to-speak decisions in
2018 of Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees19 and National Institute of Family and Life
Advocates v. Becerra?20
(2) How are Janus and Becerra influencing the selection of
scrutiny in subsequent compelled-speech cases?
In Janus and Becerra, identical five-justice conservative majorities—over the objection of four-justice liberal dissents—applied
heightened scrutiny to strike down laws that compelled expression
either directly or via monetary subsidies.21 Writing for the Janus
majority, Justice Samuel Alito declared unconstitutional, on First
Amendment grounds, an Illinois statute that required non-union,
public-sector employees to pay an agency or fair-share fee to the
union designated to exclusively represent them in collective bargaining.22 An agency fee is a percentage of union dues chargeable
to non-union members for activities germane solely to collective

18

See id. at 1294 (“In evaluating the Ordinance, the court must determine whether the
Ordinance implicates the First Amendment and, if so, what level of scrutiny applies to the
Ordinance, and whether Plaintiffs have demonstrated that a preliminary injunction is
appropriate.”).
19
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
20
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
21
See Clay Calvert, Is Everything a Full-Blown First Amendment Case After Becerra
and Janus? Sorting Out Standards of Scrutiny and Untangling “Speech as Speech” Cases
from Disputes Incidentally Affecting Expression, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 73, 78–80
(encapsulating the five-to-four split along perceived ideological lines over scrutiny in
both cases).
22
As Justice Samuel Alito summed it up for the majority:
Under Illinois law, public employees are forced to subsidize a
union, even if they choose not to join and strongly object to the
positions the union takes in collective bargaining and related activities.
We conclude that this arrangement violates the free speech rights
of nonmembers by compelling them to subsidize private speech on
matters of substantial public concern.
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2459–60.
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bargaining, as opposed to activities related to a “union’s political
and ideological projects.”23 Plaintiff Mark Janus, a non-union member, objected to the AFSCME’s positions on certain issues while
bargaining on his behalf because Janus felt those stances were not
in the best fiscal interests of cash-strapped Illinois.24 In other words,
he balked at being compelled to subsidize the union’s speech during
collective bargaining on his behalf.
In analyzing the statute, the majority rejected the dissent’s
contention that a deferential standard of review akin to rational basis
should apply, with Alito deriding that “form of minimal scrutiny [as] foreign to our free-speech jurisprudence.”25 He reasoned
that “[b]ecause the compelled subsidization of private speech seriously impinges on First Amendment rights, it cannot be casually
allowed.”26 Furthermore, Alito added teeth to the notion that compelled-speech laws demand heightened scrutiny. Specifically, he
asserted that “measures compelling speech are at least as threatening” to First Amendment rights as are ones restricting what people
can say and, in fact, can cause “additional damage” when people
are forced “to endorse ideas they find objectionable.”27 Penning a
dissent joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and
Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan rejected the majority’s position “that
compelling speech always works a greater injury, and so always
requires a greater justification.”28
In Becerra, a conservative majority similarly used heightened
scrutiny to declare “likely” unconstitutional a California statute
that required licensed crisis pregnancy centers—which advocate
against abortion—to disclose on their premises the factually
accurate message that California provides low-cost and free
abortion services.29 In doing so, the majority followed a decidedly

23

Id. at 2461.
See id. at 2461–62.
25
Id. at 2465.
26
Id. at 2464.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 2494 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
29
See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2376 (2018) (“In
short, petitioners are likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge to the licensed
notice.”).
24
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formulaic tack for scrutiny: (1) the law was content-based because
it targeted a specific topic and subject matter for regulation, rather
than applying neutrally to all speech and regardless of the underlying topic and subject matter;30 (2) content-based laws are presumptively unconstitutional and generally must clear strict scrutiny; 31 (3)
the law did not fall within the confines of two exceptions—one for
the disclosure of non-controversial facts in commercial speech settings32 and one for informed-consent mandates that regulate professional conduct and only burden speech incidental to that conduct33—to the general rule that compelled-disclosure laws face strict
scrutiny;34 and (4) the obligation to disclose facts about low-cost and
free abortion services did fit within a new exception to strict scrutiny
that the majority cryptically and cursorily carved out for “health
and safety warnings long considered permissible.”35 The interests
of the listeners (women who come to the centers), as compared to
the speakers (the centers), were given short shrift on the road to
heightened scrutiny, as the goal of protecting speakers against
compelled expression became paramount. 36
Adding insult to California’s injury, Justice Clarence Thomas
opined for the majority that it was not even necessary to apply
strict scrutiny because the law failed under the more deferential—
although still heightened when compared to rational basis—test of
intermediate scrutiny.37 The bottom line is that the mandatory notice
about abortion services violated the crisis pregnancy centers’ First

30

See id. at 2371 (“By requiring petitioners to inform women how they can obtain statesubsidized abortions—at the same time petitioners try to dissuade women from choosing
that option—the licensed notice plainly ‘alters the content’ of petitioners’ speech.”
(quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988))).
31
Id.
32
See Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626 (1985); infra text
accompanying notes (describing this exception that the Court fashioned in Zauderer).
33
See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992);
infra note 192 and accompanying text.
34
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372–74.
35
Id. at 2376.
36
See Helen Norton, Gender Equality and the First Amendment: Pregnancy and the
First Amendment, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2417, 2428 (2019) (“The [Becerra] majority’s
opinion centered only on the speakers and what they did and did not want to say, entirely
ignoring pregnant women’s First Amendment interests as listeners.”).
37
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2375.
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Amendment right not to speak.38 More fundamentally, as Professor
Mark Strasser writes, Becerra can be read “to suggest that the
State’s power to compel speech is more limited than previously
thought.”39 In brief, Janus and Becerra, while involving different
facts, create a powerful one-two punch in favor of heightened scrutiny in compelled-speech cases. Janus suggests that compelledspeech mandates may be even more dangerous than laws censoring
content, while Becerra both makes it clear that strict scrutiny
presumptively applies to compelled-speech mandates and severely
limits possible workarounds from that rigorous test.40 They also
reveal, however, that the justices disagree along perceived ideological lines about that principle.41
Are Janus and Becerra, in fact, now affecting the selection of
scrutiny, pushing courts toward adopting a heightened standard in
right-not-to-speak disputes such as Wheeler? That question is
critical not simply because identifying scrutiny is a key facet of
modern constitutional law,42 but also because the level of scrutiny
often dictates a case’s outcome.43 Specifically, when strict scrutiny
38

See Erica Goldberg, “Good Orthodoxy” and the Legacy of Barnette, 13 FIU L. REV.
639, 643 (2019) (“Becerra held, among other things, that requiring anti-abortion crisis
pregnancy centers to alert patrons to the fact that the state can provide low cost abortions
violated the centers’ First Amendment rights against compelled speech.”).
39
Mark Strasser, Deception, Professional Speech, and CPCs: On Becerra, Abortion,
and the First Amendment, 67 B UFF. L. REV. 311, 345 (2019).
40
See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of St., Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464 (2018);
see also Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2375.
41
Id.
42
See Charles W. Collier, Law as Interpretation, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 779, 812 (2000)
(“The modern levels of scrutiny doctrine has become a basic interpretive tool―arguably
the basic interpretive tool―in contemporary constitutional analysis.”) (emphasis in
original); R. Randall Kelso, Clarifying Viewpoint Discrimination in Free Speech Doctrine,
52 IND. L. REV. 355, 355 (2019) (“The preliminary decision that must be made in First
Amendment free speech cases is what level of review to apply.”).
43
See Christina E. Wells, Beyond Campaign Finance: The First Amendment
Implications of Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 66 M O. L. REV. 141, 160
(2001) (“In effect, the categorization of a law as subject to either strict or minimal scrutiny
is outcome determinative, with the actual application of those standards a rhetorical and
mechanical afterthought.”); but see Donald L. Beschle, No More Tiers? Proportionality as
an Alternative to Multiple Levels of Scrutiny in Individual Rights Cases, 38 P ACE L. REV.
384, 385 (2018) (“The American multi-tiered approach might be expected to lead to more
predictable outcomes, yet, in recent decades, the application of these tests has become
progressively less determinative of outcomes.”).

2020]

SELECTING SCRUTINY IN COMPELLED-SPEECH CASES

11

is chosen,44 it typically dooms a statute in First Amendment jurisprudence.45 This means, in turn, that if courts in compelled-speech
cases today embrace a methodology for selecting scrutiny that
almost invariably leads to strict scrutiny, then those courts are
also consistently tilting the playing field heavily against compelledspeech statutes, including those that simply require disclosure
of purely factual information to help people make better informed choices or to provide enhanced context for understanding
related information.
Before analyzing other post-Janus and post-Becerra cases,
however, it helps to return to Wheeler. It sets the stage for some
of the contrasting options courts might take for deciding scrutiny
in compelled-speech controversies, as well as the opposing narratives through which those options may be perceived. In Wheeler,
U.S. Magistrate Judge John Acosta concluded that strict scrutiny
was the correct test.46 He then determined that Portland’s placard
requirement failed this typically rigorous standard, and he enjoined
its enforcement.47
After Acosta’s ruling, Portland repealed the measure and agreed
in November 2019 to pay $350,000 to cover the MBOO’s attorneys’
fees in successfully challenging the law.48 Portland’s effort to compel speech thus proved futile and costly.49 It is helpful then for lawmakers to know in advance the level of scrutiny their compelled44

See infra text accompanying notes 52–64 (providing an overview of strict scrutiny).
See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(noting that strict scrutiny leads “to almost certain legal condemnation”); United States v.
Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 731 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) (contending strict scrutiny
yields “near-automatic condemnation”).
46
Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1305 (D. Or. 2019)
(concluding that “the placard provision in the Ordinance is a content-based regulation of
non-commercial speech, and therefore, is invalid unless Defendants can survive strict
scrutiny.”).
47
See id. at 1309–10 (finding “that Defendants have not carried their burden of
demonstrating that the Ordinance furthers a compelling governmental interest and is
narrowly tailored to further that interest,” and concluding that “Plaintiffs have
demonstrated they are likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim with
respect to the placard provision in the Ordinance.”).
48
Everton Bailey Jr., Portland to Pay $350K Settlement Linked to Suit Over Earthquake
Signs, OREGONIAN (Portland), Nov. 22, 2019, at A4.
49
Id.
45
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speech handiwork will likely face so they can better calculate if
adopting it is worth the fiscal risk of litigated unconstitutionality.
Wheeler is over, but the question remains: Was strict scrutiny
appropriate for evaluating whether a seemingly factual disclosure—
one certainly not compelling building owners to espouse or endorse
a state-sponsored political, philosophical, ideological, or religious
viewpoint or orthodoxy with which they disagreed 50—on placards
measuring less than one square-foot violated the First Amendment?
Strict scrutiny, after all, is a “high bar”51 to clear—“a demanding
standard”52 under which statutes presumptively are unconstitutional
and rarely survive.53
Indeed, it represents “the most searching form of judicial review
in free speech cases.”54 More bluntly stated by former Justice David
Souter, it “leaves few survivors.”55 By adopting strict scrutiny,

50

See infra text accompanying notes 102–21 (contrasting Wheeler with several of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal right-not-to-speak cases in which the compelled speech
squarely involved political, philosophical, ideological, or religious viewpoints or
orthodoxies).
51
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2236 (2015) (Kagan, J., concurring).
52
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011).
53
See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1666 (2015) (“This is…one of the
rare cases in which a speech restriction withstands strict scrutiny.”) (emphasis added); see
also Genevieve Lakier, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, and the Rise of the
Anticlassificatory First Amendment, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 233 (“For decades now, the
Supreme Court has insisted that content-based laws—laws that restrict speech because of
its ideas or messages or subject matter—are presumptively unconstitutional, and will be
sustained only if they can satisfy strict scrutiny.”).
54
Matthew D. Bunker et al., Strict in Theory, But Feeble in Fact? First Amendment
Strict Scrutiny and the Protection of Speech, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 349, 350 (2011).
55
City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 455 (Souter, J., dissenting). To
wit, one scholar recently observed that subjecting a law to strict scrutiny “is essentially
outcome determinative; in only one modern case has a majority of the Court
unambiguously upheld a content-based law under strict scrutiny.” Ashutosh Bhagwat, In
Defense of Content Regulation, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1427, 1428 (2017) (internal citation
omitted). The case referenced (and internally cited) in this quotation by Professor Bhagwat
is Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). A slightly older First Amendment
case in which the Court also upheld a statute while applying strict scrutiny, but in which
only a plurality of four justices joined in the opinion of the Court, is Burson v. Freeman,
504 U.S. 191 (1992). It involved a 100-foot buffer zone around the entrances to polling
places that prohibited campaigning within that space. Id. at 193. Writing for the plurality,
Justice Harry Blackmun observed that “it is the rare case in which we have held that a law
survives strict scrutiny. This, however, is such a rare case.” Id. at 211.
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Magistrate Judge Acosta thereby stacked the metaphorical deck
against Portland’s compelled-speech ordinance. 56
Under this form of assessment, the government must prove
two things: (1) a compelling interest in regulating speech, and (2)
that its regulation is narrowly tailored to serve that interest such
that no more speech is restricted than is absolutely necessary. 57
Regarding the first prong, a compelling interest frequently is
considered one of the highest order. 58 There also must be a “direct
causal link” between the regulated speech and the harm it allegedly
produces.59 The second part of the test involves the fit between
the statutory means and the compelling interest, and it demands that
the means be the least speech-restrictive avenue. 60 Strict scrutiny

56

Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 455.
See McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (2014) (providing that to pass strict
scrutiny review, a statute “must be the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling
state interest”); Brown, 564 U.S. at 799 (noting that a law passes strict scrutiny if “it is
justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest”);
United States v. Playboy Enm’t. Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (noting that under strict
scrutiny, “[i]f a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the
legislature must use that alternative”); see also Erica Goldberg, Free Speech
Consequentialism, 116 COLUM . L. REV. 687, 705 (2016) (“As a general matter, when faced
with a content-based restriction on speech, the Court subjects regulations of high-value
speech to strict scrutiny, requiring a compelling governmental interest and narrow tailoring
between the goal of the statute and the means by which the law accomplishes that goal.”).
58
See Andrew P. Napolitano, Whatever Happened to Freedom of Speech? A Defense of
“State Interest of the Highest Order” as a Unifying Standard for Erratic First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 1197, 1232–33 (1999) (“Very often…courts wed
the phrase state interest of the highest order with language talismanic of strict scrutiny,
requiring the state to demonstrate a ‘compelling state interest of the highest order’ or means
that are the least restrictive alternative to serve the government’s interest.”); Howard M.
Wasserman, Bartnicki as Lochner: Some Thoughts on First Amendment Lochnerism, 33
N. KY. L. REV. 421, 445 (2006) (contending that the Supreme Court’s use of “highest
order” in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979), was “seemingly
synonymous with the ‘compelling interest’ required as part of strict scrutiny.”).
59
Brown, 564 U.S. at 799. See also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 725 (2012)
(“The First Amendment requires that the Government’s chosen restriction on the speech at
issue be ‘actually necessary’ to achieve its interest….There must be a direct causal link
between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.”) (quoting Brown, 564 U.S.
at 799) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).
60
R. Randall Kelso, Considerations of Legislative Fit Under Equal Protection,
Substantive Due Process, and Free Speech Doctrine: Separating Questions of
Advancement, Relationship and Burden, 28 U. RICH . L. REV. 1279, 1299 (1994) (“At strict
57
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is the same stringent standard the Supreme Court applies today in
its Equal Protection Clause61 jurisprudence when evaluating the
constitutionality of laws that discriminate based on a person’s race. 62
The Court’s First Amendment standards for and presumption
against content-based regulations of speech long have tracked its
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, at least since its 1972 decision in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley.63
This circles back to an earlier question, albeit framed slightly
differently: Was it necessary for Magistrate Judge Acosta to apply
the same test used in race-based discrimination lawsuits when
evaluating the constitutionality of disclosure placards about unreinforced masonry structures?
After all, more deferential standards of review exist in First
Amendment jurisprudence. Most notably, there is intermediate

scrutiny, the statute must be the ‘least restrictive’ alternative under the restrictiveness
analysis and must have no unnecessary over-inclusiveness pursuant to the overinclusiveness inquiry.”).
61
The Equal Protection Clause provides that “[n]o state shall…deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
62
See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297, 307 (2013) (finding that “[a]ny racial
classification must meet strict scrutiny’); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 724 (5th ed. 2015) (“The Court has expressly declared that
all racial classifications—whether disadvantaging or helping minorities—must meet strict
scrutiny.”); Kimberly A. Yuracko & Ronen Avraham, Valuing Black Lives: A
Constitutional Challenge to the Use of Race-Based Tables in Calculating Tort Damages,
106 CALIF. L. REV. 325, 337 (2018) (“The Equal Protection Clause applies only to state
action, and the level of scrutiny applicable to the state action at issue depends on the nature
of the classification at issue, with classifications based on race necessarily subject to the
highest level of scrutiny.”).
63
408 U.S. 92 (1972). In Mosley, the Court reasoned that “above all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Id. at 95. It added that “under the
Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First Amendment itself, government may not
grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those
wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.” Id. at 96. See Kenneth L.
Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 20–
21 (1975) (“In a number of recent cases involving [F]irst [A]mendment interests, the
Supreme Court has used the framework of equal protection analysis to limit government’s
power to restrict free expression.”).
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scrutiny.64 It typically is used when a law is content neutral.65
Additionally, in somewhat more rare situations, forms of reasonableness balancing apply.66 In fact, some varieties of compelledspeech regulations in commercial speech settings are subject to
a very deferential reasonableness standard developed by the Supreme Court thirty-five years ago in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel.67 The Court there held that Ohio could force
attorneys in their advertisements to convey “purely factual and
64

To pass intermediate scrutiny, a regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve a
significant interest, but it does not need to be the least speech-restrictive means of serving
it. McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 486 (2014). See Dan V. Kozlowski & Derigan
Silver, Measuring Reed’s Reach: Content Discrimination in the U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeals After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 24 C OMM . L. & P OL’Y 191, 195 (2018) (“Under
intermediate scrutiny, content-neutral laws are held constitutional if they advance a
significant or important government interest and are narrowly tailored to advance that
interest. Content-neutral laws, however, do not have to be narrowly tailored to the least
restrictive means.”); see generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything:
Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. Ill. L. REV. 783
(providing an overview of intermediate scrutiny and its origins).
65
See Minch Minchin, A Doctrine at Risk: Content Neutrality in a Post-Reed
Landscape, 22 COMM . L. & P OL’Y 123, 127 (2017) (“Once a regulation is determined to
fit into one of the three categories, the Court applies intermediate scrutiny for contentneutral laws and strict scrutiny for content-based laws.”).
66
See R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny,
Intermediate Review, and “Reasonableness” Balancing, 8 ELON L. REV. 291, 291 (2016)
(noting that modern free-speech doctrine involves strict scrutiny, intermediate review, and
reasonableness balancing).
The Court applies a variation of the extremely deferential rational basis standard in cases
involving the speech of public-school students that is sponsored by a school or that is part
of the curriculum. It has ruled “that educators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in schoolsponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns.” Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)
(emphasis added). Dean Erwin Chemerinsky dubs this “the classic phrasing of the rational
basis review.” Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hazelwooding of the First Amendment: The
Deference to Authority, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 291, 294 (2013).
Similarly, the speech rights of prison inmates can be squelched upon on a showing that the
interest in censorship is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Beard v.
Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528 (2006) (citation omitted). See Alicia Bianco, Prisoners’
Fundamental Right to Read: Courts Should Ensure that Rational Basis is Truly Rational,
21 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2016) (noting that courts “have continuously deferred
to the legislature and prison administrators when considering the validity of prison policies
that threaten prisoners’ First Amendment rights. In essence, this deference leads to courts
applying an extremely lenient form of rational basis review.”).
67
Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
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uncontroversial information about the terms under which” 68 their
services are rendered, provided that the “disclosure requirements are
reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of
consumers”69 and are not “unduly burdensome.” 70 This “relatively
relaxed form of scrutiny”71 is treated by some courts as tantamount
to rational basis review,72 which generally only applies to economic
and social legislation.73
Magistrate Judge Acosta, however, did not apply one of these
more forgiving tests. That primarily is because he found the placard
ordinance was a content-based regulation.74 A regulation is contentbased if it “applies to particular speech because of the topic
discussed or the idea or message expressed.”75 Furthermore, a law
is content-based if it targets a particular subject generally, regardless of whether it discriminates against a specific viewpoint or
stance on that subject.76
68

Id. at 651.
Id.
70
Id.
71
Felix T. Wu, The Commercial Difference, 58 W M . & M ARY L. REV. 2005, 2036
(2017).
72
See Shannon M. Roesler, Evaluating Corporate Speech About Science, 106 GEO. L.J.
447, 505 (2018) (“Many courts and commentators have treated the Zauderer ‘reasonable
relationship’ test as a highly deferential test similar to rational basis review.”); Lili Levi, A
“Faustian Pact”? Native Advertising and the Future of the Press, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 647,
680–81 (2015) (observing that the test in Zauderer is “akin to rational basis review”).
73
See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Occupational Licensing, 39 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 290 (2016) (“The ‘rational basis’ standard ordinarily used to
evaluate social and economic legislation is quite generous to the government.”); Nicholas
Walter, The Utility of Rational Basis Review, 63 VILL. L. REV. 79, 79 (2018) (observing
that rational basis is “typically applied to review of economic and social regulations,” and
noting that under this test, a governmental action generally “will be upheld if the court can
conceive of any valid reason for the action, whether or not the legislature or executive had
that reason in mind when taking the action”).
74
Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1296–97
(D. Or. 2019).
75
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015).
76
See id. at 2230 (noting that “a speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is
content-based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject
matter”). Laws that do, in fact, discriminate against some viewpoints but not others on a
given subject are deemed viewpoint-based regulations, a particularly egregious subset of
content-based laws. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1766 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See generally Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L.
69
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The First Amendment strongly protects against laws that
discriminate on speech based on its topic or subject matter. 77
The Supreme Court has long adopted this position. 78 Indeed, the
Court embraces what Professor David Han dubs a “longstanding
default rule that strict scrutiny applies to content-based speech
restrictions.”79 As Justice Clarence Thomas wrote five years ago for
the majority in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, “strict scrutiny applies
either when a law is content based on its face or when the purpose
and justification for the law are content based.”80 Reed, which
did not involve compelled speech, made it clear that strict scrutiny
is the presumptive standard for statutes that are either facially content-based or, even if facially neutral, were adopted because
of a discriminatory intent.81 As this Article later makes evident,
Reed—along with Becerra and Janus—plays a key role today in
resolving the scrutiny question in compelled-speech cases.
Thus, when viewed from one angle, Magistrate Judge Acosta
simply followed the Supreme Court’s formulaic lead—one embracing a pivotal, decades-old dichotomy between content-based
and content-neutral laws that generally establishes the level of

REV. 695, 703 (2011) (“The first rule of free speech theory and doctrine is that the
government may not discriminate against a particular viewpoint based simply on its
disagreement with that viewpoint.”); Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Content-Neutrality:
Inconsistent Applications of an Increasingly Malleable Doctrine, 29 MC GEORGE L. REV.
69, 76 (1997) (“Viewpoint regulations go beyond regulating speech on a particular topic
or subject matter. They regulate one side of a debate or topic but not the other.”).
77
See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1765–66 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The First Amendment
guards against laws ‘targeted at specific subject matter,’ a form of speech suppression
known as content based discrimination.”) (quoting Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2230 (2015)).
78
See Geoffrey R. Stone, Restriction of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar
Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 82 (1978) (“In its
interpretation of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has been especially wary of
government action that restricts speech because of its content.”).
79
David S. Han, Transparency in First Amendment Doctrine, 65 EMORY L.J. 359,
363 (2015).
80
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228.
81
See Enrique Armijo, Reed v. Town of Gilbert: Relax, Everybody, 58 B.C. L. R EV. 66,
67 (2017) (describing the Reed Court’s two-step process for determining if a law is contentbased and thus presumptively subject to strict scrutiny); see also R. Randall Kelso, supra
note 42, at 400 (observing that “the majority in Reed adopted a rigid rule that if a regulation
is content-based ‘on its face,’ then strict scrutiny is automatically triggered”) (quoting
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228).
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review82—by adopting strict scrutiny.83 He added that the placard’s
message was noncommercial and therefore the much more lenient
Zauderer test noted earlier was inapplicable.84 Acosta concluded the
placard ordinance failed to pass strict scrutiny.85
Buttressing the notion that Acosta was warranted in selecting
strict scrutiny to analyze the compelled-placard law are the Supreme
Court’s 2018 decisions of Janus and Becerra. As described above,
the majorities in these two cases applied heightened scrutiny.
Acosta’s use of strict scrutiny, in fact, illustrates the accuracy of the
prediction of Dean Erwin Chemerinsky and Professor Michele
Goodwin that Becerra “weakens notification laws or makes them
vulnerable to constitutional challenges.” 86 In line with the outcome
in Wheeler, Chemerinsky and Goodwin also accurately forecasted
that Becerra would:
open the door to challenges to the myriad of laws
that require disclosure of information to patients, to
consumers, to employees, and to others. The Court
expressly says that a law requiring disclosure of

82

See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25
W M . & M ARY L. REV. 189 (1983) (exploring the development of, and critiquing, the
Court’s distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws).
83
As Justice Clarence Thomas explained in 2018, “[t]he First Amendment, applicable
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits laws that abridge the freedom
of speech. When enforcing this prohibition, our precedents distinguish between contentbased and content-neutral regulations of speech.” Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v.
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018). See Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment on the
Tracks: Should Justice Breyer be at the Switch?, 89 M INN . L. REV. 1280, 1294 (2005)
(“The use of the content-based/content-neutral distinction as a trigger for the level of
scrutiny is entrenched in First Amendment doctrine.”); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Producing
Speech, 56 W M . & M ARY L. REV . 1029, 1062 (2015) (“It is of course familiar grounds in
First Amendment jurisprudence that content-based laws are of greater constitutional
concern than content-neutral laws. For restrictions on speech itself, the doctrine imposes
strict scrutiny on content-based laws and a relatively deferential form of intermediate
scrutiny for content-neutral laws.”); see also Enrique Armijo, The “Ample Alternative
Channels” Flaw in First Amendment Doctrine, 73 W ASH. & L EE L. REV. 1657, 1691
(2016) (noting that “the content-based versus content-neutral distinction…governs Speech
Clause doctrine”).
84
Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1298 (D. Or. 2019).
85
Id. at 1309–10.
86
Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Constitutional Gerrymandering Against
Abortion Rights: NIFLA v. Becerra, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 61, 112 (2019).
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specific information is a content-based restriction on
speech because it prescribes the content of the
expression and thus it must meet strict scrutiny.87
Indeed, Acosta leaned heavily on Becerra to conclude that strict
scrutiny provided the correct test in Wheeler for evaluating the
constitutionality of Portland’s placard law. He cited Becerra for a
trio of foundational propositions:
(1) Content-based laws are presumptively unconstitutional and
only valid if the government proves it has a compelling interest that
is served by a narrowly tailored law;88
(2) Laws compelling an individual to utter a particular message
are content-based and subject to that same test because they necessarily alter the content of a person or an entity’s speech; 89 and
(3) “[A] regulation that compels a disclosure is a content-based
regulation of speech, subject to heightened scrutiny, unless an
exception applies.”90
In brief, Becerra’s impact in Wheeler proved powerful in
articulating principles for scrutiny selection. Furthermore, as
noted above, Magistrate Judge Acosta reasoned that the Zauderer
exception to strict scrutiny did not apply because the message on the
placards was noncommercial.91 Strict scrutiny therefore governed—
and killed—Portland’s ordinance.92 Wheeler was thus, when viewed
87

Id.
Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. at 1296. Acosta referred to Becerra as NIFLA on short-citation
references.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Magistrate Judge Acosta reasoned here that:
[T]he placards do not propose any kind of commercial transaction, and
do not convey any discernable relationship to any products or services
offered by Plaintiffs. Indeed, Plaintiffs have no economic motivation
to display the placards because they compel Plaintiffs to state a
message they wish to avoid. The court finds that the placards fall
outside any commonsense understanding of commercial speech.
Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d at 1298.
92
See id. at 1309–10 (concluding “that Defendants have not carried their burden of
demonstrating that the Ordinance furthers a compelling governmental interest and is
narrowly tailored to further that interest,” and finding that “[p]laintiffs have demonstrated
88
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from one perspective, a systematic, button-downed decision that
never veered off course from the Supreme Court’s precedential
tracks for content-based laws.
There is, however, a radically different and alternative narrative
to one that perceives Acosta as simply heeding precedent and
following well-established rules about applying strict scrutiny to
content-based laws. That competing account is far harsher. It is this:
Acosta, to borrow Justice Elena Kagan’s memorable phrase from
her dissent on behalf of the liberal justices in Janus, was “weaponizing the First Amendment.”93 He did so by selecting strict scrutiny,
thereby “turning the First Amendment into a sword, and using it
against workaday economic and regulatory policy”94 established by
the democratically elected Portland City Council to help protect
citizens from dangers some buildings may pose during earthquakes.
What is more, Acosta failed to adopt—to quote Justice Stephen
Breyer in his Becerra dissent attacking the majority’s embrace of
heightened scrutiny—a “respectful approach to economic and social
legislation”95 that affects speech. Just as Breyer prognosticated in
Becerra, the deleterious ramifications of applying strict scrutiny to
analyze “the mine run of disclosure requirements,” 96 such as those
“alert[ing] the public about child seat belt laws, the location of stairways, and the process to have their garbage collected,” 97 sprung
vividly to life in Acosta’s decision to apply that stringent standard to a law compelling disclosure of a building’s structure. In a
nutshell, Acosta’s approach to scrutiny, at least in this alternative
reading of Wheeler, embodies the Lochnerization of the First
Amendment that many academics have feared and decried in recent

they are likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim with respect to the
placard provision in the Ordinance”).
93
Janus v. Am. Fed’n of St., Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018)
(Kagan, J., dissenting).
94
Id.
95
Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2382 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
96
Id. at 2381.
97
Id.
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years.98 The First Amendment, in other words, was swung like
a wrecking ball by some businesses—owners of unreinforced
masonry buildings—in Wheeler to bring down a stigmatizing safety
notice that jeopardized their financial interests.
In this counterposed narrative, shielding an owner from posting
a placard revealing a building’s structure and what it may portend if
an earthquake hits is an extremely far cry from the human dignity
and autonomy interests at stake in the Supreme Court’s seminal
right-not-to-speak cases of West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette99 and Wooley v. Maynard.100 The former involved minors being compelled to salute the flag of the United States of America and to pledge allegiance to it over their religious objections.101
In protecting against forced engagement in such expression, the
Supreme Court declared that “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein.”102 Justice Robert Jackson added that “the
action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and
pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the
First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official

98

This concept generally refers to use of the First Amendment “to thwart economic and
social welfare regulation.” Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an
Egalitarian First Amendment, 118 COLUM . L. REV. 1953, 1959 (2018). The name arises
from “the theory that businesses are using the First Amendment to do the work that
substantive due process once performed in the era of Lochner v. New York, the notorious
1905 Supreme Court case invalidating a New York maximum-hours law for bakers as an
infringement of liberty of contract.” Laura Weinrib, The Right to Work and the Right to
Strike, 2017 U. CHI. L EGAL F. 513, 520 (2017). See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,
57 (1905) (declaring unconstitutional, as an interference with the right to contract under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state statute limiting the number
of hours that bakers could work); see also Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer,
Information Libertarianism, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 337 (2017) (describing how some
scholars perceive “a new free speech Lochnerism—an exploitation of the First Amendment
to promote a broad deregulatory agenda, regardless of popular democratic will”).
99
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
100
430 U.S. 705 (1977).
101
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 625–30.
102
Id. at 642.
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control.”103 Barnette thus embraces what Professor Jed Rubenfeld
calls the “anti-orthodoxy principle” in First Amendment jurisprudence that prohibits the government from dictating “what beliefs
must and must not be expressed.”104
This alternative narrative to Wheeler holds that requiring one to
post a placard about a building’s structure: (1) is nothing akin to
being forced to speak the government’s position about politics,
nationalism, and religion, and (2) does not invade an individual’s
private sphere of either intellect or spirit. As Justice Kagan wrote
about Barnette in her Janus dissent, “[r]egulations challenged as
compelling expression do not usually look anything like that.”105
Indeed, the challenged law in Wheeler looked nothing like the one
in Barnette, yet Magistrate Judge Acosta treated it just as seriously
by applying strict scrutiny.106 Of course, his decision to do so might
partly be because Barnette itself failed to create clear guidelines for
addressing future compelled-speech cases, thereby leaving it for
judges to fathom scrutiny standards and, as Acosta did, to resort to
the content-based-versus-content-neutral formula. 107
Like Barnette, Wooley also involved religious objections to
being compelled to speak.108 The Supreme Court there declared that
103

Id.
Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 S TAN. L. REV. 767, 818 (2001)
(emphasis removed). Rubenfeld explains that the anti-orthodoxy principle does not apply
to factual matters, but rather “to the world of meaning, of ideas, of feeling, of the ineffable,
of spirit-to every act of human imagination.” Id. at 821. It allows a person to be “free to
express himself without fear that his beliefs or feelings or imaginings will be deemed
unspeakable by law.” Id.
105
Janus v. Am. Fed’n of St., Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2494 (2018)
(Kagan, J., dissenting).
106
See Joseph J. Martins, The One Fixed Star in Higher Education: What Standard of
Judicial Scrutiny Should Courts Apply to Compelled Curricular Speech in the Public
University Classroom?, 20 U. PA. J. CONST . L. 85, 122 (2017) (noting that “the strict
scrutiny standard [was] explicitly applied in Barnette”); Toni M. Massaro, Nuts and Seeds:
Mitigating Third-Party Harms of Religious Exemptions, Post-Hobby Lobby, 92 DENV. U.
L. REV. 325, 355 (2015) (noting “the Barnette strict scrutiny compelled speech test”).
107
Paul Horwitz, A Close Reading of Barnette, in Honor of Vincent Blasi, 13 FIU L. R EV.
689, 695 (2019) (contending that Barnette “does very little by way of practical doctrinal
development. Beyond the particular context, it offers very little by way of judicially clear
and manageable standards for lower courts in the area of what came to be labeled as
‘compelled speech.’”).
108
See generally Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
104
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New Hampshire could not stop a Jehovah’s Witness couple from
taping over the state’s motto, “Live Free or Die,” on their vehicles’
license plates.109 The majority, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Warren Burger, was especially concerned about the government
forcing people to convey an “ideology” regarding “history, state
pride, and individualism” to which they object.110 Linking Wooley
with Barnette, Burger observed that “as in Barnette, we are faced
with a state measure which forces an individual, as part of his daily
life—indeed constantly while his automobile is in public view—to
be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological
point of view he finds unacceptable.”111 The message at issue in
Wheeler, in contrast, was not ideological but factual. No one’s religious beliefs were placed in the balance. 112 The owners of masonry
buildings were not compelled to voice a government-sponsored
ideological pledge or motto.113
Wheeler also is factually distant from another seminal right-notto-speak case, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.114 That dispute involved a Florida right-of-reply statute compelling newspapers in the Sunshine State to publish—free of charge—the responses
of candidates for public office whom those papers had criticized. 115
Thus, unlike Wheeler, Tornillo entangled being compelled to print
an objectionable political viewpoint with the jeopardization of journalistic freedom, via the Press Clause, to retain editorial independence.116 Additionally, the Supreme Court was bothered in Tornillo
109

Id. at 717.
Id.
111
Id. at 715.
112
See Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279 (D. Or. 2019).
113
Id. at 1310.
114
418 U.S. 241 (1974).
115
See id. at 244 (noting that the law in question “provide[d] that if a candidate for
nomination or election [was] assailed regarding his personal character or official record by
any newspaper, the candidate [had] the right to demand that the newspaper print, free of
cost to the candidate, any reply the candidate may make to the newspaper’s charges.”).
116
The Court reasoned in Tornillo that:
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news,
comment, and advertising. The choice of material to go into a
newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and
content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public
110
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by the chilling effect on political speech that the law might produce.117 As Professor Abner Greene encapsulates it, the Court in
Tornillo struck down the right-of-reply statute “because it would
affect editorial decisions ex ante (some newspapers might not
critique a candidate for fear they would have to run a reply) and
ex post (the effect of the law is to alter newspaper content).” 118
In brief, the need to vigilantly guard against compelled expression
to protect speakers from harm that was present in Barnette, Wooley,
and Tornillo is decidedly absent in Wheeler and thus militates
against selecting strict scrutiny.
In summary, Magistrate Judge Acosta’s ruling in Wheeler on
scrutiny can be viewed through oppositional lenses of dueling
narratives that reflect the ideological cleavage on today’s Supreme
Court. This Article thus examines how other courts, in the aftermath
of both Janus and Becerra and in five very different factual settings,
resolved the issue of scrutiny when individuals or businesses raised
First Amendment-based, right-not-to-speak objections. Those cases
are analyzed below in Part I, which also considers how alternative
tacks to choosing scrutiny—ones beyond simply deciding if a law is
content-based or that rigidly follow the call for heightened scrutiny

officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial
control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental
regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First
Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this
time.
Id. at 258.
117
See id. at 257 (“Faced with the penalties that would accrue to any newspaper that
published news or commentary arguably within the reach of the right-of-access statute,
editors might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy. Therefore, under
the operation of the Florida statute, political and electoral coverage would be blunted or
reduced.”); see also Jennifer M. Kinsley, Chill, 48 L OY. U. CHI. L.J. 253, 255–56 (2016)
(calling the chilling effect an “important concern when a putative speaker’s intended
speech is subject to self-censorship as a result of government regulation,” but arguing that
“interweaving that concern into existing free speech doctrine potentially interrupts the
intentions of the First Amendment.”); Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First
Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. R EV. 685 (1978) (providing an
overview of the chilling effect concept).
118
Abner S. Greene, “Not in My Name” Claims of Constitutional Right, 98 B.U. L. REV.
1475, 1487 (2018).
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by the majorities in Janus and Becerra—might have led to the application of different standards of review in some of these cases. 119
Part II then identifies five First Amendment interests and values
that courts might use to help determine the level of scrutiny in future
right-not-to-speak cases involving non-commercial expression. 120
Finally, the Article concludes by calling on courts to adopt a First
Amendment-based interests and values approach to scrutiny in
compelled-speech cases that, although entailing greater judicial time
and effort, spurns reductionist scrutiny formulas in favor of a more
nuanced, reflective path.121
I.

FROM PUBLIC ART, POLITICAL ADS, AND VOTER -REGISTRATION DRIVES
SEX OFFENDER S IGNS AND SPEECH CELEBRATING SAME-SEX WEDDINGS:
THE STATUS OF SCRUTINY IN 2019 IN SELECTED COMPELLED-SPEECH CASES
TO

This Part separately analyzes five compelled-speech scenarios
courts considered in 2019. In each scenario, this Article focuses on
how those courts determined the applicable level of scrutiny and,
more specifically, the role that the Supreme Court’s recent decisions
in Becerra and Janus played in those scrutiny decisions. The five
scenarios were chosen because they are factually distinct, thereby
allowing analysis of whether a uniform and predictable methodology for determining scrutiny in compelled-speech cases was applied
regardless of a case’s distinctive facts. 122
As with Wheeler, the scenarios addressed below do not involve
compelled disclosure of commercial speech. That is because the
Court in Becerra clearly identified Zauderer compelledspeech cases as a distinct niche or carve out from those requiring
heightened scrutiny.123 Such post-Becerra cases thus merit separate
attention—perhaps a separate article—as a distinct line of dis-

119

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
121
See infra Conclusion.
122
Much like the eclectic mix of 2019 cases analyzed in this Article, the compelledspeech doctrine itself has long been comprised of “something of a hodgepodge of cases.”
Madeline Lamo & Ryan Calo, Regulating Bot Speech, 66 UCLA L. R EV. 988, 1010 (2019).
123
Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018).
120
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putes in which courts apply Zauderer and wrestle with its reach
and requirements.124
Similarly, the cases analyzed here do not involve informedconsent mandates incidental to the professional conduct of medical
procedures, given the Becerra Court’s notice that such disputes are
not subject to strict scrutiny.125 That conclusion, which rests largely
on the Court’s 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,126 is highly controversial. This exception

124

In fact, there have been several Zauderer-standard cases since Becerra and Janus were
decided. See, e.g., Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 916 F.3d 749 (9th Cir.
2019) (applying Zauderer to measure the validity of a local ordinance mandating health
warnings in advertisements for sugar-sweetened beverages appearing in certain venues and
forms of media); CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 928 F.3d 832, 836 (9th
Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 658 (2019) (applying Zauderer when considering the
validity of a local ordinance requiring “cell phone retailers to inform prospective cell phone
purchasers that carrying a cell phone in certain ways may cause them to exceed Federal
Communications Commission guidelines for exposure to radio-frequency radiation”).
Professor Sarah Haan addresses recent applications of Zauderer, including in American
Beverage Association, in a new article. Sarah C. Haan, The Post-Truth First Amendment,
94 IND. L.J. 1351, 1374–87 (2019).
125
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2373. The Becerra majority approvingly cited Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), as such an
informed-consent case where a lesser standard of review was permissible. Id. In dissent,
Justice Breyer noted that the majority confined Casey to “regulation[s] of professional
conduct that only incidentally burdened speech” so that it now applies “only when
obtaining ‘informed consent’ to a medical procedure is directly at issue.” Id. at 2385
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
126
505 U.S. 833 (1992). In Casey, the Court considered the “asserted First Amendment
right of a physician not to provide information about the risks of abortion, and childbirth,
in a manner mandated by” Pennsylvania. Id. at 884. The plurality cited Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705 (1977), which is addressed earlier in this Article in the text corresponding to
footnotes 108–111, in recognizing that the law affected a “physician’s First Amendment
rights not to speak.” Id. Yet, the plurality concluded that such a right was subject to
“reasonable licensing and regulation.” Id. (emphasis added). It found, in turn, that there
was no constitutional problem with Pennsylvania’s requirement that:
[A]t least 24 hours before performing an abortion a physician inform
the woman of the nature of the procedure, the health risks of the
abortion and of childbirth, and the “probable gestational age of the
unborn child.” The physician or a qualified nonphysician must inform
the woman of the availability of printed materials published by the
State describing the fetus and providing information about medical
assistance for childbirth, information about child support from the
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from strict scrutiny now deserves stand-alone analysis post-Becerra,
especially considering the Supreme Court’s December 2019 decision declining to review the abortion-based, informed-consent case
of EMW Women’s Surgical Center v. Beshear.127
In brief, Becerra identified two settings (Zauderer and Casey
cases) when heightened First Amendment review is unnecessary
in compelled-speech disputes. In all other compelled-speech scenarios—at least, based on the majority’s logic in Becerra and Janus,
along with Reed’s reasoning about when a law is content-based
and the presumption that strict scrutiny governs content-based
measures—strict scrutiny seemingly controls the case. 128 As becomes clear below, that largely is proving to be the case across a
wide swath of factual situations, with the sole exception of the next
case addressed immediately below.
A. Compelled Public-Facing Art
If Wheeler is lamentable for weaponizing the First Amendment
by applying strict scrutiny to vitiate a workaday regulation that
targeted building owners to protect public safety, then—quite
father, and a list of agencies which provide adoption and other services
as alternatives to abortion.
Id. at 881. In brief, the plurality arguably applied something approximating rational basis
review regarding the First Amendment right-not-to-speak claim in Casey. See Carl H.
Coleman, Regulating Physician Speech, 97 N.C. L. R EV. 843, 851 (2019) (suggesting the
Court’s “use of the word ‘reasonable’ might mean that such laws are permissible as long
as they have a rational basis, given that the word ‘reasonable’ is often used as a synonym
for ‘rational’”); B. Jessie Hill, Sex, Lies, and Ultrasound, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 421, 432
(2018) (“The Court’s language of reasonableness, along with its dismissive treatment
of the claim, suggest something like rational basis review was applied to the physician’s
free speech claim.”).
127
920 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 655 (2019). The Sixth Circuit
majority in Beshear relied on Becerra for the proposition “that no heightened First
Amendment scrutiny should apply to informed-consent statutes like the abortion-informedconsent statute at issue in [Casey].” Id. at 424. The Beshear majority thus reasoned “even
though an abortion-informed-consent law compels a doctor’s disclosure of certain
information, it should be upheld so long as the disclosure is truthful, non-misleading, and
relevant to an abortion.” Id. Applying that deferential form of review, the majority upheld
a Kentucky law that “directs a doctor, before performing an abortion, to auscultate (or make
audible) the fetal heartbeat, perform an ultrasound, and display and describe the ultrasound
images to the patient.” Id. at 423.
128
See Armijo, supra note 81 (explaining Reed’s holding regarding when strict
scrutiny applies).
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conversely—the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s
not-for-publication ruling in August 2019 in Building Industry
Association–Bay Area v. City of Oakland 129 is laudable for blunting
the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit did so by applying a version
of rational basis review to uphold an ordinance compelling developers of certain real-estate projects either to display art in areas open
to the public or to contribute to a fund to purchase public art. 130 What
is perhaps even more remarkable is that the Ninth Circuit concluded
that U.S. District Judge Vince Chhabria was correct in his 2018
ruling to select the deferential level of scrutiny articulated by the
Supreme Court in Zauderer.131
That is remarkable because the Ninth Circuit held, just one
month prior to ruling in Building Industry Association, that the
Zauderer test, which was described earlier,132 applies to the disclosure of factual information in commercial speech settings.133 Indeed,
the Supreme Court in Becerra closely cabined Zauderer’s applicability to only situations involving the mandated disclosure of purely
factual, noncontroversial information related to services provided
directly by the individual being compelled to speak. 134 Building
Industry Association, in contrast, had nothing to do with either commercial speech or the disclosure of purely factual information.
129

775 F. App’x. 348 (9th Cir. 2019).
See id. at 349 (“In relevant part, the ordinance requires developers to commit a small
percentage (of up to 1%) of the project budget to displaying art in areas freely accessible
to the public, or, alternatively, to pay that amount directly into a city fund that is set up to
further those public art goals.”).
131
See id. at 350 (holding that “the district court did not err by applying the lower form
of scrutiny set forth in Zauderer, or by concluding that Oakland’s policy satisfies this
review because the ordinance is ‘reasonably related’ to the city’s legitimate interests in
improving the city’s aesthetics and raising real estate property values”).
132
See supra notes 67–73 and accompanying text (addressing Zauderer).
133
See CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n. v. City of Berkeley, 928 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2019)
(“Under Zauderer as we interpret it today, the government may compel truthful disclosure
in commercial speech as long as the compelled disclosure is ‘reasonably related’ to a
substantial governmental interest . . . and involves ‘purely factual and uncontroversial
information’ that relates to the service or product provided.”) (quoting Nat’l Inst. of Fam.
& Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018)) (internal citation omitted)
(emphasis added); see also Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 916 F.3d 749, 756
(9th Cir. 2019) (holding that “Zauderer provides the appropriate framework to analyze a
First Amendment claim involving compelled commercial speech”) (emphasis added).
134
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372.
130
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Instead, it had everything to do with compelling the display or funding of art.135 Put bluntly, the Ninth Circuit in Building Industry
Association gave the green light to ripping Zauderer’s variation of
rational basis review from its commercial-speech and factual-information moorings and extending its reach to laws compelling the
display of something as subjective in meaning—and sometimes as
provocative in impact—as artwork.136
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Building Industry Association
also is important because the court rejected the notion that the
Supreme Court’s 2018 ruling in Janus and its seminal right-not-tospeak decision in Wooley137 require heightened scrutiny in all
compelled-speech cases.138 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Janus from Building Industry Association by factually confining Janus’s reach to laws that “compel the subsidy of private
speech.”139 The appellate court also distinguished Wooley because,
unlike the compelled motto on the Granite State’s license plates,
Oakland’s art ordinance did not require property developers to
“endorse any specific viewpoint.”140 In brief, the underlying nature
of the speech being compelled makes a difference in ferreting out
the correct level of scrutiny in this tack. Mandating the display of
art is far less concerning to core First Amendment interests in
speaker self-realization and autonomy than is compelling a person

135

Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 775 F. App’x. at 349.
See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 574 (1998) (labeling as
“provocative” the homoerotic photographs of Robert Mapplethorpe and “artist Andres
Serrano’s work Piss Christ, a photograph of a crucifix immersed in urine”); Brooklyn Inst.
of Arts & Sci. v. City of N.Y., 64 F. Supp. 2d 184, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (involving a First
Amendment challenge to the defunding of a public art museum in New York City because
then-Mayor Rudolph Giuliani deemed “sick” and “disgusting” an exhibit entitled
“Sensation: Young British Artists from the Saatchi Collection”).
137
See supra text accompanying notes 108–111 (addressing Wooley, which held that a
Jehovah’s Witness couple could not be compelled to display New Hampshire’s motto
“Live Free or Die” on their vehicles’ license plates in light of the couple’s religious
objections to that slogan).
138
Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 775 F. App’x. at 350.
139
Id.
140
Id.
136
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to endorse a viewpoint with ideological overtones such as “Live
Free or Die.”141
The 2018 federal district court decision that the Ninth Circuit
affirmed in Building Industry Association merits examination
because it embraces a radically different path to determining
scrutiny than, as was the situation in Wheeler, simply asking if a law
is content-based or content-neutral and if it involves commercial
speech.142 Issuing his ruling in February 2018—several months
before the Supreme Court’s decisions in Janus and Becerra—
Judge Vince Chhabria approvingly cited and embraced a First
Amendment-based interests approach to scrutiny advocated by
Justice Stephen Breyer, perhaps doing so because Chhabria clerked
for Breyer in the early 2000s.143 In particular, Chhabria quoted
several statements144 affecting scrutiny that Breyer made when
concurring in the high court’s 2017 ruling in Expressions Hair
Design v. Schneiderman:145


141

“virtually all government regulation affects
speech,”146 and

As Professor Edward Eberle explains:
Intrinsically, free speech is valuable because it promotes and reflects
human personality and is an essence of human dignity. Autonomy to
think, listen, and speak for oneself is essential to a free and selfdetermining human being. Free speech theorists have captured aspects
of this justification for expression as resting on a basis of individual
self-fulfillment, self-realization, or liberty.
Edward J. Eberle, Cross Burning, Hate Speech, and Free Speech in America, 36 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 953, 960-61 (2004).
142
Bldg. Indus. Ass’n–Bay Area v. City of Oakland, 289 F. Supp. 3d 1056 (N.D. Cal.
2018), aff’d, 775 F. App’x. 348 (9th Cir. 2019).
143
See id. at 1059; see also Press Release, The White House (Office of the Press
Secretary), President Obama Nominates Six to Serve on the United States District Court
(July 25, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/25/
president-obama-nominates-six-serve-united-states-district-court [https://perma.cc/Y2S6BG7R] (“From 2001 to 2002, he [Chhabria] clerked for Justice Stephen G. Breyer on the
United States Supreme Court.”).
144
Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 1059–60 (quoting Justice Breyer’s
concurrence in Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017)
(Breyer, J., concurring)).
145
137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017).
146
Id. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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scrutiny determinations should be based on
“whether, or how, a challenged statute, rule, or
regulation affects an interest that the First
Amendment protects,”147 with mere rational basis
review normally called for when a regulation
“does not significantly affect the interests that
the First Amendment protects.”148

This reasoning from Expressions Hair Design tracks a 2015
assertion by Justice Breyer in Reed v. Town of Gilbert. There, he
contended that when determining scrutiny, “[t]he First Amendment
requires greater judicial sensitivity both to the Amendment’s expressive objectives and to the public’s legitimate need for regulation than
a simple recitation of categories, such as ‘content discrimination’
and ‘strict scrutiny,’ would permit.”149 Breyer’s interests-based
approach to determining scrutiny thus rejects mechanistically and
hastily applying categorical labels to laws such as content discrimination and strict scrutiny.150
For Breyer, the speech “interests close to the First Amendment’s
protective core”151 that seemingly mandate a heightened level of
judicial review of a statute are “the processes through which political discourse or public opinion is formed or expressed.” 152 He also
has suggested that protecting both unpopular ideas and a truth-seeking marketplace of ideas153 are important First Amendment interests

147

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
149
135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
150
Justice Breyer added in Reed that “the category ‘content discrimination’ is better
considered in many contexts, including here, as a rule of thumb, rather than as an automatic
‘strict scrutiny’ trigger, leading to almost certain legal condemnation.” Id.
151
Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring).
152
Id.
153
See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6 (1992) (“The
‘marketplace of ideas’ is perhaps the most powerful metaphor in the free speech
tradition.”). The marketplace theory pivots on the belief that free speech “contributes to the
promotion of truth.” Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy
Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 998 (2003). It holds “that truth will
emerge in the long run as long as the marketplace remains free from government
intervention and all ideas.” Nancy J. Whitmore, Facing the Fear: A Free Market Approach
for Economic Expression, 17 C OMM . L. & P OL’Y 21, 26 (2012).
148
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that might demand heightened review “in an appropriate case.”154
For Justice Breyer, protecting a diverse marketplace of ideas serves
self-governing democracy.155
Conversely, core First Amendment interests are not implicated—and thus vaster deference should be granted to democratically elected legislative bodies—when laws regulate marketplaces
for goods and services.156 As Breyer opined in Becerra when
pushing back against the Lochnerization of the First Amendment
addressed earlier in this Article,157 the Court should embrace a
“respectful approach to economic and social legislation” that implicates speech.158 Explaining in interests-based terminology why a
more relaxed level of judicial review is appropriate in these situations, Breyer asserted that “[u]sing the First Amendment to strike
down economic and social laws that legislatures long would have
thought themselves free to enact will, for the American public, obscure, not clarify, the true value of protecting freedom of speech.”159
In brief, Judge Chhabria in Building Industry Association firmly
latched on to Breyer’s interests-and-values tack rather than reflexively applying strict scrutiny simply because the law was contentbased.160 This ultimately led Chhabria to conclude that Oakland’s
ordinance did “not raise any of the red flags” 161 that would require
heightened scrutiny, such as: (1) compelling a person to convey a
disagreeable political or ideological message, as was the circum154

Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2382 (2018)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
155
See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 583 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“Without such a marketplace, the public could not freely choose a government pledged to
implement policies that reflect the people’s informed will.”).
156
Id.
157
See supra note 98 and accompanying text (addressing First Amendment Lochnerization).
158
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2382 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
159
Id. at 2383 (emphasis added).
160
Although Judge Chhabria did not analyze the question of whether Oakland’s law
was content-based or content-neutral, the law would certainly seem to be content-based
because it compelled either the display or funding of art—a particular form of content,
as compared to other varieties of content, such as compelling the funding of news or
educational materials.
161
Bldg. Indus. Ass’n–Bay Area v. City of Oakland, 289 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1060 (N.D.
Cal. 2018), aff’d, 775 F. App’x. 348 (9th Cir. 2019).
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stance in both Barnette and Wooley; or (2) requiring publication of
others’ messages in a way that might hinder or deter a speaker’s
willingness to convey his own message, as was the situation in
Tornillo, where a newspaper might engage in self-censorship rather
than be forced, by speaking up, to run a political candidate’s
views.162 In other words, the determination of scrutiny should entail
a close comparison between the interests and objectives of protecting the right not to speak in the case at bar with the interests and
objectives that were at stake in the Supreme Court’s seminal
compelled-speech cases of Barnette, Wooley, and Tornillo.
The Oakland art ordinance did not fit within these situations
because, as Judge Chhabria reasoned, it did:
not require a developer to express any specific viewpoint, because developers can purchase and display
art that they choose. To the extent a developer wishes
for the building to convey a particular message,
there’s no reason to believe that an art display would
muddle that message…Perhaps most importantly,
even if the ordinance to some extent encourages
developers to engage in expressive conduct by purchasing and displaying art, the degree of compulsion
is minimal, because if developers do not want to
purchase and display art on or near their property,
they can comply with the ordinance by paying a fee
to the City in the same amount.163
In summary, the ordinance’s intrusion into the kinds of interests
that the First Amendment ostensibly is meant to safeguard was
minimal, and the law therefore was “subject to review under
the First Amendment only to ensure that it [was] reasonably related
to a legitimate governmental purpose.”164 Judge Chhabria had little
problem, in turn, finding that the law was reasonably related to Oakland’s legitimate interests in “improving the aesthetics within the

162
163
164

Id.
Id.
Id.
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city and bolstering real property values.” 165 He therefore concluded
it did not violate the First Amendment. 166
Ultimately, Judge Chhabria’s approach to scrutiny is unusual.
His opinion nowhere references whether Oakland’s law is contentbased or content-neutral. There is no citation to the Court’s 2015
decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert,167 which made it clear that
content-based laws generally face strict scrutiny. 168 Instead, Judge
Chhabria relied on statements made in a concurring opinion by
a lone member of the Supreme Court—Justice Breyer in Expressions Hair Design—to lead him, by focusing on whether First
Amendment interests like those in play in Supreme Court decisions such as Barnette, Wooley, and Tornillo were significantly
affected by the law, to conclude that a form of rational basis review
was appropriate.169
Breyer, of course, long has engaged in the “partial de-doctrinalization of the First Amendment”170 by advocating for a proportionality approach to judicial review and against a rigid tiers-ofscrutiny methodology.171 He sometimes associates proportionality

165

Id.
Id. at 1061.
167
135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
168
See id. at 2226 (“Content-based laws—those that target speech based on its
communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if
the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”).
169
See Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 1059–60 (quoting Justice Breyer’s
concurrence in Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017)
(Breyer, J., concurring)).
170
Mark Tushnet, Justice Breyer and the Partial De-Doctrinalization of Free Speech
Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 508, 511 (2014).
171
For example, Justice Breyer recently described his “proportionality analysis” as
“focus[ing] on the interests the First Amendment protects” and asking, in turn, whether the
regulation in question causes harm to those First Amendment interests that is
disproportionate to the government’s objectives in regulating speech. Iancu v. Brunetti,
139 S. Ct. 2294, 2306 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). As one
scholar summarizes it, Breyer views the First Amendment as “an elastic amendment,
expanding and contracting depending on the interests that each side asserted for the dispute
currently before the Court. Through proportionality testing, Breyer typically will determine
if, in his estimation, the government’s ends justify the means employed to achieve these
goals.” Benjamin Pomerance, An Elastic Amendment: Justice Stephen G. Breyer’s Fluid
Conceptions of Freedom of Speech, 79 ALB . L. REV. 403, 507 (2016). See Floyd Abrams,
166
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with intermediate scrutiny.172 As he explained in one First Amendment case, the issue for the Court under proportionality is whether
a “statute works speech-related harm that is out of proportion to
its justifications.”173
Put bluntly, Judge Chhabria—the former Breyer clerk—went
rogue on the scrutiny determination by following the lead of a
justice known for precisely doing that.174 Yet, the Ninth Circuit
in 2019 in Building Industry Association—ruling on the case
subsequent to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Janus and
Becerra—affirmed Judge Chhabria’s decision and his choice of
applying a Zauderer-like level of deferential scrutiny in a non-commercial speech setting.175 Chhabria and the Ninth Circuit pave a
possible future alternative path for determining scrutiny in compelled-speech cases involving non-commercial expression. It is a
route guarding against weaponizing the First Amendment by not immediately turning to strict scrutiny when faced with a content-based
law. Of all the cases examined in this Article, however, it is the only
one not to adopt strict scrutiny. It thus is a clear outlier.

Keynote Remarks, Free Speech Under Fire: The Future of the First Amendment, 25 J.L.
& P OL’Y 47, 58 (2016) (remarking that Justice Breyer’s First Amendment opinions
“repeatedly seek to apply the concept of proportionality”); Jamal Greene, The Supreme
Court 2017 Term: Foreword: Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 55 (2018)
(“Proportionality and balancing approaches to rights have long found favor with Justice
Breyer.”).
172
See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J.
3094, 3096–97 (2015) (noting that “in United States v. Alvarez, Justice Breyer’s
concurrence, joined by Justice Kagan, associated proportionality review with intermediate
scrutiny and applied this standard to evaluate a First Amendment challenge to the Stolen
Valor Act”).
173
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
174
Id.
175
See Bldg. Indus. Ass’n–Bay Area v. City of Oakland, 775 F. App’x. 348, 350 (9th
Cir. 2019) (holding that “the district court did not err by applying the lower form of scrutiny
set forth in Zauderer”).
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B. Compelling Disclosure About the Buyers of Political
Advertisements
In January 2019, a federal district court in Washington Post v.
McManus176 blocked Maryland’s enforcement of a statute177 that,
among other things, compelled social media platforms and newspaper websites to publish on their own sites the identities of buyers of
political ads and the cost of those ads, within forty-eight
hours of their purchase.178 The law, which was challenged by the
Washington Post, Baltimore Sun, and several other news outlets,
was intended to curtail foreign interference in United States
elections.179 District Judge Paul Grimm determined that strict
scrutiny was the correct test for measuring the law’s constitutionality.180 He concluded, in turn, that what he called the “publication
requirement” was “most likely unconstitutional” as applied to the
news-organization plaintiffs, and he enjoined its enforcement. 181
In December 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed Judge Grimm’s ruling, dubbing it “thoughtful.” 182
The Fourth Circuit did not, however, decide whether strict scrutiny
or a slightly less stringent standard of review known as exacting
scrutiny (and described later) was appropriate. 183 That is because it
concluded that Maryland’s statute could not survive even under the
more deferential test of exacting scrutiny.184 Its decision thus is not
the focus in this Article, which concentrates on how courts have
resolved which standard of scrutiny applies in compelled-speech
cases after Becerra and Janus.
How, then, did Judge Grimm determine that strict scrutiny was
appropriate? He did so largely by relying on Reed, Becerra, and

176

355 F. Supp. 3d 272 (D. Md. 2019), aff’d, 944 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019).
M D. CODE ANN., E LEC. L AW § 13–405 (2019).
178
McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 277–83.
179
Id. at 277–78.
180
Id. at 297.
181
Id. at 306.
182
Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 513 (4th Cir. 2019).
183
See id. at 520. See also infra note 197 (describing the exacting scrutiny standard).
184
See McManus, 994 F.3d. at 520 (“On that front, we decline to decide whether strict or
exacting scrutiny should apply to a disclosure law like the one here because we hold that
the Act fails even the more forgiving standard of exacting scrutiny.”).
177
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Janus.185 He also articulated three “baseline principles” for deciding
scrutiny.186 Those principles are:
(1) Political speech receives the highest level of First
Amendment protection and laws restricting it are subject to
strict scrutiny;187
(2) Content-based laws are highly suspect, presumptively
unconstitutional and are also subject to strict scrutiny; 188
(3) The First Amendment limits the government’s power to
compel speech just as much as it does the power to restrict speech,
and laws that compel speech are necessarily content-based and thus
also must face strict scrutiny.189
Judge Grimm found that all three baseline principles were implicated by Maryland’s statute and consequently strict scrutiny was
the default standard of review unless the state could prove that an
exception to those guideposts applied.190 The Fourth Circuit, it
should be stressed, concurred that the law was a content-based
regulation that singled out political expression while also compelling speech.191 Furthermore, and unlike Grimm, the appellate court
raised another First Amendment red flag about the law: it implicated
the right to engage in anonymous political speech, 192 thereby putting
into play an additional layer of First Amendment interests. 193 All of
these factors, the Fourth Circuit concluded, “illustrated the imperative of [applying] some form of heightened judicial scrutiny.”194
As noted above, however, the appellate court declined to resolve
185

See infra notes 199–206 and accompanying text (referencing at least one of these
three cases).
186
McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 285.
187
Id. at 285–86.
188
Id. at 286.
189
Id. at 286–87.
190
Id. at 287.
191
Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 513–14 (4th Cir. 2019).
192
See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (holding that a
private citizen cannot be compelled to identify herself as the author of political materials);
see also Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960) (noting that “there are times and
circumstances when States may not compel members of groups engaged in the
dissemination of ideas to be publicly identified”).
193
McManus, 944 F.3d at 515.
194
Id. at 520.
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whether the correct heightened standard was strict or exacting
scrutiny because it found the law failed under the latter, more lenient
level of review.195
Judge Grimm identified multiple exceptions to the general rule
that strict scrutiny applies under the trio of “baseline principles”
noted above.196 These exceptions include: (1) categories of unprotected speech such as incitement, fighting words, true threats, and
obscenity; (2) commercial speech, which is generally subject to a
variation of intermediate scrutiny; (3) speech by particular classes
of individuals or entities, including public school students, prison
inmates, members of the military, public employees who are speaking pursuant to their job duties, and over-the-air broadcasters; and
(4) campaign finance disclosure requirements and ballot-initiative
disclosures affecting candidates, campaigns, political committees,
or donors, which are treated under an “exacting scrutiny” test that is
not as rigorous as strict scrutiny.197 He found that none of these
exceptions to strict scrutiny applied, and he rebuffed Maryland’s
argument that the exception for such disclosure laws should be
expanded in McManus to apply to “third-party media outlets or other
publishers of election-related advertisements.” 198
In pushing back against stretching the reach of the campaign
finance disclosure exception, Judge Grimm turned to Reed v. Town
of Gilbert, calling it “a watershed First Amendment case” that
195

Id. The Fourth Circuit seemed reticent, however, to apply strict scrutiny because of
its almost insurmountable burdens and challenges to protecting electoral integrity. See id.
(observing that “strict scrutiny, in practice, is virtually impossible to satisfy, while exacting
scrutiny is merely difficult. To declare an invariable reviewing standard of strict scrutiny
would be an attempt to script the future in the face of novel challenges to electoral integrity
that we know not of and cannot foresee”).
196
See supra text accompanying notes 186–189 (noting the three baseline principles).
197
See Wash. Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d 272, 287–93 (D. Md. 2019), aff’d, 944
F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019). Judge Grimm explained that exacting scrutiny requires the
government to prove that record-keeping, reporting, or disclosure provisions within
campaign finance laws “are ‘substantially related’ to an ‘important’ government interest.”
Id. at 291. See also Mark Strasser, Equal Protection, Same-Sex Marriage, and Classifying
on the Basis of Sex, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (2011) (noting that under the exacting
scrutiny test, a regulation “will be upheld only if it is substantially related to the promotion
of an important state interest.”). See generally R. George Wright, A Hard Look at Exacting
Scrutiny, 85 UMKC L. R EV. 207 (2016) (providing an overview of exacting scrutiny).
198
McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 293.
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refined “the analysis of content-based regulations and cementing the
primacy of the rule that such regulations receive strict scrutiny.”199
Reed, he reasoned, suggests that carving out any new exceptions
to the general rule that content-based laws must surmount strict
scrutiny should occur very rarely.200
Perhaps more significantly for this Article, Judge Grimm also
relied on the Court’s 2018 ruling in Becerra to suggest that fashioning new exemptions from strict scrutiny in compelled-speech cases
is frowned upon.201 Specifically, he pointed out that the majority
in Becerra: (1) refused to adopt a new exemption from strict scrutiny for anything labeled “professional speech,” and (2) tightly
confined the reach of the Zauderer test.202 As Judge Grimm put it,
Becerra both “reaffirms the bedrock principle that content-based
laws are presumptively unconstitutional”203 and “signals that preReed precedents [such as Zauderer] according diminished First
Amendment protection to certain categories of speech ought to be
read narrowly.”204 Finally, he cited the Court’s 2018 ruling Janus.205
He did so to support his assertion that “the Court has left no doubt
that the First Amendment cabins the government’s power to compel
speech no less than it does the power to restrict speech.” 206
Viewed collectively, as Judge Grimm considered them in
McManus, the Court’s recent rulings in Reed, Becerra, and Janus
create a powerful presumption that strict scrutiny applies in compelled-speech cases. In selecting it to govern McManus, Grimm
followed that precedential trifecta and, unlike both Judge Chhabria
199

See id. at 296.
See id. (“Plainly…the thrust of Reed is that content-based laws, as a general matter,
are suspect. In my view, its strong, unqualified language cuts against the State’s plea here
to review the Maryland statute—a facially content-based law—under a less rigorous level
of scrutiny.”). In affirming Judge Grimm’s decision, the Fourth Circuit also cited Reed for
the proposition that content-based regulations are presumptively invalid. Wash. Post v.
McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 513 (4th Cir. 2019).
201
See McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 297.
202
See id.
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
See id. at 286.
206
Id. See also Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 514–15 (4th Cir. 2019) (In
affirming Judge Grimm’s ruling, the Fourth Circuit also cited Janus as recognizing that the
First Amendment protects the right not to speak).
200
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and the Ninth Circuit in Building Industry Association, did not
expressly engage in a separate and distinct Breyer-like analysis
of whether core First Amendment interests and objectives were
negatively affected by the statute.
He implicitly did so, however, by acknowledging the law
“plainly implicated”207 political speech and that such expression
merits heightened protection because of the role it plays in the
electoral and campaign processes.208 Additionally, in rebuffing
Maryland’s argument that exacting—rather than strict—scrutiny
was applicable, Judge Grimm emphasized that the statute raised not
just Free Speech Clause concerns, but also Free Press Clause problems, as the government was encroaching on the independence
of an entity (the press) that plays a critical role as a check on the
government.209 In other words, two constitutional interests—free
speech and free press—were at stake, thus heightening the notion
that core interests and objectives of the First Amendment were
indeed at stake.
The elephant in the McManus courtroom, as it were, was the
Supreme Court’s 1974 ruling in Tornillo, addressed earlier, in which
newspapers were also forced by the government to publish
content.210 Judge Grimm did not compare the case before him
with Tornillo when determining the applicable level of scrutiny.
How courts determine scrutiny—not how they apply it once chosen—in compelled-speech cases after Becerra and Janus is the
focus of this Article.211 Grimm did, however, compare McManus
with Tornillo in the actual application of strict scrutiny, and it is
worth considering his logic there, as well as reviewing the fundamental holding of Tornillo.212

207

McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 287.
See id. at 285–86.
209
See id. at 295; see also Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment
Theory, 2 AM . B. F OUND. RES. J. 521, 527 (1977) (observing the value that a free press
“can serve in checking the abuse of power by public officials,” and noting the then-recent
impact of the First Amendment “on American life by facilitating a process by which
countervailing forces check the misuse of official power.”).
210
See supra notes 114–118 and accompanying text (addressing Tornillo).
211
See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
212
See McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 300.
208
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In striking down Florida’s right-of-reply statute that compelled
newspapers to print the responses of political candidates attacked by
those publications, Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote for the
Tornillo majority that:
[t]he choice of material to go into a newspaper, and
the decisions made as to limitations on the size and
content of the paper, and treatment of public issues
and public officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It
has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised
consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free
press as they have evolved to this time.213
Two points emerge from this quotation. The first is that editing
is for editors, not the government.214 As Professor Jerome Barron,
who argued the case before the Supreme Court for candidate Pat
Tornillo and against the Miami Herald,215 wrote more than three
decades ago, Tornillo’s central theme “is editorial autonomy: the
right of editors to decide, without judicial oversight, what they will
print and what they will not.”216 This facet of Tornillo, as Professor
David Anderson wrote, “seems to recognize a distinct right of
editorial autonomy arising from the Press Clause.” 217 In fact,
Tornillo has been viewed as absolutist and unequivocal in its
protection of press editorial sovereignty when it comes to thwarting
governmental interference.218 By privileging journalistic autonomy,

213

Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
See id. The Florida statute, Burger wrote, “intru[ded] into the function of editors.”
215
See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Media–A Contemporary Appraisal, 35 H OFSTRA
L. REV. 937, 941 (2007) (“Pat Tornillo’s lawyer, Tobias Simon, asked me to join him as
counsel in seeking a right of reply for Pat Tornillo. Consequently, I argued the case on
behalf of Pat Tornillo in the Supreme Court.”).
216
Jerome A. Barron, Essay, On Understanding the First Amendment Status of Cable:
Some Obstacles in the Way, 57 GEO. W ASH . L. REV. 1495, 1499 (1989). See also Jerome
A. Barron, The Electronic Media and the Flight From First Amendment Doctrine: Justice
Breyer’s New Balancing Approach, 31 U. M ICH . J. L. REFORM 817, 869 (1998)
(identifying “editorial autonomy” as “a preeminent value” in Tornillo).
217
David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 T EX. L. REV. 429, 494 (2002).
218
See L.A. Powe, Jr., Tornillo, 1987 S UP. CT . REV. 345, 346 (1987) (“Yet instead of
balancing, the Court held the press interests absolute.”).
214
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the Court “embraced a Fourth Estate checking model”219—one
in which the press plays the role of an independent watchdog on
the government.220
The second point from Chief Justice Burger’s quotation above
relates to the financial and spatial costs to the press of Florida’s
statute. Specifically, in a print edition of a newspaper such as the
Miami Herald more than forty-five years ago when Tornillo was
decided, a periodical that was compelled to run a candidate’s
response would either: (1) need to sacrifice some of its own planned
editorial content to make room for that response, or (2) if it did not
want to cut its own content, would need to add more pages to that
edition of the paper, thereby ratcheting up financial costs. 221
Although the Maryland statute in McManus only compelled
speech on newspapers’ websites—not in their print editions—and
thus did not affect the total volume of content a newspaper could
either post or print, that facet of Tornillo’s logic was not central for
Judge Grimm. In fact, he readily acknowledged that Tornillo’s

219

L UCAS A. P OWE, JR ., T HE F OURTH E STATE AND THE CONSTITUTION : F REEDOM OF
P RESS IN AMERICA 248 (1991).
220
As the late Professor C. Edwin Baker explained, “the press receives constitutional
protection to be a voice independent of the government (or, at least, independent of the
other three ‘estates’) in order to perform the crucial democratic tasks of providing an
independent source of vision and information, including performance of a watchdog role.”
C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause Under Existing Law,
35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 968 (2007). Indeed, the Supreme Court, subsequent to Tornillo,
has remarked on the role of “the press as a watchdog of government activity.” Leathers v.
Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991).
221
The Tornillo majority explained that:
The Florida statute exacts a penalty on the basis of the content of a
newspaper. The first phase of the penalty resulting from the compelled
printing of a reply is exacted in terms of the cost in printing and
composing time and materials and in taking up space that could be
devoted to other material the newspaper may have preferred to print.
It is correct, as appellee contends, that a newspaper is not subject to
the finite technological limitations of time that confront a broadcaster
but it is not correct to say that, as an economic reality, a newspaper can
proceed to infinite expansion of its column space to accommodate the
replies that a government agency determines or a statute commands
the readers should have available.
Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256–57 (1974).
THE
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spatial issues were not at play in McManus.222 What was, however,
critical for Grimm about Tornillo was the central facet of
that ruling—journalistic autonomy and independence from the
government. Grimm reasoned that Maryland’s statute “fails strict
scrutiny…because of its ‘intrusion on the function of editors.’”223
He added that “respect for a publisher’s right to exercise ‘editorial
control and judgment’ is not reserved for print media alone; it
applies with equal force to outlets that publish content on the Internet.”224 For Grimm, Tornillo clearly provides a formidable bulwark
of protection for the press against any and all efforts by the government to compel it to print or post content.
The Fourth Circuit also suggested that Tornillo grants absolute
protection from any governmental intrusions into a news organization’s decisions about any type of content. 225 As Judge J. Harvie
Wilkinson explained for a unanimous three-judge panel when quoting from Tornillo:
The First Amendment does not just protect a news
outlet’s editorial perspective or the way its beat
reporters cover a given campaign or policy initiative.
Rather, because the integrity of the newsroom does
not readily permit mandated interaction with the
government, the First Amendment applies in full
force to all “news, comment, and advertising.”226
It certainly seems, then, like an open-and-shut case that strict
scrutiny was the correct test for measuring the validity of Maryland’s law. Playing the role of devil’s advocate, however, one
should drill deeper and ask another question: What if Judge Grimm
had engaged in a more Breyer-like approach to determining scrutiny
that focused on the extent of the intrusion of Maryland’s laws into
the core objectives and interests that the First Amendment
222

See Wash. Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d 272, 300 (D. Md. 2019), aff’d, 944 F.3d
506 (4th Cir. 2019) (“I grant that requiring state-mandated disclosures to appear on a news
website does not necessarily take up space the site’s owner might otherwise devote to other
content.”).
223
Id. (quoting Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258).
224
Id.
225
Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 517–18 (4th Cir. 2019).
226
Id. at 518 (quoting Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258).
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safeguards?227 Might this methodology, entailing a closer comparison of McManus with Tornillo’s facts and those in seminal rightnot-to-speak cases such as Barnette and Wooley, have led him to
choose a different standard of review? Such an analysis might
unspool something akin as to what follows.
First, it is essential to examine the nature of the obligated
message. Maryland’s statute does not compel newspapers to convey
a government-scripted, viewpoint-based message, be it either a short
ideological maxim, such as “Live Free or Die,” as in Wooley, or a
longer political one, akin to pledging allegiance to the United States,
as in Barnette.228 Furthermore, newspapers under the Maryland law
are not even compelled to convey a purely fact-based, governmentscripted message, such as the one in Becerra that licensed crisis
pregnancy centers were mandated to convey229 and that likely
diluted the effectiveness of their own anti-abortion viewpoint. 230
Second, it is important to contrast McManus with Tornillo,
another Press Clause compelled-speech case. Maryland’s statute
does not compel newspapers to accommodate and convey objectionable political viewpoints of private third-parties, as was the situation
in Tornillo. No space, in fact, need be given to anyone else’s
viewpoint or opinion—be it that of the government or an individual.
In turn, there is scant threat of the variety of self-censorship that
worried the Court in Tornillo—namely, that a newspaper might

227

See supra notes 143–159 and accompanying text (addressing Breyer’s approach to
scrutiny).
228
See supra notes 99–111 and accompanying text (addressing Barnette and Wooley).
229
Licensed crisis pregnancy centers were compelled to disseminate the
following message:
“California has public programs that provide immediate free or lowcost access to comprehensive family planning services (including all
FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion
for eligible women. To determine whether you qualify, contact the
county social services office at [insert the telephone number].”
Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2369 (2018).
230
See id. at 2371 (“By requiring petitioners to inform women how they can obtain statesubsidized abortions—at the same time petitioners try to dissuade women from choosing
that option—the licensed notice plainly ‘alters the content’ of petitioners’ speech.”)
(quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988)).
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stifle its own viewpoint rather than convey it to readers and, as a
result, be forced to transmit an oppositional view.231
Third, and an even more fundamental difference when compared
with McManus, Tornillo was “an enforceable right of access”232
case—candidates attacked by newspapers were afforded free entrée
to those publications’ editorial pages.233 Conversely, the statute in
McManus does not provide anyone with access to a newspaper’s
print pages or to its website. McManus, instead, is only about
compelling disclosure of the names of purchasers of political ads
and what they paid for them. It does not pivot on giving those
individuals free access to espouse their views and opinions.
McManus, in brief, is about compelled revelation, not compelled
access. Tornillo thus seemingly involved a far greater intrusion on
press freedom than McManus.
All of these distinctions between McManus, on the one hand,
and Wooley, Barnette, Becerra, and Tornillo, on the other, call into
question whether strict scrutiny was the correct test for Judge
Grimm to apply because they suggest Maryland’s law does not work
the same kinds of harms to core First Amendment interests. Clearly,
political speech was at issue in McManus, but no political viewpoint
was compelled. Thus, while Justice Breyer acknowledges that
political speech “lies at the heart of the First Amendment” 234 and
231

As the Court explained in Tornillo:
Faced with the penalties that would accrue to any newspaper that
published news or commentary arguably within the reach of the rightof-access statute, editors might well conclude that the safe course is to
avoid controversy. Therefore, under the operation of the Florida
statute, political and electoral coverage would be blunted or reduced.
Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974).
232
Id. at 254.
233
The Court described the Florida law as:
a “right of reply” statute which provides that if a candidate for
nomination or election is assailed regarding his personal character or
official record by any newspaper, the candidate has the right to demand
that the newspaper print, free of cost to the candidate, any reply the
candidate may make to the newspaper’s charges. The reply must
appear in as conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type as the
charges which prompted the reply, provided it does not take up more
space than the charges.
Id. at 244.
234
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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laws affecting it presumptively demand heightened review, 235 that
presumption might be rebutted in McManus. After all, the law in
McManus does not restrain political speech; instead, it actually
provides the public with greater information about the sources
(the purchasers of advertisements) of political speech in order to
make better informed judgments about the claims being made.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the government “has a
compelling interest in protecting voters from confusion,”236 and
Maryland’s law arguably helps voters understand political advertisements by clearing up any confusion regarding whose point of
view is being conveyed.
Instead of strict scrutiny, then, might not Justice Breyer’s more
flexible balancing approach of proportionality have been more
appropriate? He argues that proportionality “is specially designed
for a context where important constitutional rights and interests
conflict”237 and is “useful when a statute restricts one constitutionally protected interest in order to further some other comparably
important interest.”238
That fits the scenario in McManus. Protecting the press from
government intrusions that jeopardize its independence must be
balanced against the need to safeguard the democratic electoral
process. Indeed, the intent behind Maryland’s statute was “to
stop foreign powers—Russia, in particular—from interfering in
Maryland elections in the future.”239 Whether the law actually
furthers that objective, of course, is a matter to be sorted out later in
the actual application of whatever level of scrutiny is applied. But
when it first comes to the crucial antecedent step of selecting the
standard of scrutiny, Maryland’s interest seems to be, in Breyer’s

235

See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017) (Breyer,
J., concurring) (“If, for example, a challenged government regulation negatively affects the
processes through which political discourse or public opinion is formed or expressed
(interests close to the First Amendment’s protective core), courts normally scrutinize that
regulation with great care.”)
236
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992).
237
S TEPHEN BREYER , M AKING OUR DEMOCRACY W ORK: A JUDGE’ S VIEW 163 (2010).
238
Id. at 163.
239
Wash. Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d 272, 281 (D. Md. 2019), aff’d, 944 F.3d
506 (4th Cir. 2019).
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terms, “comparably important”240 to protecting the press from
having to reveal the identity of individuals and entities who
purchase advertisements.
There is even more reason than this, however, to push back on
strict scrutiny from a Breyer-like perspective. He observes that when
“a challenged government regulation negatively affects the
processes through which political discourse or public opinion is
formed or expressed (interests close to the First Amendment’s protective core), courts normally scrutinize that regulation with great
care.”241 The argument for not applying strict scrutiny, when viewed
through the prism of this quotation, is that Maryland’s law is
intended to positively affect the processes through which public
opinion about political issues is formed. It strives to accomplish this
by adding more speech to the marketplace of ideas to help voters
better understand the sources behind the viewpoints expressed in
advertisements. Knowing, for example, that Russia or a Russian
entity purchased a specific political ad might cause voters to discount its credibility and devalue its viewpoints. In other words, the
argument is that a little bit of government intervention in the
marketplace of ideas, via compelled-speech mandates that provide
the public with more objective facts about the ads they read, actually
enhances democratic self-governance, and furthers informed public
debate, even if it intrudes on press autonomy. 242
Safeguarding speech in order to facilitate democratic selfgovernance, in turn, is a First Amendment theory often associated

240

B REYER , supra note 237, at 163.
Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
242
Cf. Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 786 (1987) (contending
that “autonomy may be protected, but only when it enriches public debate. It might well
have to be sacrificed when, for example, the speech of some drowns out the voices of others
or systematically distorts the public agenda,” and asserting that the government may need
“to enact measures or issue decrees that enrich public debate, even if that action entails an
interference with the speech of some and thus a denial of autonomy”); Howard M.
Wasserman, Compelled Expression and the Public Forum Doctrine, 77 T UL. L. REV. 163,
194 (2002) (asserting that “compelling individuals to speak…facilitates a greater amount
of speech, likely from a greater number of speakers. Ensuring more speech from more
sources arguably ensures the dissemination of a greater amount of speech and a broader,
more diverse, and more dynamic marketplace of ideas.”).
241
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with philosopher-educator Alexander Meiklejohn.243 Columbia
University President Lee Bollinger explains that for Meiklejohn,
“the principle of free speech plays a practical role for a self-governing society, protecting discussion among the citizens so that they can
best decide what to do about the issues brought before them for
decision.”244 Indeed, Meiklejohn contended that the twin points of
ultimate interest in protecting political speech are “the minds of the
hearers”245 and “the voting of wise decisions.”246 If that really is the
case, then Maryland’s statute actually promotes the voting of wise
decisions by providing citizens with facts that might help them to
make better sense of the content they read in political advertisements
and thereby to make more informed voting-booth choices about
candidates and ballot measures. Choosing an often outcome-determinative standard such as strict scrutiny to evaluate the constitutionality of Maryland’s law thus might not have provided the correct
mechanism for balancing the arguably comparable competing interests and values at stake. Where the First Amendment right of the
press not to speak collides head on with the public’s interest in
receiving accurate facts about political speech in a manner that does
not compel the press to print another person’s or the government’s
political viewpoint, a proportionality or intermediate scrutiny
approach to judicial review may be appropriate.
In summary, and as described earlier in this section, a confluence
of multiple forces (the presence of a content-based regulation that
both affects political speech and compels members of the press to
convey information they otherwise would not) and a trio of cases
(Reed, Becerra, and Janus) strongly suggest that Judge Grimm was
correct in deciding that strict scrutiny should govern McManus.
243

See MATTHEW D. BUNKER , CRITIQUING F REE S PEECH: F IRST AMENDMENT T HEORY
CHALLENGE OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY 9 (2001) (“Alexander Meiklejohn,
perhaps the leading proponent of the self-government theory, argued that the freedom of
speech guaranteed by the First Amendment was the means by which democracy
functioned.”); Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of
Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1993) (noting that “Meiklejohn
anchors the First Amendment firmly to the value of self-government”).
244
L EE C. BOLLINGER , T HE T OLERANT S OCIETY 46 (1986).
245
ALEXANDER M EIKLEJOHN , F REE S PEECH AND ITS RELATION TO S ELFGOVERNMENT 25 (1948).
246
Id.
AND THE
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The counter-argument offered above (one contrasting McManus’s
facts with those of key right-not-to-speak cases such as Barnette,
Wooley, and Tornillo, and one more closely examining how First
Amendment objectives in protecting speech are implicated by
Maryland’s statute) suggests, however, that Judge Grimm’s determination need not have been inevitable and that another less formulaic path for selecting scrutiny was viable. Whether the application
of a different standard—notably, Breyer’s proportionality approach
or something akin to intermediate scrutiny—ultimately would have
changed the outcome, of course, is another matter.
What is key for this Article, though, is considering how the
standard of scrutiny was selected and suggesting possible alternative
methodologies to that selection process. In brief, if one equally
values press autonomy and the integrity of the electoral process,
then selecting a standard that initially tilts the playing field in favor
of the former interest and against the latter is suspect.
C. Compelling Disclosure of Information in Voter Registration
Drives
In September 2019, a federal district court in League of Women
Voters v. Hargett247 blocked Tennessee from enforcing a compelledspeech obligation imposed on groups engaged in voter registration
drives. Specifically, when making any “public communication
regarding voter registration status,” these groups were statutorily
mandated to “display a disclaimer that such communication is not
made in conjunction with or authorized by the secretary of state.”248
In issuing a preliminary injunction, District Judge Aleta Trauger
reasoned that the measure implicated “well-developed caselaw
regarding government-compelled speech.” 249 Although she did not
use the phrase “strict scrutiny,” Judge Trauger nonetheless deemed
the statute presumptively unconstitutional and held it would only
247

400 F. Supp. 3d 706 (M.D. Tenn. 2019).
Id. at 712–13 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-132(a)(1), repealed by H.B. 2363,
111th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2020)). The statute defines public communications as ones
“made using newspapers or magazines, mass mailings, phone bank or text messages,
electronic mail systems, or websites.” Id. at 732 (quoting T ENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19132(a)(2), repealed by H.B. 2363, 111th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2020)).
249
Id. at 729.
248
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pass First Amendment muster if Tennessee could demonstrate that
it was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. 250 In other
words, she adopted strict scrutiny without calling it such. She indicated that the disclaimer provision fit within this framework as a
content-based law—the touchstone for triggering strict scrutiny
under Reed—because it involved a government-drafted script that
would necessarily alter the message of groups registering voters. 251
Judge Trauger’s analysis of the applicable level of review was
very brief, consisting of only two paragraphs. Given that she selected strict scrutiny, however, it is unsurprising that she cited both
Becerra and Reed to support her conclusion.252 These cases, she
wrote, helped to establish what she characterized as “bedrock First
Amendment principles.”253
Judge Trauger also rebuffed Tennessee’s contention that a lesser
standard of review—namely, the vastly deferential rational basis
test254—was merited because the law only compelled the disclosure
of objective facts about those registering voters. 255 Citing Becerra,
she reasoned that “[t]he Supreme Court…has flatly rejected the
argument that merely because a statement is technically true then
the government can force a person to make that statement without
offending the First Amendment.”256 She added—citing Becerra
once again—that “the Supreme Court has recognized that, if left
unchecked, the government can use mandatory disclaimers—even
truthful ones—as a means of ‘manipulat[ing] the content of…discourse’ on issues of profound importance.” 257 This is an important
point. The manipulation of the message in Hargett was particularly
troublesome, Judge Trauger found, because: (1) speech regarding
voter registration is political and thus resides at the heart of First

250

Id. at 729–30.
Id. at 729.
252
Id. at 729–30.
253
Id. at 730.
254
See id. at 729, n.10 (noting that “[t]he defendants suggest…that the disclaimer
requirement is subject only to rational basis review,” and holding that such a relaxed
approach was cabined to the context of commercial speech, not political expression).
255
Id. at 730.
256
Id.
257
Id.
251
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Amendment protection,258 and (2) the disclaimer denigrated the
power of those trying to sign up voters by calling to the public’s
attention their “lack of authority.”259 On this latter point, it will be
recalled that those conducting voter registration drives had to tell
people that their efforts were “not made in conjunction with or
authorized by the secretary of state.”260 One can easily imagine how
this disclosure might, at least for some prospective registrants,
lessen the level of credibility or gravitas that they ascribe to the
message that they should register and, in turn, how this compelled
disclosure might dissuade them from registering at all.
Judge Trauger’s concern about the power of a speaker’s message
being diminished or mitigated by a government-drafted disclosure
requirement, in fact, tracks the majority’s fear in Becerra that
the effectiveness of a crisis pregnancy center’s anti-abortion viewpoint is significantly diminished by having to convey the fact that
California offers free and low-cost abortion services. 261 Both
Hargett and Becerra thus tap into what the author of this Article
previously called the “message-diluting or message-adulterating”
consequences of some compelled-speech mandates. 262 Regarding
Becerra, the author explained elsewhere that:
by being forced to convey facts about a procedure to
which the speaker (i.e., a licensed crisis pregnancy
center) objects and, in turn, to convey facts that
might (because they specify that abortion services
258

Judge Trauger wrote that “the speech touched on by the Act falls within the highest
level of constitutional protection.” Id. She had observed earlier in her opinion that “[a]
discussion of whether or not a person should register to vote, moreover, inherently
‘implicates political thought and expression.’” Id. at 724 (quoting Buckley v. Am. Const.
Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 195 (1999)).
259
Id. at 730.
260
Id. at 712–13.
261
As Justice Clarence Thomas wrote in Becerra, “[b]y requiring [licensed crisis
pregnancy centers] to inform women how they can obtain state-subsidized abortions—at
the same time petitioners try to dissuade women from choosing that option—the licensed
notice plainly ‘alters the content’ of [the centers’] speech.” Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life
Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018) (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind
of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988)).
262
Clay Calvert, Wither Zauderer, Blossom Heightened Scrutiny? How the Supreme
Court’s 2018 Rulings in Becerra and Janus Exacerbate Problems with Compelled-Speech
Jurisprudence, 76 W ASH. & L EE L. REV. 1395, 1408 (2019) (emphasis in original).
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are offered free and at low-cost) lead a patient to
adopt that procedure, the power of the speaker’s own
message in favor of not terminating pregnancy is
arguably diminished.263
In summary, and as in McManus addressed immediately above,
the Supreme Court’s logic in Becerra and Reed laid the groundwork
for a formulaic approach in Hargett to identifying strict scrutiny as
the appropriate test. It also is important to note that Judge Trauger
considered her method for selecting scrutiny to fall in line with
“well-established constitutional standards for evaluating compelled
speech”264 and to encompass “bedrock First Amendment principles.”265 There was, in other words, no need in the judge’s mind
to consider an alternative methodology for choosing scrutiny; the
principle that strict scrutiny applies to content-based, compelledspeech mandates permeates the constitutional bedrock. Viewed in
this light, Becerra’s impact—cited four times in just two paragraphs
by Trauger—is proving both swift and profound. 266
D. Compelling Sex Offenders to Express Self-Stigmatizing
Messages
In October 2019, U.S. District Judge Marc Treadwell in Reed v.
Long267 granted a preliminary injunction—on behalf of several
registered sex offenders—that stopped Butts County, Georgia’s
Sheriff Gary Long from placing signs on the public rights-of-way
immediately in front of their residences268 that warned people not to
263

Id.
Hargett, 400 F. Supp. 3d at 730.
265
Id.
266
Id.
267
420 F. Supp. 3d 1365 (M.D. Ga. 2019).
268
A right-of-way was defined in Long as “that part of the yard closest to the road.” Id.
at 1376. The fact that the signs were on rights-of-way abutting the residences of the
plaintiffs rather than closer to their abodes was irrelevant for purposes of the First
Amendment analysis. Judge Treadwell reasoned that:
[W]hen the Defendants place signs in front of registrants’ homes, the
fact that the signs are in rights-of-way, rather than a few feet closer to
the homes, does not alter the First Amendment issues raised by the
posting of the signs and the ban on any response by the Plaintiffs to
the signs.
Id. at 1374.
264
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trick-or-treat there.269 The case plainly pitted the sheriff’s concern
with protecting children on Halloween270 against the First Amendment right of sex offenders not to be compelled to convey the
sheriff’s stigmatizing warning message. 271
Judge Treadwell chose strict scrutiny to measure the validity of
Sheriff Long’s mandate.272 In selecting this yardstick, he quoted the
Supreme Court’s 2018 Janus decision for the proposition that the
First Amendment protects the right not to speak.273 He also turned
to the seminal “Live Free or Die” license-plate case of Wooley,
particularly because it suggests that while the message at issue
may be that of the government and thus considered “government
speech,” it is not immune from a traditional compelled-speech
analysis.274 This is important because the government speech
doctrine generally shields governmental entities from First Amendment claims of censorship.275 As Erwin Chemerinsky observes,
269

The signs included images of two red stop signs, along with a drawing of a Halloween
treat bag overlaid with the international “no symbol” ( ). Id. at 1369. The text, which
was set in all capital letters as indicated here, read: “WARNING! NO TRICK-OR-TREAT
AT THIS ADDRESS!! A COMMUNITY SAFETY MESSAGE FROM BUTTS
COUNTY SHERIFF GARY LONG.” Id. The sheriff had posted such signs near Halloween
in 2018, and he “testified that he plan[ned] to place identical signs in front of the residences
of the fifty-seven registered sex offenders living in Butts County” proximate to Halloween
in 2019. Id. at 1370.
270
Regarding the sheriff’s interest, Judge Treadwell explained that:
[N]otwithstanding the absence of any specific information or data
indicating that the Plaintiffs pose a risk, Sheriff Long strongly believes
the signs are necessary. As he posted on his re-election campaign’s
Facebook page: “I am so ready for this fight. My staff and I will fight
this to the end!!! Nothing is more important than our children!!!”
Id. at 1371.
271
See id. at 1374 (“The Plaintiffs argue that their First Amendment rights were violated
when the Defendants placed the signs in front of their homes and forbade them from
moving the signs or placing any contradicting or competing message near the signs.”).
272
See id. at 1377 (“To justify the burden on the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights, the
Defendants must show (1) the compelled speech and their restrictions promote a
compelling government interest and (2) only the least restrictive means to further that
interest were used.”).
273
Id. at 1374.
274
Id. at 1376.
275
See generally Clay Calvert, The Government Speech Doctrine in Walker’s Wake:
Early Rifts and Reverberations on Free Speech, Viewpoint Discrimination, and Offensive
Expression, 25 W M . & M ARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1239 (2017) (providing an overview of the
government speech doctrine).
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“when the government is the speaker, the First Amendment does not
apply at all or provide a basis for challenging the government’s
action.”276 Yet, as Judge Treadwell wrote in citing Wooley, “the
Supreme Court has never said that government speech cannot also
be, or can’t become, compelled speech.” 277
Treadwell, engaging in a nuanced approach to scrutiny, also
thoroughly weighed the strength of the competing interests before
announcing that strict scrutiny was the correct standard. First, he
seriously questioned the validity of the sheriff’s ostensible interest
in safeguarding minors from sexual abuse. To wit, he opined that:








the plaintiffs “by all accounts…are rehabilitated.
They live productive, law-abiding lives.” 278
“[t]he Sheriff’s decision is not based on any determination that the Plaintiffs are dangerous.” 279
“[t]he evidence adduced at the hearing tends to
establish that, having served their sentences, they
have been rehabilitated and are leading productive lives.”280
“Sheriff Long acknowledged that since he
became sheriff in 2013, he has never had any
problem with [sex offender] registrants having
unauthorized contact with minors, or, for that
matter, any problems at all with registrants living
in Butts County.”281
there was an “absence of any specific information or data indicating that the Plaintiffs pose
a risk…”282

Collectively, these observations belittle the sheriff’s safety
interest in compelling speech in Long and, sub silentio, suggest that
heightened scrutiny is warranted to review his mandated message
because his justification for intruding on the speech rights of sex
276
277
278
279
280
281
282

Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 730 (2011).
Long, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1376.
Id. at 1367–68.
Id. at 1368.
Id.
Id. at 1371.
Id.
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offenders is questionable. As Judge Treadwell encapsulated it,
the plaintiffs had, “as far as the law is concerned, paid their debts
to society.”283 A further incursion on their rights, without more
particularized evidence, thus seemingly merits strict scrutiny.
In contrast to the sheriff’s interest, the First Amendment concern
with stymieing the compelled-speech obligation was much weightier for Treadwell for at least four reasons. First, he noted that
the plaintiff sex offenders were barred by the sheriff from engaging
in counterspeech against the warning signs.284 Specifically, they
were prohibited from posting their own responsive yard signs
bearing competing messages.285
Counterspeech, of course, traditionally is the preferred self-help
remedy in First Amendment jurisprudence for speech with which
people disagree or find offensive.286 Sheriff Long, in brief, stripped
the plaintiffs of the opportunity to fight back—on their own property and with their own words, no less—and to battle against the
sheriff’s compelled warning message. This conflicts with Justice
Anthony Kennedy’s observation for the plurality in United States v.
Alvarez287 that “[t]he First Amendment itself ensures the right to
respond to speech we do not like.”288

283

Id. at 1367.
See id. at 1375 (“By their own admission, the Defendants plan to restrict the Plaintiffs’
speech if allowed to post the signs this Halloween.”).
285
See id. at 1371 (“This year, like last year, residents and homeowners will not be
allowed to move the signs, cover the signs, place something in front of the signs, or post a
competing sign.”) (emphasis added).
286
See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“If
there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by
the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence.”), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1961); see also Mary Anne
Franks, Fearless Speech, 17 F IRST AMEND . L. REV. 294, 309 (2018) (noting that “First
Amendment fundamentalists insist the best response to bad speech is more speech,” but
arguing that “[t]he optimistic embrace of counter-speech as the cure for falsity and injury
is, however, unfounded”); Philip M. Napoli, What If More Speech Is No Longer the
Solution? First Amendment Theory Meets Fake News and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED.
COMM . L.J. 55, 58 (2018) (observing that “a First Amendment tradition that has valorized
the notion of ‘counterspeech.’ A central tenet of the First Amendment is that more speech
is an effective remedy against the dissemination and consumption of false speech”).
287
567 U.S. 709 (2012).
288
Id. at 728.
284

56

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXXI:1

Although Judge Treadwell did not cite it, the Supreme Court’s
1994 decision in City of Ladue v. Gilleo289 substantially bolsters
his point that denying the right to speak through a sign in one’s yard
is particularly egregious. As Justice John Paul Stevens reasoned
in Gilleo for a unanimous Court, “[r]esidential signs are an unusually cheap and convenient form of communication. Especially for
persons of modest means or limited mobility, a yard or window
sign may have no practical substitute.”290 Such signs, he wrote,
embody “a venerable means of communication that is both
unique and important.”291 Stevens added that “[a] special respect for
individual liberty in the home has long been part of our culture and
our law…; that principle has special resonance when the government seeks to constrain a person’s ability to speak there.” 292
In brief, thwarting one’s ability to speak through a home yard sign
raises significant First Amendment concerns, thereby militating in
favor of applying strict scrutiny to measure the validity of any
such governmental efforts.
Second, Judge Treadwell examined the underlying substantive
content of the compelled speech. He determined that it did not
involve conveying objective facts about the plaintiffs, but rather
pivoted on hurling “accusations” at them. 293 The accusations, of
course, are that it is dangerous to trick-or-treat at the plaintiffs’
residences and that people should avoid them.294
Third, Treadwell focused on the location where the compelled
speech would occur and how that venue, in turn, would exacerbate
the detrimental impact of the message by making the plaintiffs seem
to endorse it. He explained that:

289

512 U.S. 43 (1994). In Gilleo, the Court struck down for violating the First
Amendment a municipal ordinance that barred residential signs that conveyed, among
other things, “political, religious, or personal messages.” Id. at 54. Plaintiff Margaret Gilleo
challenged the ordinance, which prohibited an 8.5- by 11-inch sign she posted in a secondstory window that expressed the anti-war sentiment, “For Peace in the Gulf.” Id. at 46–47.
290
Id. at 57.
291
Id. at 54.
292
Id. at 58 (internal citation omitted).
293
Reed v. Long, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1365, 1376 (M.D. Ga. 2019).
294
See id. at 1369–70 (describing the content of the signs that the sheriff posted in 2018
and that he planned to post again in 2019).
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[s]omeone who displays, or allows the display of, a
sign in front of their home likely intends to convey
that the message is endorsed by them, or allowed by
them, or, at the very least, that they have acquiesced
in the message. By requiring the Plaintiffs to display
these signs, Sheriff Long and his deputies are requiring the Plaintiffs to effectively endorse or adopt, or
at least acquiesce in, his message, not theirs, because
the only message Sheriff Long will allow is his.295
Fourth, the judge focused on the importance of the source of the
compelled message and, more specifically, the credibility of that
source in the public’s eyes and how it would likely sway or influence
the interpretation of the warning message. Source credibility,
indeed, is a very important concept in communication research when
it comes to trusting messages.296 The warning sign in Long featured
the statement “A COMMUNITY SAFETY MESSAGE FROM
BUTTS COUNTY SHERIFF GARY LONG.” 297 Judge Treadwell
reasoned that “[t]he public undoubtedly will assume that Sheriff
Long’s determination is correct and, just as undoubtedly, the public
assume that this determination is based on some process that yielded
a conclusion that, in fact, the Plaintiffs’ homes are unsafe.”298
That assumption, he emphasized, would be false. 299

295

Id. at 1376–77.
See Sarah De Meulenaer et al., Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, and the
Effects of Source Credibility on Health Risk Message Compliance, 33 HEALTH COMM .
291, 291 (2018) (“Source credibility consists of two dimensions: source expertise; the
degree of knowledge or expertise a source has on the message topic; and source
trustworthiness, the degree to which an audience perceives the assertions made by a source
to be valid.”); Kristen D. Landreville & Cassie Niles, “And That’s a Fact!”: The Roles of
Political Ideology, PSRs, and Perceived Source Credibility in Estimating Factual Content
in Partisan News, 63 J. BROAD. & E LEC . M EDIA 177, 181 (2019) (“Source credibility is
conceptualized as audience perceptions of the speaker’s competence (or expertise),
trustworthiness, and goodwill.”); Andrea Miller & David Kurpius, A Citizen-Eye View of
Television News Source Credibility, 54 AM . BEHAV. S CI. 137, 140 (2010) (“The currency
of credibility and trust hinges largely on the credibility and trustworthiness of the
information and, particularly, the sources.”).
297
Long, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1369.
298
Id. at 1377.
299
Id. (“There has been no process available to the Plaintiffs to contest Sheriff Long’s
determination that their homes are unsafe.”).
296
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In summary, four factors—(1) the denial of a self-help counterspeech remedy for the plaintiffs; (2) the accusatory substantive
content of the compelled message; (3) the front-yard location of the
compelled message; and (4) the credibility of the source to whom
the compelled message was directly attributed—collectively militated in favor of applying strict scrutiny, particularly when those
factors were considered alongside the dearth of evidence proffered
by Sheriff Long demonstrating that the plaintiffs posed any danger.
While it is unsurprising that Judge Treadwell selected strict scrutiny
and cited Janus and Wooley in the process of doing so, he neither
referenced Becerra nor cited Reed for the general principle that
content-based laws typically are subject to strict scrutiny. Thus,
Treadwell’s analysis departs on this latter point from those of the
judges in McManus and Hargett. Given his critique, however, of
the sheriff’s interest in compelling speech and his analysis of the
four factors noted above, Judge Treadwell reached the correct
conclusion in selecting strict scrutiny to measure the validity of
sex-offender warning signs.
Ultimately, Long differs from the other 2019 compelled-speech
cases analyzed thus far in two respects. First, it did not involve a
statute, but rather the independent actions of a non-legislative
governmental actor—Sheriff Long. Treadwell, however, gave no
indication that this affected his analysis.
Second, and more importantly, the compelled speech in Long:
(1) targeted and stigmatized individuals based on their past bad acts,
and (2) was justified by suppositions—really, mere guesses—that
they might engage in those same acts again. This is a key
difference from the other cases. For example, while the ostensible
interests in compelling speech in Wheeler (the unreinforced
masonry case) and Long both pivoted on protecting the public from
supposed future harms (collapsing buildings during earthquakes, in
the former, and abuse by sexual offenders during Halloween, in the
latter), only in the latter case did the compelled speech both tarnish
an individual’s reputation within his community (neighbors would
see the signs) and degrade his internal sense of dignity and selfworth. Thus, while strict scrutiny was selected by the judges in both
Wheeler and Long for evaluating compelled speech, the need seems
to be greater to apply it in Long (assuming that one perceives
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warning signs targeting humans, rather than buildings, as more
constitutionally suspect). Although it certainly may be hard to feel
much sympathy for registered sex offenders, even when they
have already served their prison time, Judge Treadwell’s careful
analysis of the interests on both sides of the compelled-speech
equation—those of Sheriff Long in mandating speech and those
of the plaintiffs in opposing it—provides a thoughtful template
for selecting scrutiny that does far more than just assume that
a compelled-speech mandate is subject to strict scrutiny because
it is content-based.
E. Anti-Discrimination Laws and Compelling the Creation of
Speech-Based Products
As with Long immediately above, the compelled-speech cases
examined in this section involve the stigmatization of individuals.
In the disputes here, however, the opprobriously branded individuals are not the ones being compelled to speak against their will.
Rather, they are people who, based on their sexual orientation, are
denied dignity and equal treatment under the law because others,
in the face of anti-discrimination statutes, refuse to be compelled
to create what they contend are speech-based artifacts meriting
First Amendment protection and exemption from those statutes.300
Thus, the 2019 cases here are on the leading edge of what Professor
R. George Wright calls “conflicts between speech claims and antidiscrimination claims in consumer contexts.” 301
Furthermore, akin to the counterposed interpretations of the
scrutiny standard in the unreinforced masonry case of Wheeler, the
scrutiny disputes here can be framed contrastingly, depending on
one’s ideologies and values. Specifically, they can be seen either as
cases weaponizing the First Amendment—via the invocation of
free-speech claims and the adoption of strict scrutiny—to target
300

Cf. Caroline Mala Corbin, Speech or Conduct? The Free Speech Claims of Wedding
Vendors, 65 E MORY L.J. 241, 269 (2015) (“With wedding vendors, it is public
accommodation law. Granting free speech significance to the provision of wedding
services makes customers belonging to historically subordinated groups more vulnerable
to discrimination.”).
301
R. George Wright, Speech and Discrimination in Consumer Contexts, 48 STETSON L.
REV. 1, 1 (2018).
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gays and lesbians (or, at least, to attack equality-centric laws
protecting them from disparate treatment based on sexual
orientation) or as ones in which the First Amendment simply
safeguards religiously devout individuals from being forced
to create expressive items celebrating values (namely, that same-sex
marriages are acceptable) they find deeply objection-able. More
briefly, the cases pit principles of equality against individual liberty.
Indeed, in certainly the most contentious and high-profile
compelled-speech cases of 2019, the selection of scrutiny followed
the resolution of two more foundational, threshold questions.
First, was speech even targeted for regulation or was it affected, if
at all, merely incidentally or tangentially to the regulation of
conduct?302 In other words, if only conduct was involved or if
speech was impacted only incidentally to conduct, then the First
Amendment would essentially be neutralized. 303 The cases thus tap
into what traditionally has been a rather fundamental dichotomy
between First Amendment protected speech and unprotected
conduct.304 But compounding the problem, as illustrated later, is a
related secondary question: If speech, in fact, does exist and is
regulated, then who is actually speaking—the creator of the speech
product or the customer who purchases it? More succinctly, to
whom should the speech be ascribed?
A trio of cases—each involving business owners who voiced
religious-based objections to having to comply with antidiscrimination public accommodations laws by creating what
they claimed were speech-based products celebrating same-sex

302

Cf. Paul Sherman, Occupational Speech and the First Amendment, 128 H ARV. L.
REV. F. 183, 188 (2015) (“The notion that there is a distinction between laws that regulate
speech and laws that regulate conduct with merely an incidental effect on speech is well
established.”).
303
See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011) (“It is . . . true that the First
Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or conduct from imposing
incidental burdens on speech.”).
304
Randall P. Bezanson, Is There Such a Thing as Too Much Free Speech?, 91 O R . L.
REV. 601, 601 (2012) (“From its beginning, the First Amendment speech guarantee has
rested on two fundamental boundaries: speech versus conduct and liberty versus utility.”);
R. Randall Kelso, supra note 42, at 356 (“By its terms, the First Amendment proscribes
only government action ‘abridging the freedom of speech,’ not conduct. Governmental
regulations of conduct, therefore, are outside of the ambit of the First Amendment.”).
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weddings—illustrate these predicaments. The 2019 cases addressing the issue of scrutiny are, from oldest to most recent: (1) the
Supreme Court of Washington’s unanimous ruling in Washington v.
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc.;305 (2) the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit’s two-to-one decision in Telescope Media Group v.
Lucero;306 and (3) the Supreme Court of Arizona’s four-to-three
ruling in Brush & Nib Studios v. City of Phoenix.307
The debate over selecting scrutiny in such right-not-to-speak
claims involving public accommodations laws was not resolved by
the Supreme Court in the 2018 case Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission.308 The Court held in favor of
cake baker Jack Phillips and his refusal to create a cake for a
same-sex wedding reception. The decision was based narrowly on
Free Exercise Clause grounds, with the Court dodging the Free
Speech Clause claim.309 Justice Clarence Thomas, it should be
noted, wrote a separate concurrence on Phillips’s free speech theory,
finding both that creating a custom wedding cake was expressive
conduct protected by the First Amendment and that “Colorado’s
public-accommodations law cannot penalize it unless the law
withstands strict scrutiny.”310
In delivering the opinion of the Court, however, Justice Anthony
Kennedy left it for another day to sort out precisely how applying
“constitutional freedoms [of speech] in new contexts can deepen our
understanding of their meaning.”311 While Kennedy may have been
focusing on whether creating a wedding cake falls within the
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441 P.3d 1203 (Wash. 2019).
936 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2019).
307
448 P.3d 890 (Ariz. 2019).
308
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
309
See id. at 1724 (concluding that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s “actions
here violated the Free Exercise Clause”); see also Abner S. Greene, Barnette and
Masterpiece Cakeshop: Some Unanswered Questions, 13 FIU L. Rev. 667, 667 (2019)
(noting that in Masterpiece Cakeshop, “the Court resolved the matter on narrower, asapplied, Free Exercise Clause grounds”).
310
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1745–46 (Thomas, J., concurring).
311
Id. at 1723.
306
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meaning of “speech” and implicates coverage by the First Amendment,312 his words could just as easily apply now to the law’s understanding of scrutiny selection in such cases where First Amendment
concerns are determined to exist.
So, how did the courts in the three cases here rule on the question
of scrutiny? One court, in fact, did not rule on it. Specifically, the
Supreme Court of Washington in Arlene’s Flowers, in reconsidering
the case on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court in light of its
ruling in Masterpiece Cakeshop, concluded that the creation and
sale of wedding floral arrangements was neither pure speech nor
expressive conduct313 and thus received no First Amendment speech
protection.314 Instead, it was “unprotected conduct,” 315 and therefore
Washington’s high court never faced the scrutiny selection issue. In
turn, Barronelle Stutzman, a Southern Baptist who believes
marriage should only be between a man and a woman, 316 lost
her free speech claim.317 Arlene’s Flowers thus illustrates the

312

See Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56
W M . & M ARY L. REV. 1613, 1618 (2015) (“When an act (whether a regulatory act of
government or a communicative or expressive act of a speaker) is held to implicate the
First Amendment—when a First Amendment-inspired test or standard of review applies—
the act can be considered to be covered by the First Amendment.”); Amanda Shanor, First
Amendment Coverage, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 318, 319 (2018) (asserting that “First
Amendment coverage denotes the scope of activities that litigants and judges consider
proper targets of constitutional litigation and review”).
313
Expressive conduct generally refers to the idea that certain forms of conduct can rise
to the level of speech within the meaning of the First Amendment. As former Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor wrote in characterizing cross-burning as a form of speech, “the First
Amendment protects symbolic conduct as well as pure speech.” Virginia v. Black, 538
U.S. 343, 360, n.2 (2003). The Court’s primary test for expressive conduct requires both
that a particularized message be intended by the actor engaging in the conduct, as well as
a great likelihood that the message will be understood as intended by those who view it in
the surrounding circumstances. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974).
The Court has clarified, however, that “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a
condition of constitutional protection,” particularly when it comes to paintings, music,
literature and parades. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515
U.S. 557, 569 (1995). See also Corbin, supra note 300, at 244 (noting that “[w]hether
conduct has an expressive element is (often but not always) determined by the test set forth
in Spence v. Washington”).
314
Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203, 1224–28 (Wash. 2019).
315
Id. at 1227.
316
Id. at 1211.
317
Id. at 1228.
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importance of the first of the two “foundational, threshold questions” noted above.318
However, in both Telescope Media Group and Brush & Nib
Studios, the respective majorities determined that First Amendmentprotected speech was at issue, thus they confronted the scrutiny
question.319 Before examining their resolution of the scrutiny
question, it helps to briefly understand the nature of the speech in
each case and the objections raised by the respective plaintiffs.
In Telescope Media Group, the speech consisted of wedding
videos produced by Carl and Angel Larsen, a Christian couple,
as part of their Telescope Media Group business.320 They sought
to produce only wedding videos “promot[ing] their view of
marriage as a sacrificial covenant between one man and one
woman”321 in order to influence “the cultural narrative regarding
marriage.”322 They objected to producing same-sex wedding videos
under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), which prohibits
places of public accommodation from discriminating against individuals based on their sexual orientation.323 In brief, they claimed
it was “unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment to require them to make same-sex-wedding
videos.”324 In concluding that the Larsens’ videos “are, in a word,
speech,”325 the Eighth Circuit majority emphasized the large amount
of editorial control and judgment the couple intended to exercise
in creating them.326
318

Sherman, supra note 302 and accompanying text.
Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 750 (8th Cir. 2019); Brush & Nib
Studios, LC v. City of Phx., 448 P.3d 890, 908 (Ariz. 2019).
320
Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 750 (“The Larsens’ videos are a form of speech
that is entitled to First Amendment protection.”).
321
Id. at 748 (internal quotation marks omitted).
322
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
323
M INN . S TAT . § 363A.11(a)(1) (2019) and M INN . S TAT . § 363A.17(3) (2019).
324
Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 749.
325
Id. at 751.
326
The majority wrote:
The complaint makes clear that the Larsens’ videos will not just be
simple recordings, the product of planting a video camera at the end of
the aisle and pressing record. Rather, they intend to shoot, assemble,
and edit the videos with the goal of expressing their own views about
319
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In Brush & Nib Studios, the Arizona Supreme Court majority
concluded that custom wedding invitations created by Joanna Duka
and Breanna Koski, the owners of Brush & Nib Studios, “constitute
pure speech entitled to full First Amendment protection.”327
In holding the invitations were pure speech, the majority focused on
the fact that Duka and Koski “use their original artwork, paintings,
hand-drawn images, words, and calligraphy as a means of personal
expression.”328 The duo, who are Christians, “do not believe that
two people of the same sex can be married.” 329For them, “creating
a custom wedding invitation that conveys a message celebrating
same-sex marriage, for any customer regardless of sexual orientation, violates their sincerely held religious convictions.”330
They sued the City of Phoenix to prevent it from enforcing a public
accommodations ordinance they claimed “compels them to use their
artistic talents and personal expression to create custom invitations
celebrating same-sex weddings in violation of their free speech
rights.”331 Although they alleged a violation of their speech rights
under Arizona’s constitution, the Arizona Supreme Court nonetheless applied First Amendment principles to resolve the case. 332
In summary, majorities of both the Eighth Circuit in Telescope
Media Group and the Supreme Court of Arizona in Brush & Nib
Studios concluded that speech covered by the First Amendment, not
simply the conduct of refusing to sell a product as the governmental

the sanctity of marriage. Even if their customers have some say over
the finished product, the complaint itself is clear that the Larsens retain
ultimate editorial judgment and control.
Id.
327

Brush & Nib Studios, LC v. City of Phx., 448 P.3d 890, 908 (Ariz. 2019).
Id. at 909. The majority held that “pure speech” encompasses “original artwork,” as
well as “words, pictures, paintings, and films,” that “are used by a person as a means of
self-expression.” Id. at 906.
329
Id. at 898.
330
Id.
331
Id. at 899–900.
332
Id. at 903 (reasoning that “because federal precedent conclusively resolves Plaintiffs’
claim, we can adequately address it under First Amendment jurisprudence,” and adding
that “by applying First Amendment jurisprudence, we…address Plaintiffs’ state claim.).
328
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entities had claimed,333 was at issue. They thus additionally needed
to address the level of scrutiny to apply to resolve the compelledspeech claims; both selected strict scrutiny.334 How did they choose
that test? Sections 1 and 2 below examine the approaches to scrutiny
in Telescope Media Group and Brush & Nib Studios, respectively.
Each section reviews both the majority and dissenting opinions as
they relate to the selection of scrutiny.
Section 3 then shows how these cases illustrate a foundational
problem with selecting scrutiny in a formulaic way that hinges on
whether a law is content-based or content-neutral. The line separating content-based from content-neutral laws sometimes is anything
but clear.335 The majorities in both cases deemed the public
accommodations laws at issue to be content-based measures as
applied to the plaintiffs’ activities.336 In so holding, the majorities
also adopted and applied strict scrutiny. In contrast, the dissents in
both cases concluded the laws were content-neutral and subject to a
more deferential standard of review.337 Thus, if one initially
perceives the individual liberty of speech, on the one hand, and the
interest in equality and non-discrimination, on the other, to be
roughly comparable, then: (1) the selection of strict scrutiny is
problematic because it initially tilts the playing field in favor of
the former interest over the latter, and (2) the very process that
leads to the selection of strict scrutiny—deciphering whether a law
is content-based or content-neutral—is malleable and, cynically
viewed, manipulatable to conform to a jurist’s prioritization of
liberty over equality.

333

Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 752 (8th Cir. 2019) (“Minnesota’s
position is that it is regulating the Larsens’ conduct, not their speech.”); Brush & Nib
Studios, 448 P.3d at 900 (“The City argues…that the Ordinance, as applied to Plaintiffs’
custom wedding invitations, regulates conduct, not speech.”).
334
Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 754 (“Laws that compel speech or regulate it based
on its content are subject to strict scrutiny, which will require Minnesota, at a minimum, to
prove that the application of the MHRA [Minnesota Human Rights Act] to the Larsens is
‘narrowly tailored to serve [a] compelling state interest[].’”) (quoting Reed v. Town of
Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015)); Brush & Nib Studios, 448 P.3d at 914 (concluding
that Phoenix’s ordinance “must survive strict scrutiny”).
335
See infra Section I.E.3.
336
See id.
337
See id.
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1. Resolving Scrutiny in Telescope Media Group
The Eighth Circuit in Telescope Media Group applied a simple,
cut-and-dried methodology to conclude that strict scrutiny was
appropriate: “Laws that compel speech or regulate it based on its
content are subject to strict scrutiny.”338As is critical for this
Article, the majority drew heavy support from the Supreme Court’s
2018 Janus decision in fashioning the first facet of this disjunctive
rule.339 Specifically, it cited Janus for the proposition that as
between the right to speak and the right not to speak, “the latter is
perhaps the more sacred of the two rights.” 340 That notion draws life
from dual assertions Justice Alito made for the Janus majority: (1)
“measures compelling speech are at least as threatening” as those
thwarting it, and (2) “[w]hen speech is compelled . . . additional
damage is done” beyond that caused when speech is restricted
because forcing people to “endorse ideas they find objectionable is
always demeaning.”341 Additionally, the Eighth Circuit majority
quoted Janus for the principle that there is a “‘cardinal constitutional
command’ against compelled speech.” 342 In brief, Janus evidenced
for the majority both the harm wrought by compelled-speech
mandates (their “demeaning” nature) and that they are verboten (the
cardinal constitutional command against them), thereby providing
support for the decision to apply strict scrutiny.
For the majority, Telescope Media Group fit snugly within this
framework. Here, the court deemed it demeaning for the Larsens,
under the MHRA, to be forced to convey a positive message about
same-sex marriage that conflicted with their beliefs. 343 Where
Becerra proved particularly powerful in Wheeler, McManus, and
Hargett in building a rationale for applying strict scrutiny in
compelled-speech cases,344 it was Janus that played a front-and338

Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 754 (emphasis added).
See id. at 752–53 (citing Janus v. Am. Fed’n of St., Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council
31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) four times).
340
Id. at 752 (citing Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2463–64).
341
Id.
342
Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 752 (quoting Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2463).
343
Id. at 752–53. The majority explained that the MHRA “compels the Larsens to speak
favorably about same-sex marriage if they choose to speak favorably about opposite-sex
marriage.” Id. at 752.
344
See supra text accompanying notes 88–90, 200–206, and 255–266.
339
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center role for the Telescope Media Group court in establishing
its bright-line rule that “[l]aws that compel speech . . . are subject
to strict scrutiny.”345
Two other Supreme Court right-not-to-speak decisions also
nudged the majority towards concluding that laws compelling
speech are subject to strict scrutiny—Tornillo, addressed earlier,346
and Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of
Boston.347 In Hurley, the Court held that the First Amendment
allowed the private organizers of a St. Patrick’s Day parade—an
inherently expressive activity348—to exclude, in the face of a
Massachusetts public accommodations law, the carrying of a banner
by a gay, lesbian, and bisexual organization because its banner
would intrude on the autonomy of the parade organizers in controlling the parade’s messages.349 The dispute in Hurley pivoted not on
banning the group from marching, but rather on allowing it to march
with “its own banner.”350 The Court ruled for the parade organizers,
concluding their “claim to the benefit of this principle of autonomy to control one’s own speech is as sound as the South Boston
parade is expressive.”351
The Eighth Circuit majority used both Tornillo and Hurley
largely to rebut Minnesota’s argument that the injury to the Larsens
was not, in fact, demeaning because the MHRA did not require them
to convey a specific government-drafted message.352 For the majority, Tornillo and Hurley stood for the collective principle that the
forced inclusion of a third-party’s message (a political candidate’s
views in Tornillo, and a gay, lesbian, and bisexual organization’s
banner in Hurley) is just as harmful as being forced to convey
345

Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 754.
See supra text accompanying notes 114–18 (addressing Tornillo).
347
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
348
Id. at 568 (“Parades are…a form of expression, not just motion, and the inherent
expressiveness of marching to make a point explains our cases involving
protest marches.”).
349
Id. at 573 (concluding that “this use of the States power violates the fundamental rule
of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the
content of his own message”).
350
Id. at 572.
351
Id. at 574.
352
See Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 753 (8th Cir. 2019).
346
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a government-scripted statement. 353 In other words, for the Eighth
Circuit, the “foisting of a third party’s message on a speaker”354
is equally as injurious as the government compelling its own prefabricated message.
The majority added that beyond simply compelling speech,
the MHRA interfered with the speech rights of the Larsens by
operating “as a content-based regulation of their speech.” 355 As the
appellate court wrote, there were “overlapping” concerns about
compelling speech and imposing a content-based regulation, thus
providing two justifications for why the MHRA, as applied to the
Larsens’ wedding videos and their desire not to create ones celebrating same-sex marriages, should be subjected to strict scrutiny. 356
The majority deemed the MHRA content-based, despite its
facial neutrality, because the obligation it imposed on the Larsens to
create wedding videos for same-sex couples was triggered by their
initial decision to create a specific type of content—namely, wedding videos for opposite-sex couples. 357 That is to say, the MHRA
both: (1) created an obligation to produce one type of content (samesex wedding videos) only because of the Larsens’ earlier decision to
produce another type of content (opposite-sex wedding videos), and
(2) penalized their initial decision by forcing them to create content
to which they objected.358The majority cited Reed to support the
notion that the MHRA was content-based because its operation was
triggered in Telescope Media Group by the ideas and messages
expressed through wedding videos.359
Finally, the majority turned to Tornillo to support the theory that
the Larsens were penalized based upon content they produced, much
in the same way that Florida newspapers in Tornillo were penalized
for printing content critical of candidates for public office. 360 In a
nutshell, the Larsens would not have been obligated to create same353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360

Id.
Id.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 752.
Id. at 753.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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sex wedding videos had they not elected to create opposite-sex ones,
and Florida newspapers would not have faced a mandate to publish
the views of candidates for public office they opposed had they not
published views critical of them in the first place.361 Thus, much as
the Supreme Court in Tornillo fretted about the chilling effect that
Florida’s right-of-reply law might have on newspapers by deterring
them from printing their own views about candidates in order not to
be compelled to publish those of the candidates they opposed, 362 the
Eighth Circuit majority worried about the chilling effect on the
speech of the Larsens, who wanted to “make films that promote their
view of marriage as a ‘sacrificial covenant between one man and
one woman.’”363 As the Telescope Media Group majority wrote in
quoting Tornillo, “‘the safe course’ for the Larsens would be to
avoid the wedding-video business altogether. Yet this type of
compelled self-censorship, a byproduct of regulating speech based
on its content, unquestionably ‘dampens the vigor and limits the
variety of public debate.’”364
But the majority did not stop there in equating the gravity of the
content-based penalty and the possibility of self-censorship in
Telescope Media Group with that in Tornillo. It contended that
the obligation imposed by the MHRA was actually worse than
that levied by the right-of-reply statute in Tornillo.365 The majority
reasoned that in Tornillo, “all the newspaper had to do was
reproduce verbatim an opinion piece written by someone else….
The MHRA, in contrast, would require the Larsens to use their
own creative skills to speak in a way they find morally objectionnable.”366 In other words, it is more injurious—from a First Amendment perspective, in the majority’s view—to be compelled to
create objectionable content for someone else than it is to publish
objectionable content someone else has already created. This
suggests a type of logic where the sweat-of-one’s-brow—the effort

361

Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 116–17 (addressing the chilling effect and selfcensorship concerns in Tornillo).
363
Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 748.
364
Id. at 754 (internal quotation marks omitted).
365
Id. at 754, n.4.
366
Id. (internal citation omitted).
362
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of writing rather than merely printing—affects right-not-to-speak
scrutiny analyses.
All of this reasoning, it must be emphasized, occurred before the
majority articulated its clear-cut rule noted earlier that “[l]aws
that compel speech or regulate it based on its content are subject
to strict scrutiny.”367In brief, Janus, Hurley, and Tornillo played
key roles for the Eighth Circuit majority in supporting its selection of strict scrutiny. Applying that test, the majority reversed
the trial court’s dismissal of the Larsens’ free speech claim and sent
the case back to the lower court to decide whether a preliminary
injunction should be issued.368
Judge Jane Kelly dissented.369 As with the majority, she
recognized that videos are expression safeguarded by the First
Amendment.370 But that conclusion provided no succor, in her view,
for the Larsens. Why? Not only because she believed the MHRA
would actually survive strict scrutiny, 371 but also because she found
the more deferential, intermediate scrutiny standard was the correct
test, as she viewed the MHRA to be a content-neutral regulation that
does not, in fact, compel speech. 372 The statute only regulates
conduct, in Judge Kelly’s view, and is neither content-based on its
face nor was it adopted with the illicit motive of targeting particular
content, thereby putting it outside of Reed’s requirements for a
content-based law.373 In brief, the MHRA regulates the speech products of the Larsens, but only incidentally to regulating discriminatory conduct by places of public accommodation—here, the
367

Id.
Id. at 747 (“Because the First Amendment allows the Larsens to choose when to speak
and what to say, we reverse the dismissal of two of their claims and remand with
instructions to consider whether they are entitled to a preliminary injunction.”).
369
Id. at 762 (Kelly, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
370
Id. at 771.
371
Id. at 776 (“Although intermediate scrutiny is the applicable standard, the MHRA
would survive even strict scrutiny.”).
372
Id. at 763–73 (contending that the majority “tries to recharacterize Minnesota’s law
as a content-based regulation of speech, asserting that it forces the Larsens to speak and to
convey a message with which they disagree. Neither is true,” and finding that “[t]he MHRA
neither compels speech nor targets speech based on its content. In fact, the law says nothing
about speech at all,” and adding that it “is a content-neutral statute and subject to
intermediate scrutiny”).
373
Id.
368
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Telescope Media Group business.374 The mere fact that a speechbased product was involved did not make the law, at least for Judge
Kelly, content-based and thus did not trigger strict scrutiny. 375
Four facets of her logic in concluding that intermediate
scrutiny was appropriate are important, especially when contrasted
with that of the majority. First, she distinguished Tornillo because it
did not involve a public accommodations law, but rather pivoted
on a statute that directly compelled specific content to be printed
by newspapers.376 As such, the Eighth Circuit majority’s efforts to
analogize the harms suffered by the Larsens to those sustained by
the Miami Herald in Tornillo “fail[ed] from the start.”377
Second, she used Hurley, which did involve a public accommodations law, to her advantage by distinguishing its facts from those
in Telescope Media Group. Judge Kelly pointed out that Massachusetts’ public accommodations statute transformed an inherently
expressive parade into its very own public accommodation.378
Thus, the statute, by demanding inclusion of a banner with a
specific message, necessarily had the effect of a content-based
regulation by requiring the speaker (the parade organizer) to alter
its own message.379 As she interpreted it, Hurley stands for the
principle “that a facially neutral [public accommodations] law
may be subject to strict scrutiny if it is applied in a way that materially burdens the speaker’s ‘autonomy to choose the content
of his own message.’”380

374

Id. at 776.
Id. at 763 (opining “[t]hat the service the Larsens want to make available to the public
is expressive does not transform Minnesota’s law into a content-based regulation”).
376
Id. at 773 (“That a law regulating the content of a newspaper was deemed a contentbased regulation of speech has no bearing on whether a law regulating discrimination in
places of public accommodation also so qualifies.”) (emphasis in original).
377
Id.
378
Id. at 775 (noting that “the application of Massachusetts’s law in Hurley improperly
transformed the parade sponsors’ speech into a public accommodation”).
379
Id. at 774.
380
Id. (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 573
(1995)) (emphasis in original).
375
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In contrast, the public accommodation in Telescope Media
Group is the business itself that offers wedding video services, 381
not—despite their claims—the Larsens’ own speech. 382 Instead, the
speech—the message—is that of their customers, as the Larsens are
simply in the business of telling customers’ messages and stories,
regardless of how much editorial control the Larsens exercise.383
In brief, wedding videos are speech, but the message they convey
belongs to the customer for whom they are created. 384 Thus, the
Larsens’ own message is not altered by the MHRA. If, instead, the
Larsens were independent videographers or filmmakers telling their
own stories, rather than operators of a public accommodation telling
stories on behalf of others, then the level of scrutiny would be
different, Judge Kelly averred,385 and strict scrutiny would apply.386
Therefore, Judge Kelly’s comparison with Hurley taps into the
secondary fundamental issue noted earlier affecting scrutiny in
compelled-speech cases involving public accommodations laws:
Who is really speaking—the business or the customer? 387 If the
speaker is the business (or, as in Hurley, the parade organizer),
then a public accommodations law that forces it to provide content
against its desire will trigger strict scrutiny. If, in contrast, the
speaker is the customer, then the business is only engaged in the
conduct of creating someone else’s speech-based product and strict
scrutiny is unnecessary to consider the business’s First Amendment

381

Id. at 767 (“The Larsens concede that, by offering wedding-video services to the
general public, TMG [Telescope Media Group] qualifies as a place of public
accommodation under the MHRA’s definition.”).
382
Id. at 775 (“Whereas the application of Massachusetts’s law in Hurley improperly
transformed the parade sponsors’ speech into a public accommodation, here it is the
Larsens who are affirmatively declaring their speech to be a public accommodation by
selling their videography services on the open market.”).
383
Id.
384
Id. (“Although the Larsens may exercise editorial control over TMG’s [Telescope
Media Group’s] services, it is still ultimately the couple’s story that is being told, not that
of the Larsens.”).
385
Id. (“If the Larsens truly were artists speaking their own message, then TMG similarly
would not qualify as a place of public accommodation and this entire lawsuit would be
unnecessary.”).
386
Id. at 776 (“A law telling an independent artist what pictures to paint or a newspaper
what articles to publish would still be subject to strict scrutiny.”).
387
See supra p. 60.
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claim because speech is being regulated only incidental to the
conduct of its creation.
The majority in Telescope Media Group clearly saw the speaker
as the Larsens. It did so by focusing on two assertions the Larsens
made: (1) that they create wedding videos “with the goal of expressing their own views about the sanctity of marriage,”388 and (2) that
they “retain ultimate editorial judgment and control.”389 For the
majority, this meant that the videos created by the Larsens became
their own public accommodations un-der the MHRA, much like the
parade in Hurley was its own public accommodation.390
Judge Kelly, in contrast, embraced a perceptual, reasonableobserver view of who was speaking. What mattered for her was
whether “viewers of TMG’s wedding videos would be likely to
understand them to be expressions of the Larsens’ ‘particularized
message’ about marriage.”391 This tracks the second prong of the
two-part test for symbolic speech adopted by the Supreme Court in
Spence v. Washington.392 Under the Spence test, conduct rises to the
level of speech not only if a person intends through his or her
actions to convey a particularized message, but also if that message
is substantially likely to be understood given the circumstances in
which it occurred.393 Under this standard, she concluded that
“reasonable observers” would not perceive the same-sex wedding
videos the Larsens would be forced to create under the MHRA
as conveying their own message.394 The majority in Telescope
Media Group, it should be noted, held that wedding “videos

388

Id. at 751 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
390
Id. at 758 (“But when, as here, Minnesota seeks to regulate speech itself as a public
accommodation, it has gone too far under Hurley and its interest must give way to the
demands of the First Amendment.”) (emphasis added).
391
Id. at 775 (Kelly, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989)).
392
418 U.S. 405, 409–10 (1974).
393
See id. at 410–11 (“An intent to convey a particularized message was present, and in
the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it.”).
394
Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 775 (Kelly, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
389
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themselves are…speech,”395 and thus it did not need to use the
Spence test. This raises the issue of whether a test that applies
for symbolic expression (Spence) is relevant where pure speech
products are involved.
In brief, Telescope Media Group illustrates competing methods
for deciding who is speaking in public accommodations law cases
where speech products are compelled: (1) should the asserted
intent of, and amount of editorial control exercised by, a service
provider decide the issue; or (2) should a judge’s resolution of how
a reasonable observer, looking at the finished speech product, would
perceive it be determinative? Both tacks seem problematic: selfserving protestations of conveying one’s own message and including contractual verbiage specifying ultimate editorial control can
exempt one out of public accommodations laws, on the one hand,
while fathoming who is truly speaking can amount to a guessing
game and perhaps lead to misattribution, on the other hand. 396
The split in Telescope Media Group fails to resolve this issue and,
instead, illustrates how taking different routes to speech attribution
can ultimately lead to very different conclusions.
A third facet of Judge Kelly’s analysis on the level-of-scrutiny
determination warranting review is her favorable use of the
Supreme Court’s 2006 ruling in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic
and Institutional Rights.397 In Rumsfeld, the Court rejected the
argument made by FAIR—an association of law schools and
faculty members—that a federal law (the Solomon Amendment)
violated their First Amendment rights of free speech and
expressive association by compelling them, at the risk of losing
federal funding, to host military recruiters on campus and to allow
those recruiters to disseminate their views. 398 FAIR objected to the
military’s discriminatory policy regarding gay service members because it conflicted with FAIR’s own non-discriminatory beliefs and
395

Id. at 751.
See Wright, supra note 301, at 6–7 (asserting that “[a]udiences will not always be of
one mind in judging matters of speech authorship and endorsement,” and adding that
“[c]ourts should thus more generally recognize the possibility of divided, mixed, and
uncertain audience ascriptions of responsibility for speech”).
397
547 U.S. 47 (2006).
398
Id. at 51–53.
396
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policies about gays and lesbians.399 The theory, in brief, was that
being forced to accommodate the recruiters’ views about gays in the
military would alter and dilute the law schools’ non-discriminatory
viewpoint on that subject.400
The Supreme Court rejected FAIR’s argument. It concluded the
Solomon Amendment primarily regulated conduct (allowing
on-campus access to military recruiters), not speech.401 To the extent
that law schools were forced to engage in speech by emailing and
posting flyers notifying students that military recruiters would be on
campus, the Court determined that such speech was “plainly incidental to the Solomon Amendment’s regulation of conduct.” 402
It reasoned that this speech was “a far cry” from that at issue in
Barnette and Wooley where individuals had to endorse “a Government-mandated pledge or motto.”403
Judge Kelly cited Rumsfeld to support her conclusion that
the MHRA is not transformed into a content-based regulation of
speech subject to strict scrutiny merely because its regulation
of conduct incidentally affects speech. 404 She indicated that the
impact was merely incidental, much like that in Rumsfeld, because
the Larsens were not forced “to advocate a particular, governmentsanctioned message.”405
A fourth point—one beyond distinguishing Tornillo, one
distinct from using Hurley to her advantage, and one separate from
favorably invoking the Court’s decision in Rumsfeld—about Judge
399

See id.
Id.
401
Id. at 60 (“As a general matter, the Solomon Amendment regulates conduct, not
speech. It affects what law schools must do—afford equal access to military recruiters—
not what they may or may not say.”).
402
Id. at 62.
403
Id. The Court explained that:
Compelling a law school that sends scheduling e-mails for other
recruiters to send one for a military recruiter is simply not the same as
forcing a student to pledge allegiance, or forcing a Jehovah’s Witness
to display the motto “Live Free or Die,” and it trivializes the freedom
protected in Barnette and Wooley to suggest that it is.
Id.
404
Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 776 (8th Cir. 2019) (Kelly, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
405
Id.
400
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Kelly’s logic in the scrutiny determination is especially important
for this Article. In particular, she cited both Becerra and Janus as
standing for the principle that “when the government compels an
individual to engage in speech the individual otherwise would find
objectionable, this ordinarily constitutes a content-based regulation
triggering strict scrutiny.”406 As with Wheeler, McManus, Hargett,
and Long, this indicates the collective powerful impact of Becerra
and Janus. Yet, the key word here, given Kelly’s conclusion that
intermediate scrutiny should apply, is “ordinarily.” Her close
comparison of the facts in Telescope Media Group with key
compelled-speech cases such as Tornillo, Hurley, and Rumsfeld
makes it evident—at least in her view—that Becerra and Janus
merely create a rebuttable presumption, not an insurmountable one,
regarding strict scrutiny. In other words, Becerra and Janus are not
immune from pushback by lower courts that take the time to
closely compare the facts of the case before them with those at
issue in other Supreme Court rulings. Her assertion of the
compelled-speech scrutiny rule, with its inclusion of “ordinarily,”
contrasts directly with the majority’s unequivocal, caveat-free
assertion in Telescope Media Group that “[l]aws that compel
speech . . . are subject to strict scrutiny.”407
With the Eighth Circuit’s split over scrutiny in mind, the
Article next turns to a similar divide in a nearly identical case that
confronted the Supreme Court of Arizona in 2019, Brush & Nib
Studios v. City of Phoenix.408
2. Resolving Scrutiny in Brush & Nib Studios
In deciding the applicable level of scrutiny, the Brush & Nib
Studios majority turned to the usual formula—the dichotomy
between content-based and content-neutral laws. 409 Unsurprisingly,
it also cited Reed for the twin propositions that content-based laws

406

Id. at 772 (emphasis added).
Id. at 754.
408
448 P.3d 890 (Ariz. 2019).
409
Id. at 912 (observing that “we must first decide what level of scrutiny applies to the
Ordinance. This requires us to examine whether the Ordinance is a content-neutral or
content-based regulation of speech, or merely a regulation of conduct.”).
407
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are presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny.410
The majority concluded that while Phoenix’s public accommodations law was facially content-neutral, it operated as a content-based
law as applied to the wedding invitations created by the owners
of Brush & Nib Studios, Joanna Duka and Breanna Koski.411
The majority reasoned that the law “coerces Plaintiffs into abandoning their convictions, and compels them to write celebratory
messages with which they disagree.” 412 It analogized the situation
to Hurley, just as the majority did in Telescope Media Group,
with Duka and Koski’s wedding invitations being transformed by
the law into their very own expressive public accommodations. 413
Significantly, the Arizona Supreme Court majority quoted favorably
the Eighth Circuit majority’s bright-line rule in Telescope Media
Group that “‘[l]aws that compel speech or regulate it based on its
content are subject to strict scrutiny.’”414 Applying strict scrutiny,
the Brush & Nib Studios majority ruled in favor of Duka and Koski’s
free speech claim and entered summary judgment for them as to
their “creation of custom wedding invitations that are materially
similar to the invitations in the record.”415
What role did Becerra and Janus play for the majority in
leading up to its choice to apply strict scrutiny? Becerra, along with
Wooley, was used to stand for the principle that the First Amendment guards against laws “requiring an individual to express a
prescribed government message.”416 Janus, in contrast, was used to
illustrate “[t]he importance of protecting an individual’s autonomy
over his or her speech.”417 As with the majority in Telescope Media
Group, the majority in Brush & Nib Studios pointed to Janus for
the notion that compelled-speech mandates are more dangerous
than those restricting speech because it is demeaning to be forced to

410

Id. at 913.
Id. at 914.
412
Id.
413
Id.
414
Id. at 913 (quoting Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 754
(8th Cir. 2019)).
415
Id. at 926.
416
Id. at 904.
417
Id. at 905.
411
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endorse ideas one finds objectionable.418 Thus, while the majority in
Brush & Nib Studios did not explicitly hold that either Becerra or
Janus mandated strict scrutiny, the two cases were used more to
illustrate the injuries wrought by compelled-speech mandates.
The majority’s opinion drew three dissents, including one
authored by Judge Scott Bales which was joined by the other two
judges not in the majority.419 This dissent was also the lengthiest of
the three, and it is examined here regarding the selection of scrutiny.
Judge Bales contended that while Phoenix’s public accommodations law would survive strict scrutiny as applied to Duka and
Koski’s invitations,420 it did not need to face that test. He argued that
the law is “content neutral”421 and “regulates conduct, and not
speech, [such that] any burden on speech is incidental.”422 Thus, as
in Rumsfeld, the law does not raise heightened First Amendment
concerns.423 Additionally, just as Judge Kelly did in Telescope
Media Group, he factually distinguished Hurley as irrelevant.424
Bales also benchmarked the facts in Brush & Nib Studios against
those in Barnette and readily distinguished them, remarking that
“requiring businesses to treat customers equally is in no way comparable to compelling public-school children to salute the flag.” 425

418

Id.
Id. at 929 (Bales, J., dissenting, joined by Timmer, J., and Staring, J.).
420
Judge Bales wrote that “the interest in preventing discrimination is compelling” and
that the “case implicates the compelling interest in preventing discrimination in public
accommodations.” Id. at 929–30. He added that there is “no less restrictive alternative”
means of serving that interest. Id. at 933. In brief, both prongs of the strict scrutiny test
would be satisfied.
421
Id. at 932.
422
Id.
423
Id. (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006)).
424
Regarding Hurley, he observed that:
[t]o the extent a parade analogy is apt, this case is more like a supplier
of banners refusing to sell to a disfavored group than a paradeorganizer being compelled to include groups with objectionable views.
Brush & Nib and its owners are like the suppliers, not the paradeorganizers. The organizers would be the marrying couple and forcing
them to include particular messages in their wedding would be more
analogous to Hurley.
Id. at 933.
425
Id. at 930.
419
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Critically, Judge Bales argued—also much as Judge Kelly did in
Telescope Media Group—that even if speech is involved, the
message it conveys is not ascribable to the creators (Duka and
Koski) and thus their speech rights are not at stake.426 He contended
that “our analysis of the issues should consider whether others
would view Brush & Nib’s creation of custom invitations as
expressing its owners’ endorsement of same-sex marriage.” 427 Thus,
dissents in both Media Telescope Group and Brush & Nib Studios
would adopt a perception-based, reasonable-observer standard on a
seemingly pivotal threshold question of whether the speech, in fact,
is that of the creator or the customer. Bales blasted the majority for
considering the question of message attribution to be irrelevant. 428
In fact, the majority had reasoned that when pure speech (rather than
expressive conduct, where the understanding of someone who
observes the conduct is relevant under the Spence test for deciding
if speech exists within the meaning of the First Amendment) 429 is at
issue, then message attribution does not matter because pure speech
contains the personal expression of the creator/artist.430
3. Exposing a Fundamental Problem with the Usual
Methodology for Choosing Scrutiny Beyond
Selecting a Too Stringent Standard
The majorities in both Media Telescope Group and Brush & Nib
Studios concluded that strict scrutiny was the correct standard for
measuring the validity of public accommodations laws as applied to
the creation of speech-based products that convey messages to
which their creators object on religious grounds.431 Both majorities
adopted this standard by reasoning that the laws in question
compelled-speech, were content-based as applied to the plaintiffs
426

Id. at 933.
Id.
428
Id. (“The majority goes even further and holds that whether a message is attributed to
a speaker is irrelevant in this case.”).
429
See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–10 (1974); see also supra text
accompanying note 393 (setting forth the Spence test).
430
Brush & Nib Studios, 448 P.3d at 911–12.
431
See Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 754 (8th Cir. 2019) (selecting
strict scrutiny); Brush & Nib Studios, 448 P.3d at 914 (concluding that to be constitutional,
Phoenix’s ordinance “must survive strict scrutiny”).
427
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and that, in turn, both compelled-speech and content-based laws
require strict scrutiny.432 The Telescope Media Group majority
articulated—and the Brush & Nib Studios majority quoted favorably—a seemingly hard-and-fast rule codifying this methodology:
“Laws that compel speech or regulate it based on its content are
subject to strict scrutiny.”433
The dissents in both cases contended that while the respective
public accommodations laws would have survived strict scrutiny,
more deferential standards were appropriate. Judge Kelly concluded
in Telescope Media Group that the MHRA was content-neutral and
subject to intermediate scrutiny.434 Judge Bales’ dissent in Brush &
Nib Studios determined that “[b]ecause the [o]rdinance regulates
conduct, and not speech, any burden on speech is incidental.”435
He added that even if one sees the ordinance as regulating speech, it
nonetheless “is content neutral.”436
The cases thus illustrate a key weakness with using a reductionist methodology for determining scrutiny in compelled-speech
cases that pivots on whether a statute is content-based or contentneutral: What is content-based or content-neutral is subjective
and manipulatable. The Supreme Court itself, of course, long has
recognized this problem: The formulaic dichotomy is not as clear
as one might first believe.437 Scholars also have focused on this
trouble for some time.438 However, the problem is exacerbated in
situations such as Telescope Media Group and Brush & Nib Studios
where conduct and speech are entangled and where, in turn, jurists
432

Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 752 (concluding that the MHRA “operates as a
content-based regulation of their [the Larsens’] speech”); Brush & Nib Studios, 448 P.3d
at 914 (concluding that “the [o]rdinance, as applied to Plaintiffs’ custom wedding
invitations, operates as a content-based law”).
433
Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 754; Brush & Nib Studios, 448 P.3d at 913
(quoting Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 754).
434
Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 776 (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
435
Brush & Nib Studios, 448 P.3d at 932 (Bales, J., dissenting).
436
Id. at 933.
437
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (“Deciding whether a particular
regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task.”).
438
Stone, supra note 82, at 251 (“The content-based and content-neutral concepts are not
self-defining…Moreover, several types of ambiguous restrictions do not fit neatly within
either the content-based or the content-neutral category.”).

2020]

SELECTING SCRUTINY IN COMPELLED-SPEECH CASES

81

have wiggle room to disagree about whether conduct or speech is
the primary target of regulation.
The danger is that judges’ political ideologies will sway these
determinations and fill that wiggle room, akin to how the personal
economic philosophies of the justices dictated decisions during the
Lochner era.439 Thus, if the First Amendment fight over the right not
to speak in Becerra was really a proxy for a larger battle about
abortion rights, and if the First Amendment fight over the right not
to speak in Janus was really a proxy for a larger battle about labor
union rights, then the First Amendment fight over the right not to
speak in Telescope Media Group and Brush & Nib Studios was
really a proxy for a larger battle about gay rights. Viewed in this
light, ramping up scrutiny in all three cases simply served what some
perceive as the conservative-libertarian purpose of using “the First
Amendment to erect a barrier against regulation that [is] aimed to
promote liberal or progressive values.” 440 In other words, it is the
weaponization theme to which Justice Kagan referred in her
Janus dissent441 and the Lochnerization of the First Amendment.442
Indeed, “the use of civil libertarian arguments to undermine antidiscrimination law has been identified by several scholars as a particularly worrisome form of modern-day Lochnerism.”443 The use of
a pliable dichotomy between content-based and content-neutral
laws for selecting scrutiny provided the mechanism for making the

439

Jesse H. Choper & Stephen F. Ross, The Political Process, Equal Protection and
Substantive Due Process, 20 U. P A. J. CONST . L. 983, 1040 (2018) (observing how “the
Supreme Court in interpreting the Constitution faced a unique crisis in the 1930s, when a
series of laws enacted by elected officials were jeopardized by judicially-developed
interpretations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses that allowed courts to
invalidate laws based on the Justices’ personal economic philosophy”).
440
Steven J. Heyman, The Conservative-Libertarian Turn in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 117 W. VA. L. REV . 231, 236 (2014).
441
Janus v. Am. Fed’n of St., Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan,
J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying note 93.
442
Supra note 98 and accompanying text.
443
Kessler & Pozen, supra note 98, at 1963. See also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The
Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV.
1205, 1233 (2014) (“By withdrawing from the vulnerable ground of property and contract
to the more politically congenial ground of the First Amendment… libertarian skeptics
have put themselves in a position to threaten even the core applications of public
accommodations laws.”).
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possibility of strict scrutiny and facilitating such Lochnerism
a somewhat easy reality for the majorities in both Telescope
Media Group and Brush & Nib Studios. Both majorities, in turn,
found that the laws, as applied to the plaintiffs’ speech products,
failed strict scrutiny.444
With this examination of the 2019 scrutiny determinations in
Wheeler, Building Industry Association, McManus, Hargett, Long,
Media Telescope Group, and Brush & Nib Studios in mind, as well
as the recognition that in only one instance (Building Industry
Association) was strict scrutiny not selected, the next part
addresses five First Amendment interests and values that courts
might consider when choosing scrutiny in future compelled-speech
cases involving non-commercial expression.
II. BEYOND BECERRA , JANUS, AND CONTENT-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS:
CONSIDERING F IRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS AND BENCHMARKING
AGAINST PRECEDENTS IN COMPELLED-SPEECH CASES

If courts were to delve more deeply into the First Amendment
interests and values at stake in compelled-speech cases before
selecting a scrutiny standard, instead of just considering if a mandate
were content-based, then what interests and values might they
evaluate? Set forth below are five First Amendment interests and
values that courts might analyze. They are: (1) the First Amendment
anti-orthodoxy interest in not speaking; (2) the First Amendment
interest in self-realization through the receipt of speech; (3) the
First Amendment interest in the discovery of factual knowledge; (4) the First Amendment interest in facilitating democratic

444

Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 755–58 (8th Cir. 2019) (holding that
“regulating speech because it is discriminatory or offensive is not a compelling state
interest,” and finding that “when, as here, Minnesota seeks to regulate speech itself as a
public accommodation, it has gone too far under Hurley and its interest must give way to
the demands of the First Amendment”); Brush & Nib Studios, LC v. City of Phx., 448 P.3d
890, 915 (concluding that Phoenix “has failed to demonstrate that the [o]rdinance,
as applied to Plaintiffs’ creation of custom wedding invitations, furthers a compelling
governmental interest,” and also finding that “because the purpose of the [o]rdinance
is to regulate conduct, not speech, regulating Plaintiffs’ speech is not narrowly tailored
to accomplish this goal,” thus meaning that the ordinance failed both prongs of
strict scrutiny).
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self-governance; and (5) the First Amendment interest in protecting
an autonomous press.
This list is not meant to be exhaustive, given that the unique
facts of a case might suggest other interests meriting examination.
For example, the First Amendment interest in protecting anonymous
speech is not included among the five core interests set forth below,
but it certainly is relevant in cases such as McManus.445
Additionally, no single interest is either controlling or a necessary condition for a specific level of scrutiny. Furthermore, it may
be that some interests and values simply are irrelevant for a case,
given the nature of the compelled message. However, they ultimately should be considered collectively (in any given case, as
indicated in the analysis below, appraisal of some interests and
values may point toward heightened scrutiny, while others may not),
with the final goal being adoption of a standard that strikes the best
balance between the apparent First Amendment interests in compelling speech and in not speaking. The factors below, at various points,
also tap into the facts of key Supreme Court compelled-speech
decisions, thus allowing for benchmarking by judges of the cases
before them with the high court’s rulings. Thus, when determining
the level of scrutiny, courts should: (1) consider these five First
Amendment interests and values, and (2) engage in close comparisons between the facts at issue and those in Supreme Court rulings.
Additionally, in articulating the five First Amendment interests
and values, this Part illustrates how they might, where relevant, be
implicated in the 2019 cases examined in this Article—Wheeler,
Building Industry Association, McManus, Hargett, Long, Media
Telescope Group, and Brush & Nib Studios. In brief, the cases
analyzed in Part I often are brought to bear in Part II.
The overarching principle should be that strict scrutiny is warranted when the most harmful and seemingly egregious incursions
on First Amendment interests and values are created by a compelled-speech mandate, particularly when the First Amendment
interests and objectives in compelling speech are, by comparison,

445

See supra text accompanying notes 191–193 (noting the Fourth Circuit’s concern with
anonymity in Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019)).
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disproportionately weak. Strict scrutiny should apply in these situations because it presumes a law is unconstitutional, 446 and thus the
government faces the rightfully daunting task of justifying its harmful incursions into an individual’s right-not-to-speak province.
However, when the First Amendment interests in not speaking and
in being compelled to speak are relatively comparable, then the
more deferential, yet still heightened, inter-mediate scrutiny test
should be adopted. Finally, when the harm wrought to the First
Amendment interests and values in not speaking is minimal, particularly when the benefit to the public of compelling the speech is
maximal, then a version of the Zauderer test—one akin to rational
basis review—should apply.
What all of this means is that courts must spend more time up
front in selecting a scrutiny test rather than just asking if a law is
content-based and, if it is, then subjecting it to the sledgehammer
that often is strict scrutiny. The approach offered here borrows from
Justice Stephen Breyer’s 2019 recommendation in Iancu v. Brunetti
that courts should “appeal more often and more directly to the values
the First Amendment seeks to protect” in considering the scrutiny
statutes receive.447 He rejects rigidly applying strict scrutiny to laws
merely because they are content-based, particularly if those laws
“pose little or no threat to the speech interests that the First Amendment protects.”448 Breyer avers that “content discrimination, while
helping courts to identify unconstitutional suppression of expression, cannot and should not always trigger strict scrutiny.”449
By adapting Breyer’s proportionality approach to scrutiny so that it
is used in the initial selection of a traditional scrutiny standard
(strict, intermediate, or rational basis), one must examine “the
seriousness of the harm to speech” interests and “the importance of
446

McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 479 (2014).
Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2305 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
448
Id. at 2304 (emphasis added).
449
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(emphasis in original). Justice Breyer suggests that strict scrutiny should apply when the
government discriminates against the viewpoint conveyed on a particular topic. Id. (“To
use content discrimination to trigger strict scrutiny sometimes makes perfect sense. There
are cases in which the Court has found content discrimination an unconstitutional method
for suppressing a viewpoint.”) (emphasis added).
447
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the countervailing objectives.”450 In other words, the approach to
selecting scrutiny advocated here involves evaluating some of the
same factors Breyer uses when he actually applies his proportionality methodology to decide if a regulation “works harm to First
Amendment interests that is disproportionate in light of the relevant
regulatory objectives.”451 Judicial heavy lifting therefore should be
done both in selecting a scrutiny test and then in applying it.
A. The First Amendment Anti-Orthodoxy Interest in Not Speaking
Compelling a person to speak necessarily interferes with her
autonomy—her “individual dignity and choice” 452—about what to
say and how to say it.453 The Supreme Court’s logic in Barnette and
Wooley, however, suggests that not all speech compulsions are
equally harmful to autonomy interests. This pushes back on the
Court’s “general rule” in Hurley that compelled statements of fact
are just as suspect as compelled statements of opinions. 454
The starting point here is for courts to mull over where the
substantive content of the compelled message, taken in its entirety,
falls on a continuum. On one end of this spectrum are objectively
verifiable statements of true (i.e., accurate) facts about particular
topics or subjects; it is the end of the continuum suggesting a
deferential form of review is appropriate. On the opposite end are
purely subjective stances, viewpoints or ideologies involving—akin
to Barnette—”…politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters
of opinion”455 that, when a person is forced to convey them,
“invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of
450

Id. at 2236 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2235–36.
452
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
453
See Wu, supra note 71, at 2033 (“Compelling individuals to speak, even in
circumstances in which it is clear that they might or might not be sincere, fails to accord
due respect for those individuals as autonomous, thinking human beings whose views are
independent of those of the state.”).
454
See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573
(1995) (contending that “this general rule, that the speaker has the right to tailor the speech,
applies not only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to statements
of fact the speaker would rather avoid”).
455
W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). The other matters of
opinion would also include, but are not limited to, views regarding “history, state pride,
and individualism.” Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
451
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the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official
control.”456 In other words, this is the end of the continuum that
safeguards the anti-orthodoxy interest of the First Amendment,
thereby militating in favor of strict scrutiny. 457
Cases such as Wheeler, involving an objectively verifiable
message about a building’s construction and the fact that it “may”
be dangerous in an earthquake (assuming experts have, in fact,
demonstrated hazards may arise), as well as ones like Becerra,
where it is patently provable that California provides free and lowcost abortion services, fall on the end of the continuum militating
for deferential review.458 Similarly, Maryland’s statute in McManus
simply compels disclosure of only factual information—the names
of advertisement buyers and the prices they paid for those ads—as
does Tennessee’s disclaimer in Hargett that statements made by
those conducting registration drives are not authorized by the
state.459 None of those cases involve the compelled conveyance of a
subjective idea, viewpoint or philosophy. Thus, this factor—when
viewed in isolation from the others below—suggests that Wheeler,
McManus, and Hargett should have been subject to a deferential standard of review akin to rational basis. As the Article later
illustrates, countervailing First Amendment interests and values
must be factored into the scrutiny selection equation and may, in
turn, suggest a more stringent standard is needed. 460
In contrast, cases such as Barnette, Wooley (a state motto
expressing the apparent view that one is better off dead than to live
in an unfree society), and Tornillo (conveying a political candidate’s
viewpoint to which the speaker-newspaper objects) fall on the other
end.461 Disputes on this end merit a more rigorous level of review.
Why? Because, as the Court opined in Wooley, “[t]he First
456

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
See Rubenfeld, supra note 104 and accompanying text (addressing the antiorthodoxy value).
458
See generally Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279 (D. Or.
2019); Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
459
Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019); League of Women Voters v.
Hargett, 400 F. Supp. 3d 706 (M.D. Tenn. 2019).
460
See infra Conclusion.
461
See generally Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
457
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Amendment protects the right of individuals to hold a point of view
different from the majority and to refuse to foster . . . an idea they
find morally objectionable.”462
It is important to note the Court’s choice of the word “idea”
rather than “fact.” It suggests a key difference—one embraced by
the continuum proposed here—between conveying objectionable
ideas and objectionable facts, with the former conflicting more
significantly with the First Amendment’s protection on “matters of
opinion.”463 Indeed, the Wooley Court buttressed this distinction
between ideas and facts by emphasizing that New Hampshire’s state
motto consisted of an “ideological point of view,”464 not a factual
assertion. Thus, although the crisis pregnancy centers in Becerra
objected to abortion, they were not compelled to transmit objectionable ideologies, beliefs, or views about abortion, merely facts. 465
The notion that compelling individuals to voice a disagreeable
viewpoint (as compared to a distasteful fact) merits a heightened
degree of scrutiny also comports with the longstanding principle in
First Amendment jurisprudence—a principle recently reinforced
twice by the Court—that viewpoint discrimination by the government when regulating private speech is verboten.466 It also jibes
with the Court’s observation in a compelled-speech case involving
cable system operators that “the principle that each person should
decide for him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence” resides “[a]t the heart of
the First Amendment.”467 There is no mention of “facts” there.
462

Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
464
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
465
As Justice Breyer explained in his Becerra dissent, “the availability of state resources
is not a normative statement or a fact of debatable truth. The disclosure includes
information about resources available should a woman seek to continue her pregnancy or
terminate it, and it expresses no official preference for one choice over the other.”
Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2388 (2018)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
466
See, e.g., Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2019) (calling it “a core postulate
of free speech law” that “[t]he government may not discriminate against speech based on
the ideas or opinions it conveys”); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (dubbing viewpoint discrimination “a form of speech suppression so potent
that it must be subject to rigorous constitutional scrutiny”).
467
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (emphasis added).
463
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In other words, this principle embodies a core anti-orthodoxy First
Amendment interest.
This first factor uses a continuum because a compelled
message might involve the expression of both objectively verifiable
facts and subjective viewpoints. Consider a twist on the sheriff’s
sex-offender warning signs at issue in Long.468 If the signs had
simply read “This is the residence of a registered sex offender,” then
(assuming a registered sex offender indeed lived there) it would be
a purely factual message. But Sheriff Long’s actual signs did not
convey that factual statement or, for that matter, any facts about the
occupants. Instead, they expressed the opinion—an accusatory perspective and belief—that a particular residence was dangerous by
including two stop signs, the word “WARNING!” and the message
“NO TRICK-OR-TREAT AT THIS ADDRESS.”469 If the signs
also had included “This is the residence of a registered sex
offender,” then they would have embodied statements of both fact
and opinion. In such hybrid cases, it would be for judges to decide
whether the entire message, when viewed as a whole, fell closer to
one end of the continuum than to the other or whether it was in the
middle, indicating intermediate scrutiny might be appropriate. 470
What about cases such as Telescope Media Group and Brush &
Nib Studios? They also involve both objectively verifiable facts and
subjective values. The stories told in wedding videos and the information communicated on invitations express both facts (for videos,
what took place and who was there; for invitations, the date, time
and location of a wedding), and subjective values (celebrating
specific forms of love and marriage, depending, of course, on the
contents of the videos and invitations). No government-scripted
philosophy or maxim, however, is compelled, unlike in Barnette and
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Reed v. Long, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1365, 1370 (M.D. Ga. 2019).
Id.
470
The notion that mixed messages should be viewed as a whole is recognized in other
areas of First Amendment law, such as obscenity. In obscenity cases, triers of fact must
consider whether media artifacts—for instance, magazines that may include editorial
material stretching from news articles to editorials to photospreads—taken as a whole
appeal to a prurient interest in sex. See Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (providing
that for a work to be deemed obscene, triers of fact must “find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest”) (emphasis added).
469
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Wooley. Instead, these cases more closely track the hosting and
accommodating of the values of a third-party scenario in Tornillo.
This raises the sub-issue of whether being compelled to create
or host a third-party’s viewpoint in the course of operating a public business is as harmful to the anti-orthodoxy value as being
compelled to a convey a government-drafted viewpoint in a nonbusiness setting. A key argument for finding the former is less injurious is that the invasion occurs only within the public sphere of
business operations, not the private “sphere of intellect and
spirit.”471 Thus, while being mandated to create—as part of a
speech-product—an ideological message with which one disagrees
intrudes on the anti-orthodoxy principle, the intrusion is arguably
less egregious when the compulsion occurs during the course of
business operations rather than in one’s private life.
On the anti-orthodoxy factor, cases such as Building Industry
Association, where the compelled speech is “art” of the speaker’s
choosing—the speaker possesses vast discretion to select whatever
message it is that the public-facing art she purchases conveys—tilt
toward a deferential form of scrutiny. In essence, the government
has given the speaker significant ability to control his or her own
message, as long as it falls within the very broad, if not boundless, category of art. No government ideology or that of a third
party is compelled.
Finally—although it is unlikely to arise—being forced by the
government to convey an objectively verifiable false statement
of fact would be treated as falling on the Barnette, Wooley, and
Tornillo side of the continuum and, on this factor standing alone,
would demand heightened scrutiny. That is because, as the Supreme
Court has observed, there generally “is no constitutional value in
false statements of fact.”472 The government forcing a person to convey a false statement of fact seems particularly degrading to a person’s sense of dignity and autonomy or, as the Court put it in Barnette, “the sphere of intellect” protected by the First Amendment.473

471
472
473

W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
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Conveying a false fact upon government compulsion is decidedly
anti-intellectual.
B. The First Amendment Interest in Self-Realization Through the
Receipt of Speech
This interest pivots on the unenumerated First Amendment right
to receive and access speech474 and, in particular, how the receipt of
speech facilitates a person’s sense of self-fulfillment and selfrealization. As Professor C. Edwin Baker explained, “individual
self-fulfillment and participation in change are fundamental
purposes of the First Amendment.”475 Similarly, Thomas Emerson
emphasized this point in his enduring 1970 tome The System of Free
Expression, writing that “freedom of expression is essential as a
means of assuring individual self-fulfillment. The proper end of man
is the realization of his character and potentialities as a human
being.”476 Viewed in this light, speech is shielded as “an end itself,
an end intimately intertwined with human autonomy and dignity.” 477
The focus on this variable thus is how the receipt of compelledspeech might facilitate the recipient’s sense of self-realization and
self-fulfillment.

474

See Packingham v. N.C., 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–37 (2017) (asserting that “[a]
fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all persons have access to places
where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more,”
and rebuking North Carolina for adopting a statute that barred sex offenders from
“access[ing] to what for many are the principal sources for knowing current events,
checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the modern public square, and
otherwise exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge”) (emphasis added);
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–63 (1972) (recognizing a right to receive speech,
including information and ideas); Stanley v. Ga., 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“This right to
receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth . . . is fundamental to our
free society.”) (internal citation omitted); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)
(observing that “the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment
contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The right of freedom of speech and press
includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive,
[and] the right to read”) (emphasis added); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)
(“This freedom embraces the right to distribute literature…and necessarily protects the
right to receive it.”) (internal citation omitted).
475
C. E DWIN BAKER, HUMAN L IBERTY AND F REEDOM OF S PEECH 51 (1989).
476
T HOMAS I. E MERSON , T HE S YSTEM OF F REE E XPRESSION 6 (1970).
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Smolla, supra note 153, at 9.
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This factor is highly relevant in cases such as Media Telescope
Group and Brush & Nib Studios where, standing by itself, it
militates in favor of a deferential standard of review for evaluating
measures compelling speech. That is because a public accommodations law that requires the creation of wedding videos and invitations
celebrating same-sex marriages facilitates the receipt of speech by
the individuals in those marital unions that validates and affirms
their identities and love, thereby leading to self-fulfillment and realization of their identity as gay, married individuals. Additionally,
the receipt of such speech products symbolizes their inclusion in
society as individuals worthy of equal treatment under its laws, thus
enhancing their sense of dignity and self-worth. Furthermore, married individuals can look back at the invitations or watch the videos
again and again, even years or decades later, bringing memories and
renewed meaning to their lives—throughout their lives—via speech.
Denial of the receipt of such speech when opposite-sex couples
are simultaneously allowed this opportunity thus amounts to a dignitary harm, with the inability to receive speech symbolizing
disrespect. They are—to put it bluntly—denied a key part of their
life narratives that give them meaning. It is like watching a film in
which key parts have been censored and edited out, destroying the
story’s meaning and significance.
Such denial of the receipt of speech therefore means much
more than just being deprived of access to a non-speech product,
like a wedding gift of towels or a toaster. Those utilitarian items
neither edify nor enrich an individual’s mind and spirit. If “[c]hoices
about marriage shape an individual’s destiny,” as Justice Anthony
Kennedy wrote in Obergefell v. Hodges,478 then being denied receipt
of speech about one’s own marriage shapes, in a stigmatizing way,
the meaning of that event for an individual by jettisoning a celebratory facet of the story. If the act of getting married helps one realize
her own identity, then so too does being able to possess the story
about that marriage as one would like it told.
In cases such as Media Telescope Group and Brush & Nib
Studios, this variable also is critical because it does not necessitate
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135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
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a fight over whether speech or conduct is being regulated. Essentially, it freely and perhaps boldly concedes to the plaintiffs that
speech is at issue—even speech celebrating the value of same-sex
marriage to which those plaintiffs object and invoke their antiorthodoxy interest described in Section A. Yet, the variable here
in Section B provides the defendants with a countervailing First
Amendment interest in receiving such speech (a self-realization
through receipt of expression interest) to forcefully push back
against strict scrutiny.
In brief, there is a profound self-realization or self-fulfillment
interest in compelling business operators to create speech products
like same-sex wedding invitations and videos. This suggests a
deferential standard of review is warranted for public accommodations laws as applied to the products at issue in Media Telescope
Group and Brush & Nib Studios. This First Amendment-based
interest, of course, must be considered along with the First Amendment anti-orthodoxy interest of the creators of such products.
To the extent that a judge concludes the two First Amendment
interests are relatively comparable, this militates in favor of selecting an intermediate scrutiny test that does not initially slope the
playing field decidedly in favor of one interest over the other.
This variable is also implicated in Building Industry Association,
where it stands by itself, pointing to a deferential form of scrutiny
as well. Why? Because experiencing public-facing art—whether
simply because it is aesthetically beautiful and thus brings individual happiness and pleasure or because of some deeper meanings or
messages an observer takes away from pondering it—can be fulfilling and enrich a person’s life. In other words, compelling the
display of art so that others can receive it—can view it and experience it—sometimes affects viewers’ lives in meaningful ways. 479
Furthermore, this variable arises in McManus and suggests that
deferential review is merited. It does so to the extent that people who
choose to read the compelled facts about buyers of political
479

See T HOMAS M ERTON , NO M AN IS AN ISLAND 35 (Shambala Publ’ns 2005) (1955)
(“Art enables us to find ourselves and lose ourselves at the same time. The mind that
responds to the intellectual and spiritual values that lie hidden in…a painting…discovers a
spiritual vitality that lifts it above itself…”).
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advertisements and what they paid for them may feel more
educated about politics, thereby helping to realize their own
identities as informed and savvy citizens. Receiving such speech
might, for example, bring them empowering confidence, making
them feel as if they will not be duped by a political advertisement
because they understand who sponsored it. It should be noted that
this is a different value than the democratic self-government
interest discussed below in either voting wisely or participating
in democracy. In other words, receipt of the compelled-speech
in McManus can simply make people feel differently about
themselves when it comes to politics, regardless of whether they
actually vote and irrespective of whether they otherwise engage in
dialogue and debate with others about politics. It is, then, a sense of
self-fulfillment that comes from being an informed political citizen.
In Hargett, the compelled speech might affect one’s identity as
either a registered or unregistered voter. For example, if a person is
dissuaded from registering due to hearing the mandated disclaimer,
as Judge Trauger indicated one might well be, then the person
has not realized his or her full potential and capacity to influence
the political process.480 Additionally, as the late Professor Kenneth
Karst asserted, “voting remains a crucial symbol of citizenship,
of membership in the community.”481 Receiving a message that
dissuades the possibility of voting (due to not registering) thus
negatively affects the realization of one’s identity as a full
member of the community. This indicates that, as to this First
Amendment interest in Hargett, heightened scrutiny of Tennessee’s
law is warranted.
Finally, this variable does not seem relevant for Wheeler or
Long. Receiving speech about a building’s structural integrity does
not appear likely to affect one’s self-realization or self-fulfillment.
It certainly might influence where one chooses to live or shop
through the acquisition of knowledge (as discussed below in Section
C), but that impact feels different in kind from the interest in self480

See League of Women Voters v. Hargett, 400 F. Supp. 3d 706, 730–31 (M.D. Tenn.
2019) (noting that the “the disclaimer is designed to highlight the speaker’s lack of
authority” and thus, in the plaintiffs’ view, it “will cause a stigmatic injury by making voter
registration activities seem somehow illegitimate”).
481
Karst, supra note 63, at 26.
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realization through the receipt of speech. The warning signs in Long
are not likely to affect the self-realization or self-fulfillment of the
people who read them. However, they may change how those people
behave and their course of conduct about where to trick-or-treat
(discussed in Section C).
C. The First Amendment Interest in the Discovery of Factual
Knowledge
Professor Vincent Blasi identifies “truth seeking” as a basic
value “served by a robust free speech principle.”482 The First
Amendment truth-seeking interest links to the Supreme Court’s
frequent invocation—dating back to Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States483—of the marketplace
of ideas theory for speech protection.484
Although connected to the marketplace of ideas theory, which
pivots on protecting speech to discover truth and to test conceptions
of truth,485 the variable identified here holds that government intervention in the marketplace via compelled-speech obligations sometimes is justified to help listeners discover the wisest course of
action for themselves by acquiring factual knowledge. 486 In other
words, this variable bridges the marketplace of ideas quest for truth
482

Vincent Blasi, Holmes and Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 S UP. CT . REV. 1, 1.
Holmes, in often-quoted language, reasoned in Abrams that:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
484
Rodney A. Smolla, The Meaning of the “Marketplace of Ideas” in First Amendment
Law, 24 C OMM . L. & P OL’Y 437, 438 (2019) (“The marketplace of ideas metaphor has
been invoked constantly by the Supreme Court justices in First Amendment cases.”).
485
See supra note 153 and accompanying text (addressing the marketplace of
ideas theory).
486
For instance, in upholding a compelled-speech mandate imposed on terrestrial
broadcasters, the Supreme Court cited the truth-seeking function of the First Amendment
and the marketplace of ideas, but emphasized that “[i]t is the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.” Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
483

2020]

SELECTING SCRUTINY IN COMPELLED-SPEECH CASES

95

with the acquisition of facts and factual knowledge in that marketplace as a central First Amendment value. 487
The link to the truth-seeking interest is especially important in
considering the constitutionality of compelled-speech mandates
because it “focuses on the value of speech to the listener, not the
speaker.”488 In brief, compelled-speech mandates pump more
speech into the marketplace of ideas, thus potentially allowing
listeners and readers to better sort out what is true or wise for
them.489 The emphasis on listeners’ rights to receive factual information has justified the Supreme Court in upholding compelled,
fact-based disclosure obligations in the commercial speech realm. 490
Furthermore, in Becerra, Justice Breyer contended that
the fact-based, compelled-speech obligation imposed on crisis
pregnancy centers by California actually fostered the marketplace of
ideas “by providing information to patients to enable them to make
fully informed medical decisions in respect to their pregnancies.” 491
Thus, if the marketplace of ideas serves what the Court has called
the “truth-seeking function” of speech, 492 then sometimes compelling others to speak facts enhances truth discovery through the
acquisition of knowledge. Truth in this sense is not some objectively
verifiable or absolute truth;493 Holmes himself “detested absolutism.”494 Rather, as Justice Breyer suggests in Becerra, it is an
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See Joseph Blocher, Free Speech and Justified True Belief, 133 H ARV. L. REV. 439
(2019) (bridging the marketplace of ideas to knowledge as a First Amendment value).
488
Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. P A. L.
REV. 615, 677 (1991).
489
The danger, of course, is that the government, via compelled-speech obligations,
is allowed to distort the marketplace of ideas with only the views and facts that it privileges
and values.
490
Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
491
Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2388 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
492
Hustler Mag. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
493
Justice Holmes, in fact, did not believe in absolute truths. See Jared Schroeder, The
Holmes Truth: Toward a Pragmatic, Holmes-Influenced Conceptualization of the Nature
of Truth, 7 BRIT . J. AM . L EG. S TUD. 169, 178 (2018) (encapsulating Holmes’s views
on truth).
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Irene M. Ten Cate, Speech, Truth, and Freedom: An Examination of John Stuart
Mill’s and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Free Speech Defenses, 22 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN . 35, 48 (2010).

96

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXXI:1

informed decision about the best course of action or, to use Professor
Stanley Ingber’s term, a judgment about “the best decisions.” 495
Under this factor—standing by itself and in isolation from the
others articulated here—the guiding principle is that the more a
compelled-speech mandate appears to facilitate the acquisition of
factual knowledge that might help to better inform a person’s
decisions about a future course of action that is important to that
person, the less rigorous should be the level of scrutiny that is
applied to measure its validity. How might this play out in some of
the cases examined in this Article?
In Wheeler, acquiring the factual knowledge that a building’s
structure might make it vulnerable in an earthquake could affect
one’s future course of action. Learning this fact might, in turn, cause
a person to seek out additional information, either about unreinforced masonry structures generally or about whether the specific
building in question has undergone seismic retro-fitting, even if it is
not up to the threshold needed to avoid the placard requirement.
The acquisition of such information in the marketplace of ideas thus
might lead a person to decide whether or not to live there or even
simply whether or not to shop there. Where one chooses to live
certainly seems to be a course of action that would be important to
the average person. This suggests a deferential standard of scrutiny
is warranted—at least on this factor—in Wheeler.
The variable, however, seems far less relevant for examination
in a case such as Building Industry Association. In Building
Industry Association, the speech was art. While art certainly may
be valuable for self-realization as argued above in Section B, its
relevance here is much more speculative because the real-estate
developers were not mandated to choose or fund art with a particular
message, be it factual or otherwise. Viewing art usually does not
involve the acquisition of factual knowledge.
In McManus, however, acquiring factual knowledge about the
source of a political advertisement might influence a person’s
future course of action in terms of either adopting or rejecting the

495

Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J.
1, 25.
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advertisement’s stance or position on a ballot initiative or a
candidate. That, in turn, could affect how that person votes on such
important matters. This suggests that a deferential form of review is
warranted in McManus, at least on this sole factor. Furthermore, the
First Amendment interest here overlaps with the democratic selfgovernance value described in the next section in cases such as
McManus where political speech is involved.
In Hargett, Judge Trauger pointed out that the mandated
disclaimer was “designed to highlight the speaker’s lack of
authority,”496 with the implication being that it might deter people
from registering to vote. Thus, the acquisition of factual knowledge
in Hargett certainly might influence and inform a very important
future course of action about whether to register to vote, thereby
suggesting—on this factor alone—that less rigorous scrutiny is
merited. As this indicates, however, Tennessee’s mandate might
actually dissuade and suppress participation in the political process,
something that conflicts both with the self-realization interest in
receipt of speech discussed above in Section B and with the First
Amendment interest in facilitating democratic self-governance
addressed in Section D below. This demonstrates the importance
of the point emphasized at the start of this Part of the Article that
the five First Amendment interests and values must be considered
collectively when selecting a standard of scrutiny.
In Long, the warning signs do not facilitate the acquisition
of factual knowledge that might help a person to make a betterinformed decision about where to trick-or-treat. Instead, the messages are statements of opinion that might actually confuse people
and cause them to make less informed decisions because the
opinions of the sheriff regarding the dangerousness of specific residences are speculative. This militates in favor of applying heightened scrutiny on this variable in Long. As noted above, the general
principle for this variable is that the more a compelled-speech
mandate appears to facilitate the acquisition of factual knowledge
that might help to better inform a person’s decisions about a future
course of action that is important to that person, the less rigorous
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should be the level of scrutiny that is applied to measure its validity.
The opposite is true in Long.
Finally, the variable seems irrelevant in Telescope Media Group
and Brush & Nib Studios. These cases do not involve the receipt
of factual information that might help the recipients—for purposes
here, the married couples who want to receive the speech from business operators are considered the recipients—make better informed
choices about a future, important course of action. As noted above
in Section B, however, the wedding invitations and videos serve a
very different and valuable function in self-realization through the
receipt of speech.
D. The First Amendment Interest in Facilitating Democratic SelfGovernance
Philosopher-educator Alexander Meiklejohn contended more
than seventy years ago that in the “method of political self-government, the point of ultimate interest is not the words of the
speakers, but the minds of the hearers.”497 Citizens thus must have
access to as much information as possible to facilitate “the voting of
wise decisions.”498 As former Yale Law School Dean Robert Post
encapsulates this value, “[t]he First Amendment is understood to
protect the communicative processes necessary to disseminate
the information and ideas required for citizens to vote in a fully
informed and intelligent way.”499
This interest is more than just scholarly or theoretical. It was
reinforced by Justice Kagan in her Janus dissent, where she
explained that the First Amendment was meant “to protect
democratic governance.”500 Similarly, Justice Breyer wrote the year
prior to Janus that among the “interests close to the First Amendment’s protective core” are “the processes through which political

497
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discourse or public opinion is formed or expressed.”501 Any “government regulation [that] negatively affects” those processes, he
added, is typically scrutinized “with great care.” 502
Indeed, the Court has made it evident that laws burdening
political speech are subject to strict scrutiny.503 In explaining why
that test applies, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote in Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission that “the right of citizens to inquire,
to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is
a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary
means to protect it.”504 Importantly, Kennedy’s quotation refers both
to the right to speak and the right to receive speech—the right “to
hear”—thereby implicating compelled-speech obligations that
might, in fact, provide greater information affecting “the voting
of wise decisions.”505 This interest is particularly acute, the Court
wrote decades earlier, when it comes to speech affecting “campaigns
for political office.”506
Consideration of this variable thus requires appraising: (1) the
apparent nature and depth of the interference caused by a
compelled-speech mandate with a speaker’s independence from
government control and manipulation as an autonomous, participatory member of a democratic society; and (2) how the compelledspeech mandate might either help or hinder the listener’s ability to
better participate in the political process in, as Post put it, “a fully
informed and intelligent way.”507 In other words, attention must be
paid to the impact of the law on both the speaker and the audience.
Given the longstanding rule noted above that laws burdening
political speech face strict scrutiny review508 and the Court’s
observation in Citizens United that political speech “is central to the
meaning and purpose of the First Amendment,”509 consideration of
501

Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017)
(Breyer, J., concurring).
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this factor—standing by itself—starts from the presumption that
strict scrutiny applies if a compelled-speech mandate affects political speech. That presumption, however, may be overcome by
considering the two factors above. For instance, if the intrusion on
the speaker’s ability to function independently from the government
in the political process—not, in other words, to be co-opted by it as
a stooge or tool for conveying the government’s subjective viewpoint on either a political issue or about a government official
(or candidate for a government office)—seems minimal, while the
benefit to the audience of receiving accurate factual information that
may help to better inform voting booth decisions appears significant,
then this might rebut the presumption for strict scrutiny and suggest
that the more deferential intermediate scrutiny test is appropriate.
However, before considering the effects on both the speaker and
the audience, the threshold issue that must be addressed is when
this variable even comes into play. That determination, as proposed
here, pivots directly on whether the compelled speech provides
factual information to those who read or hear it that might better
inform their politically oriented actions and decisions. The perspective of the audience—”the minds of the hearers,” as Meiklejohn
wrote—thus is key.510A judge therefore should ask if the compelled
message, on its face, transmits factual information that might
help to enlighten a reasonable person’s choice or choices regarding
actions affecting democratic governance, such as for whom to vote
or whether to campaign for or against a candidate for public office
or a ballot issue.
Importantly, if the compelled message involves non-factual
political information (i.e., a political opinion or viewpoint), then
this triggers consideration of another First Amendment interest
addressed earlier—the anti-orthodoxy interest—and militates in
favor of strict scrutiny as to that variable.511 In brief, the focus on
the variable in this section is on compelled factual information
affecting democratic self-governance because the compelled disclosure of non-factual political information is already addressed by
the anti-orthodoxy variable.
510
511

M EIKLEJOHN, supra note 245, at 25.
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The factual message on the warning placards in Wheeler does
not trigger consideration of this variable. Why? Because, on its face,
the message simply provides factual information about a building’s
structure and the dangers that its structure may pose during an earthquake. The message might influence where a person chooses to live,
selects to shop, or otherwise chooses to do business—something
already addressed above in Section C’s consideration of the First
Amendment interest in the discovery of factual knowledge. The
message, however, seemingly would not affect how a person votes,
which raises an important distinction for the application of this
variable. Specifically, the issue of what Portland should do about its
approximately 1,600 unreinforced masonry structures—how they
should be regulated, whether Portland should mandate certain
levels of retrofitting and whether the buildings should be subject to
a warning-placard requirement—clearly is a contentious political
one in that community.512 However, the speech itself on the warning
signs is not. The words compelled—the facts expressed—are what
matters for this variable.
This variable also is not implicated by Oakland’s art mandate in
Building Industry Association. Although art obviously can be political in nature, as made evident earlier,513 Oakland’s law neither
specifies nor requires that real-estate developers purchase or fund
art that conveys a particular message, be it political or otherwise.514
Without a mandate calling more directly for conveyance of factual
information that might enlighten a reasonable person’s choice or
choices regarding actions affecting democratic governance, this
factor is rendered irrelevant in Building Industry Association.515
Furthermore, this variable is not connected to Long. A brief
discussion of why it is not relevant there further fleshes out and clarifies the author’s intent for this variable’s application. The message

512

See Njus, supra note 4, at A10.
See Bldg. Indus. Ass’n-Bay Area v. City of Oakland, 775 F. App’x. 348, 349 (9th Cir.
2019); see also supra Section I.A (addressing two political and legal controversies spawned
by art; “Building Industry Association, in contrast, had nothing to do with either
commercial speech or the disclosure of purely factual information. Instead, it had
everything to do with compelling the display or funding of art”).
514
See Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 775 F. App’x. at 349.
515
See Id.
513
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on the sheriff’s warning signs certainly might affect a person’s
decision about whether to trick-or-treat at a specific home or residence—something already addressed in Section D’s discussion of
Long on the discovery-of-factual-knowledge variable.516 Whether to
ask for candy and other treats at a particular venue, however, is
not a choice affecting democratic self-governance, such as voting or
supporting a candidate or a ballot initiative.
One might argue, however, that the warning message is political
because it may generate support for a government official—namely,
Sheriff Long—by suggesting to residents that he is highly concerned
about protecting children from ostensibly dangerous sexual offenders. In brief, the compelled speech might chum the political waters
favorably for him. Recall here that the signs proclaim that the warning message was brought to them by Sheriff Long. 517 In other words,
the primary compelled message on the signs may influence where a
child trick-or-treats, but a secondary compelled message (one that
identifies a government sponsor) may affect whether a parent or
neighbor supports a government actor (namely, the sheriff) and, in
turn, the policies that actor favors.
This secondary message—one that potentially affects politics by
identifying a government actor as the source of another compelled
message—does not, however, trigger this variable. If it did, then that
also would mean that the signs in Wheeler were political because
they identified Portland’s local government as the sponsor of the
message by including the “P.C.C.” (Portland City Code) designation.518 Portland residents who might have found the placards useful
might have more ardently supported members of the local government as a result, viewing those local officials as taking important,
positive steps in protecting them from dangers posed by unreinforced masonry buildings. Thus, in considering if this variable is
triggered, courts should focus only on the primary message being
compelled, not on the government sponsorship of that message.

516

See Reed v. Long, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1365, 1377 (M.D. Ga. 2019); see also supra
Section I.D (setting forth the content of the signs at issue in Long).
517
See Long, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1369.
518
See Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1288 (D. Or.
2019) (setting forth the content of the placards at issue in Wheeler).
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Additionally, this variable is not implicated in Telescope Media
Group and Brush & Nib Studios.519 Those cases involve messages
celebrating same-sex weddings. Same-sex marriages and weddings
unquestionably are political issues. The primary messages conveyed
in the compelled-speech products in those cases do not, on their face,
provide facts to those who read or watch them that might better inform their decision-making in a self-governing democracy. Rather,
the primary factual messages are ones that announce and memorialize a couple’s wedding and love.520 For instance, the primary
message in a wedding invitation most likely involves facts regarding who is getting married, along with facts about when and where
the wedding is to occur, and words extending an invitation to
the recipient to attend the wedding and celebrate the occasion.
One might argue that receiving an invitation to a same-sex wedding
could enlighten recipients about the nature of same-sex weddings or
influence how they feel about their permissibility, but these are akin
to secondary messages taken away, not primary ones.
This variable, however, clearly is implicated in both Hargett and
McManus. In Hargett, the disclaimer on its face directly relates to
the voting registration process and must be conveyed to those who
have not yet registered, thereby affecting a threshold decision for
many people of whether to join in a vital part of the democratic
self-governing process as a voter.521 In McManus, the factualdisclosure mandate on its face affects political advertisements—
content designed to sway and influence potential voters. 522
In Hargett, the speakers are forced to convey a factual message
(namely, that what they are saying to potential registrants “is not
made in conjunction with or authorized by the secretary of state”)
523
that may, as Judge Trauger pointed out, detrimentally impact
their ability, as citizens participating in the democratic process via

519

See generally Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2019); Brush
& Nib Studios v. City of Phx., 448 P.3d 890 (Ariz. 2019).
520
See Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 775; Brush & Nib Studios, 448 P.3d at 930.
521
League of Women Voters v. Hargett, 400 F. Supp. 3d 706, 720 (M.D. Tenn. 2019).
522
Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 510–11 (4th Cir. 2019).
523
Hargett, 400 F. Supp. 3d at 712–13 (construing TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-132,
repealed by H. B. 2363, 111th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2020).
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voter registration drive, to sign up potential voters. 524 In other
words, the power of citizens acting in a political capacity is harmed
by the government’s message. In contrast, the benefit to listeners
from hearing the message appears de minimis. The compelled
information does not, on its face, inform them in any way about how
to register to vote or the benefits of voting.525 If the information is,
in fact, relevant in some way to the voting process, then the government would need to prove that during the actual application of
judicial scrutiny.526 In brief, there appears to be little evidence to
rebut the presumption on this variable that strict scrutiny provides
the appropriate test.
In McManus, the compelled-speech mandate guards against
what Meiklejohn called the “mutilation of the thinking process”527
by providing factual information to voters about who is sponsoring political ads.528 This information may help voters to better
sort out the possible motives behind such ads by knowing who is
advocating the positions the ads espouse. In brief, the information
may foster “the voting of wise decisions”529 by providing greater
context to voters for understanding them. The depth of the compelled-speech interference with speakers’ autonomy as independent
political actors is arguably minimal, as it involves disclosing only
names (of ad purchasers) and prices.
On the other hand, Maryland’s law compromises the independence of news organizations as political actors by using them to
convey factual information that that state deems important.530
The fact that the news outlets do not cast votes for candidates and
may be corporations seemingly does not lessen this concern, particularly in light of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.531
The Court there affirmed the extension of First Amendment political
524

Id. at 730 (noting that “the disclaimer is designed to highlight the speaker’s lack of
authority”).
525
Id. at 734.
526
See id. at 730.
527
M EIKLEJOHN, supra note 245, at 26; see also supra notes 248–49 and
accompanying text.
528
See Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 511 (4th Cir. 2019).
529
M EIKLEJOHN, supra note 245, at 25.
530
See McManus, 944 F.3d at 518.
531
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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speech rights to corporations.532 Adding to the gravity of the
intrusion on the speakers’ rights in McManus is the fact that the
speakers are members of the press, thereby putting into play a fifth
First Amendment interest addressed below: That of protecting an
autonomous press—one that plays a watchdog role on the government—from government incursions on its editorial decisions and
judgments.533 This illustrates why a holistic, totality-of-the-circumstances approach to scrutiny selection that involves consideration
of multiple variables is important. Viewed together, consideration
of both the First Amendment interest in facilitating democratic
self-governance and the First Amendment interest in protecting an
autonomous press suggest that strict scrutiny may be warranted,
especially given the presumption on the former variable that strict
scrutiny applies.
Of course, any such conclusion must be considered along with
the fact that, on the first variable addressed in Part II (the anti-orthodoxy interest), only factual information is being compelled by
Maryland’s statute, thus militating in favor of a deferential standard
of review in McManus on that variable.534 Additionally, the Article
contended that the second variable (the self-realization interest
through the receipt of speech) tilted toward a deferential form of
review.535 Furthermore, as noted above, consideration in McManus
of the third variable—the First Amendment interest in the discovery
of factual knowledge—also suggests that deferential review is
warranted.536 In other words, when the anti-orthodoxy interest, the
self-realization interest and the interest in the discovery of factual
knowledge are considered collectively, along with the interests
addressed in this Section and below in Section E, then a judge
might reasonably find that intermediate scrutiny applies, given the
seemingly equal significance of the countervailing interests.

532

Id. at 899.
See McManus, 944 F.3d at 515. See also infra Section II.E; supra note 220 and
accompanying text (addressing the watchdog role of the press).
534
See supra Section II.A.
535
See supra Section II.B.
536
See supra Section II.C.
533
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E. The First Amendment Interest in Protecting an Autonomous
Press
In cases such as Tornillo and McManus, the First Amendment
interest in protecting the editorial autonomy and independence
of news organizations under the Press Clause comes into play.537
These cases are about more than just free speech; they are also about
a free press. Of the 2019 cases addressed in this Article, only
McManus raises Free Press concerns that trigger this variable.538
The guiding principle here is that the greater the intrusion into
the editorial autonomy of a news entity caused by a compelledspeech mandate, the greater is the reason to apply strict scrutiny to
measure that mandate’s validity.539 In considering this variable,
courts should closely benchmark the facts of the case before them
with those in Tornillo.
The Article, in Section B of Part I, illustrated that there are,
in fact, seemingly critical differences between Tornillo and
McManus.540 Those distinctions suggest that the intrusion into
editorial autonomy interests is much more severe in Tornillo than it
is in McManus. This, in turn, provides some reason for pushing back
against the application of strict scrutiny—at least, on this variable
standing alone—in McManus. The true key for the application of
this factor, if courts were to adopt it when deciding scrutiny, is
whether they perceive the ruling in Tornillo as creating an absolute,
bright-line rule against any governmental intrusions into journalistic
decision making (thus necessitating strict scrutiny) or whether they
view it as less absolute in nature and as simply raising a danger to
be guarded against. Laws such as Maryland’s statute, by not compelling the transmission of a political viewpoint to which a newspaper objects, provide an entrée for courts to engage in a more refined
and nuanced approach for interpreting Tornillo. To the extent
Tornillo is still perceived as absolute, however, then this factor
militates in favor of applying strict scrutiny in McManus.
537

See supra text accompanying notes 214–20 (addressing the Supreme Court’s focus on
editorial autonomy from the government in Tornillo).
538
See supra Section II.B.
539
Id.
540
See supra text accompanying note 231 (drawing distinctions between Tornillo and
McManus).
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In summary, this Part proposed five First Amendment interests
that courts should consider when determining scrutiny in compelledspeech cases not involving commercial expression. Furthermore,
it illustrated how those interests might come into play and be
analyzed in the 2019 rulings addressed in Part I. In the process of
addressing these factors, courts should also benchmark the facts of
the cases before them with those in U.S. Supreme Court rulings
involving compelled-speech obligations.
In some situations, not all five interests will be relevant.
For instance, this Part suggested that in Wheeler, two factors—the
anti-orthodoxy interest and the discovery of factual knowledge
interest—militated in favor of applying a deferential form of
scrutiny to Portland’s placard ordinance, while the other three
factors—self-realization through the receipt of speech, democratic
self-governance, and press autonomy—were irrelevant. In brief,
something akin to rational basis review was more appropriate
in Wheeler.
On the other hand, the Article argued that all five interests were
relevant in McManus. The anti-orthodoxy, self-realization, and
discovery of factual knowledge interests tilt toward a deferential
form of review, while the democratic self-governance and press
autonomy interests lean toward strict scrutiny. Another First
Amendment interest not among the five here, but one noted above
that may be relevant in some cases, including McManus, is safeguarding the First Amendment interest in anonymous political
speech.541 In McManus, the First Amendment interest in protecting
the anonymity of advertising buyers would tilt toward strict scrutiny.
In cases such as McManus, where multiple factors lean one way and
multiple factors lean the other direction, it suggests that intermediate
scrutiny is most relevant because it neither stacks the deck against a
compelled-speech law (strict scrutiny) or gives it a virtual free pass
(rational basis review or something similar to the Zauderer test).
Such a nuanced approach to selecting scrutiny thus is the benefit of
an interests-and-values methodology.

541

See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text (noting the Fourth Circuit’s concern
with anonymity in Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019).
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CONCLUSION

All compelled-speech cases simply are not alike. Some involve
political speech; others do not. Some compel the dissemination
of government-scripted messages, while others mandate the disclosure of facts that will necessarily vary from situation to situation,
such as revealing the names of those buying advertisements and the
prices they paid. Some involve only Speech Clause interests, while
others involve a combination of Speech Clause and Press Clause
concerns, thereby putting two First Amendment clauses into play.
Additionally, some require speech that publicly stigmatizes
and humiliates an individual based on past bad acts, while others
simply deprecate buildings based on the nature of their construction
technique and therefore harm their owners’ fiscal interests. In other
words, there may be dignity harms in some cases, while there
may be financial ones in others. Finally, some compelled-speech
battles pit an individual’s ability to be free from conveying a
message that conflicts with his deeply held religious beliefs against
the ability of others to live in a non-hostile world that does not
discriminate against and demean them based upon their sexual
orientation. The differences among these scenarios, at least at first
blush, are seemingly substantive ones, not merely superficial distinctions. They are distinctions that might make a difference when
it comes to the standard of judicial review.
Yet, with the lone exception of the related rulings by both U.S.
District Judge Vince Chhabria and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in the public-facing art case of Building Industry Association,542 one might well be forgiven for believing they all feature
identical facts and all raise the same heightened level of First
Amendment concerns about invading a person or an entity’s right
not to speak. That is because courts in all the other cases analyzed
here—admittedly, a small sample, but one purposefully chosen to
involve disputes featuring a diverse range of facts and compelledspeech mandates—deployed strict scrutiny.

542

Bldg. Indus. Ass’n–Bay Area v. City of Oakland, 289 F. Supp. 3d 1056 (N.D. Cal.
2018), aff’d, 775 F. App’x. 348 (9th Cir. 2019).
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This does not mean that strict scrutiny was necessarily the wrong
standard in all the disputes. For instance, the Article contends that
Judge Treadwell was correct in Long in selecting strict scrutiny, but
largely because he examined—in advance of choosing that test—the
weaknesses of the sheriff’s interest in compelling speech and a quartet of reasons (ones beyond the simple content-based nature of the
mandate) why strict scrutiny was justified.543 On the other hand,
strict scrutiny may not have been the optimal test in other cases. In
particular, the Article makes the case for applying a more deferential
test in McManus—namely intermediate scrutiny.544 It also argues
that applying strict scrutiny in Wheeler can be viewed as unnecessary and wrongheaded—a weaponization and Lochnerization of the
First Amendment to attack a public-safety disclosure ordinance that
involved fact-based signs measuring less than one square foot.545
Furthermore, the Article demonstrates that embracing a methodology for selecting strict scrutiny that pivots on whether a law is content-based or content-neutral is problematic due to its malleability
in the public accommodations law cases of Telescope Media Group
and Brush & Nib Studios, where the majorities and dissents fractured over whether, in fact, the laws were content-based or contentneutral as applied to the plaintiffs’ speech-based products. 546
Additionally, the Article illustrated how evaluating the First
Amendment interest in safeguarding self-realization through the
receipt of speech indicates that strict scrutiny was unwarranted—
intermediate scrutiny, instead, was more appropriate—in Telescope
Media Group and Brush & Nib Studios, with the self-realization
interest pushing back forcefully against the anti-orthodoxy interest
of the plaintiffs in those cases.547
Ultimately, this Article reveals that strict scrutiny today is the
default standard of review in compelled-speech cases not involving

543

See supra Section I.D (addressing Long).
See supra text accompanying notes (making the argument for a lesser standard of
scrutiny in McManus).
545
See supra text accompanying notes 93–107 (arguing that Magistrate Judge Acosta’s
decision in Wheeler to select scrutiny was incorrect, as it weaponized the First Amendment
against a fact-based, health-and-safety regulation).
546
See supra Section I.E (addressing Telescope Media Group and Brush & Nib Studios).
547
See supra Section II.B.
544
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either the disclosure of non-controversial facts in commercial
speech settings (Zauderer cases) or informed-consent provisions
incidental to professional medical procedures (Casey cases).
Perhaps the most direct articulation of the guiding rule was by the
Eighth Circuit in Telescope Media Group: “Laws that compel
speech . . . are subject to strict scrutiny.”548 The Supreme Court of
Arizona majority in Brush & Nib Studios favorably quoted that
rule.549 The federal district court in McManus spelled out a similar
clear-cut rule, although later pointing out that it was subject to
exceptions: “laws compelling speech are treated as content-based
and are subject to strict scrutiny.”550 Likewise, the federal district
court in Wheeler adopted this rule, albeit carving out a caveat
for Zauderer-like cases involving commercial speech: “a regulation
that compels a disclosure is a content-based regulation of speech,
subject to heightened scrutiny, unless an exception applies.” 551
The court in Wheeler also made it evident that the “heightened
scrutiny” standard to which it referred was, indeed, strict scrutiny.552
And in her dissent in Telescope Media Group, Judge Kelly articulated a variation of same rule, but qualifying it with the word “ordinarily” to suggest it is rebuttable: “when the government compels
an individual to engage in speech the individual otherwise would
find objectionable, this ordinarily constitutes a content-based regulation triggering strict scrutiny.”553All in all then, strict scrutiny is
the presumptive test today in compelled-speech cases.554
The situation surely will remain this way if courts ritualistically
follow a traditional, reductionist approach to deciding scrutiny
under which content-based laws, as compared to content-neutral
548

Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 754 (8th Cir. 2019).
Brush & Nib Studios, LC v. City of Phx., 448 P.3d 890, 913 (Ariz. 2019).
550
Wash. Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d 272, 287 (D. Md. 2019).
551
Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1296 (D. Or. 2019).
552
See id. at 1305 (“As noted above, the placard provision in the Ordinance is a contentbased regulation of non-commercial speech, and therefore, is invalid unless Defendants
can survive strict scrutiny.”).
553
Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 772 (Kelly, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
554
This comports with Professor Genevieve Lakier’s observation that in compelledspeech cases, the Court tends these days to make “a sort of a metaphysical claim, that any
time the government compels speech, we have to apply strict scrutiny.” Genevieve Lakier,
Commentary: Post-Panel Commentary, 13 FIU L. R EV. 853, 860 (2019).
549
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ones, are presumptively subject to strict scrutiny.555The Supreme
Court’s 2018 compelled-speech rulings in Janus and Becerra, when
coupled with the Court’s 2015 decision in Reed, buttress the principle that heightened review should apply in compelled-speech
cases that do not fall within the narrow parameters of the Zauderer
or Casey exceptions recognized in Becerra.556
Returning to the questions posed in the Introduction, the
primary methodology for selecting scrutiny was, then, both to cite
the principle that content-based laws are subject to strict scrutiny
and to conclude that the compelled-speech mandates in question
were content-based and thus subject to that test.557 The problems
with this methodology are that:
(1) strict scrutiny may not be appropriate—may be too
stringent of a test—given the competing First Amendment interests
at stake in any given case and, more specifically, in the cases
examined here of Wheeler, McManus, Media Telescope Group, and
Brush & Nib Studios, and
(2) it can be manipulated to serve political or cultural
ideologies in some settings where there is room for disagreement as
to whether a law is content-based or content-neutral, such as the
cases of Telescope Media Group and Brush & Nib Studios
analyzed in this Article.
The Article also illustrated that the Court’s decision in Becerra
played a key role in buttressing the selection of strict scrutiny in

555

See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral and
Content/Viewpoint Determinations, 34 M C GEORGE L. REV. 595, 596 (2003) (“The
distinction between content-based and content neutral government actions is fundamental
to free speech doctrine. A content-based government speech restriction receives the most
rigorous scrutiny, which is almost always fatal. By contrast, a content neutral speech
restriction receives much more lenient intermediate review.”).
556
See supra text accompanying notes 21–41 and 80–81 (addressing Janus, Becerra
and Reed).
557
See Brush & Nib Studios, LC v. City of Phx., 448 P.3d 890, 913–14 (Ariz. 2019);
Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 752–54 (8th Cir. 2019); League of Women
Voters v. Hargett, 400 F. Supp. 3d 706, 729–30 (M.D. Tenn. 2019); Wash. Post v.
McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d 272, 286–87 (D. Md. 2019); Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v.
Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1296 (D. Or. 2019).
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Wheeler,558 McManus,559 and Hargett.560 Furthermore, Janus was
cited by the courts in selecting that test in McManus,561 Long,562
and Telescope Media Group.563 The Ninth Circuit in Building
Industry Association, however, distinguished Janus from the case
before it, limiting Janus’s reach to disputes involving the subsidization of private speech.564
Because compelled-speech mandates invariably require
messages that relate to a particular topic or specific subject
matter—be it unreinforced masonry structures (Wheeler), political
advertisements (McManus), voter-registration drives (Hargett),
or a person’s status as a sex offender (Long)—they are almost
automatically subject to strict scrutiny under the methodology
adopted by most courts here. As Justice Breyer explained in Becerra
in pushing back against this formulaic tack for scrutiny in
compelled-speech cases, “[v]irtually every disclosure law could
be considered ‘content based,’ for virtually every disclosure law requires individuals ‘to speak a particular message.’” 565 Magistrate
Judge Acosta certainly embraced this formulaic notion, citing
Becerra for the principle that “a regulation that compels a disclosure
is a content-based regulation of speech.”566
Furthermore, when courts conclude that anti-discrimination
laws affecting public accommodations compel a person to create
expressive products that convey a specific message (Telescope
Media Group and Brush & Nib Studios), those laws too (in the
majorities’ view) must face strict scrutiny, at least as applied to the
558

Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d at 1296. Acosta referred to Becerra as NIFLA in shortcitation references. See also supra text accompanying notes 88–90.
559
McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 297. See also supra text accompanying notes 194–95.
560
Hargett, 400 F. Supp. 3d at 729–30.
561
McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 297. See also supra text accompanying notes 185–89.
562
Supra notes 272–73 and accompanying text.
563
Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 752–54 (8th Cir. 2019). See also supra
text accompanying notes 344–45.
564
See Bldg. Indus. Ass’n–Bay Area v. City of Oakland, 775 F. App’x.. 348, 350
(9th Cir. 2019).
565
Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2380 (2018) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (citing Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234–35 (2015)).
566
Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1296 (D. Or. 2019)
(citing Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371; Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 916 F.3d
755–56 (9th Cir. 2019)).
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creation of those artifacts by individuals who raise religious-based
objections and when courts view the speech products as expressing
the views of those who create them, not customers. How a court
should determine who is speaking through such products—by
focusing on the extent of editorial control and judgment left to the
vendor or by asking how a reasonable person would perceive who
is speaking based on the finished product—remains highly
problematic in this approach, as the fracture over which method
applies between the majority and dissent in Telescope Media Group
indicates.567 Additionally, Judge Bales’s dissent in Brush & Nib
Studios argued that the perception of the observer of the speech is
critical, whereas the majority reasoned that it made no difference.568
Surviving strict scrutiny is “the legal equivalent of sinking a
basket from half-court”569—an exceedingly difficult task, as noted
earlier.570 Its deployment creates a steep, uphill battle for democratically elected lawmakers who believe they must inform the public
about certain information. To wit, Portland’s placard ordinance was
enjoined in Wheeler.571 Maryland’s law compelling newspapers to
publish the identity of ad buyers and the prices they paid was
enjoined in McManus.572 Tennessee’s voting-registration disclaimer
requirement was enjoined in Hargett.573 A Georgia sheriff’s warning sign mandate about sex offenders was enjoined in Long.574
And the majorities in both Telescope Media Group and Brush &
Nib Studios found that public accommodations laws protecting
people from discrimination based on their sexual orientation failed
strict scrutiny.575

567

Supra notes 395388–96 and accompanying text.
448 P.3d 890, 929–33 (Ariz. 2019). See also supra notes 420388–30 and
accompanying text.
569
Wynter K. Miller & Benjamin E. Berkman, The Future of Physicians’ First
Amendment Freedom: Professional Speech in an Era of Radically Expanded Prenatal
Genetic Testing, 76 W ASH & L EE L. REV. 577, 608 (2019).
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Supra notes 51388–55 and accompanying text.
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Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1312 (D. Or. 2019).
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Wash. Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d 272, 278 (D. Md. 2019).
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League of Women Voters v. Hargett, 400 F. Supp. 3d 706, 710 (M.D. Tenn. 2019).
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Reed v. Long, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1365, 1381 (M.D. Ga. 2019).
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Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 748 n.4 (8th Cir. 2019).
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Given its power, strict scrutiny thus should not be trotted
out lightly or formulaically by one branch of government—the
judiciary—to target the work of another—the legislature—simply
because a compelled-speech mandate, such as one notifying citizens about a building’s structure in the interest of protecting them
from possible harm, is content-based. One possible alternative is
for judges to:
(1) consider the First Amendment interests and values implicated by any given compelled-speech mandate; and
(2) benchmark the mandate against the treatment of those same
First Amendment interests and values in key Supreme Court
rulings involving compelled speech such as Barnette, Wooley,
Tornillo, Hurley, Becerra, and Janus where the Court declared
invalid compelled-speech obligations.
Part II identified five First Amendment interests and values that
courts might consider in such a methodology. It is an approach
under which the determination that a regulation is content-based
does not, standing alone, create a presumption that strict scrutiny
applies and that, concomitantly, the regulation is presumptively
invalid. A more nuanced and flexible tack, in other words, should
be adopted that selects a scrutiny standard based on a thorough and
holistic evaluation of the First Amendment interests at stake and on
an examination of how those same interests were treated by the
Supreme Court in prior compelled-speech cases.
Adopting a First Amendment interests approach, of course, has
drawbacks. First, it lacks the consistency and predictability of the
Court’s predominant scrutiny methodology under which contentbased laws are subject to strict scrutiny unless an exception applies.
Judges may view First Amendment interests and values differently,
thus adding a degree of subjectivity to the selection-of-scrutiny process. Second, it entails a more time-consuming task for judges. They
must ferret out the competing interests at stake, as well as the nature
and depth of the incursions into the province of the First Amendment, before picking a scrutiny standard. The constitutional territory
may, depending on the case, involve evaluating not simply interests
in free speech, but also—as in Tornillo and McManus—interests in
a free press that might be gored by a compelled-speech obligation.
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This adds an additional level of analysis. In brief, while the principle
that a content-based law is subject to strict scrutiny provides a shortcut tool for selecting the test that applies, thereby allowing judges to
devote greater time and energy to the subsequent application of the
test, an interests-and-objectives methodology requires that judges
expend significant effort on both selecting and applying scrutiny.
In other words, time must be spent both upfront on choosing the
relevant scrutiny test and then down the road on applying it.
This more nuanced approach to choosing scrutiny additionally
requires, as noted above, that judges benchmark the compelledspeech cases before them against the facts, interests, and values at
stake in major U.S. Supreme Court compelled-speech decisions.576
For instance, Justice Kagan in Janus contrasted the facts there
to those in Barnette and found them dissimilar, thus bolstering
her argument that the Janus majority was wrong in choosing
heightened scrutiny to review Illinois’s agency-fee statute. 577 In the
compelled-art case of Building Industry Association addressed
earlier in this Article, Judge Chhabria engaged in substantial benchmarking against Supreme Court precedent. In particular, he cited
Wooley, Barnette, and Tornillo as cases where the Court “closely
scrutinized”578 compelled-speech measures and “applied heightened
First Amendment scrutiny.”579 The case before him, he concluded,
did “not raise any of the red flags discussed” in those decisions.580
Additionally, Chhabria found that the case before him did not, in
quoting Justice Breyer, “otherwise ‘significantly affect the interests
that the First Amendment protects.’”581 In brief, by distinguishing
576

In addition to the U.S. Supreme Court compelled-speech decisions addressed earlier
in this article—namely, Becerra, Janus, Wooley, Barnette, Tornillo, Hurley and
Rumsfeld—other important high court rulings affecting the right not to speak (including
expressive association cases) that should be used as points of comparison include Boy
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) and Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind,
487 U.S. 781 (1988).
577
Janus v. Am. Fed’n of St., Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2494 (2018) (Kagan,
J., dissenting).
578
Bldg. Indus. Ass’n–Bay Area v. City of Oakland, 289 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1060
(N.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d, 775 F. App’x. 348 (9th Cir. 2019).
579
Id.
580
Id.
581
Id. (quoting Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017)
(Breyer, J., concurring)).
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key Supreme Court rulings in compelled-speech cases from the
dispute he was tasked with resolving, Chhabria was able to conclude
that the ordinance was not subject to strict scrutiny and, instead, was
only subject to a form of rational basis review. 582
In affirming that decision, the Ninth Circuit also benchmarked
the law at issue in Building Industry Association with Supreme
Court rulings. Specifically, the appellate court observed that Oakland’s ordinance was distinguished from that in Wooley because it
did “not endorse any specific viewpoint.” 583 Similarly, the Ninth
Circuit contrasted compelled-art measure before it with Janus,
noting that Oakland’s measure did not “compel the subsidy of
private speech.”584 This analysis facilitated the appellate court’s
conclusion that heightened scrutiny was not warranted.585
A problem with this approach, however, is that judges can
interpret the same landmark cases in markedly different ways.
That is dramatically illustrated by Telescope Media Group, in
which the majority cited Tornillo and Hurley to support the
application of strict scrutiny,586 while the dissent distinguished both
Tornillo and Hurley from the case before it.587 Adopting an interests-and-values approach that involves benchmarking with key
Supreme Court cases thus requires, in some instances, tolerating
more subjectivity in selecting scrutiny than usually occurs with the
content-based-versus-content-neutral formula.
The bottom line for now, however, is that Reed, Becerra, and
Janus potently combine to create a presumptively strict scrutiny
world for compelled-speech mandates, regardless of the underlying
First Amendment interests and values at stake. Justice Kagan certainly was correct when she observed in Janus that most compelled-

582

See id. (“Therefore, the ordinance is subject to review under the First Amendment
only to ensure that it is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”).
583
Bldg. Indus. Ass’n–Bay Area v. City of Oakland, 775 F. App’x. 348, 350
(9th Cir. 2019).
584
Id.
585
See id. (“However, that the First Amendment is implicated does not alone necessitate
analysis under exacting scrutiny. We find the compelled speech precedents put forth by
BIA inapposite to the regulatory framework at hand.”).
586
Supra notes 352–64 and accompanying text.
587
Supra notes 376–86 and accompanying text.
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speech cases do not feature facts nearly as disturbing as those in
Barnette about compelling a child to salute the government’s flag
and utter an oath pledging allegiance to it.588 Yet, setting aside the
outlier that is Building Industry Association, one would never know
it based on the pervasive selection of the Court’s most stringent
test—strict scrutiny—to measure the validity of compelled-speech
measures involving non-commercial expression in 2019.

588

Janus v. Am. Fed’n of St., Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2494 (2018)
(Kagan, J., dissenting).

